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vThere have been many calls for better evidence and better use of evidence 
in health policy making in specific countries and internationally. Much 
attention has been paid to the variable quality of policy-relevant research, 
the claims to validity of different research designs, and the independence 
and conflicts of interest of researchers (Cartwright and Hardie 2012; 
Evans 2003; Marmot 2004; Petticrew and Roberts 2003). However, dif-
ferences in the availability of independent, high quality, research only pro-
vides one of several possible answers to the complex problem of explaining 
why some policies in particular contexts, and at certain points in time, 
appear to be more aligned with evidence from research than others.
It is an empirical observation that the idea and rhetoric of ‘evidence- 
based’, or ‘evidence-informed’ policymaking are more prevalent in some 
countries and in some policy fields than others. In Britain, for example, 
evidence-informed policy became an official government aspiration since 
the 1999 White Paper “Modernising Government” (HM Government 
1999), while in Germany official discourse is largely unaffected by explicit 
appeals to evidence per se; although in practice there are many examples 
in which experts, expertise and research contribute to policy decisions. 
The health sector particularly embraces the language of evidence use, 
given its successful history of shaping clinical practice through the embrace 
of the methods of ‘evidence based medicine’ (Klein 2000; Berridge and 
Stanton 1999) – and the experience of the medical field has led to calls for 
other sectors to emulate its methods and approach to evidence use (HM 
Government 2013). Indeed, global health advocacy is often built around 
scientific expertise and evidence in the form of research findings, which 
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play a crucial role in informing decisions of international organisations 
such as the World Health Organization (Oxman et al. 2007; D’Souza and 
Newman 2012). Similarly, international donor agencies often utilise the 
rhetoric of evidence use to justify their aid expenditures or policy choices 
in the health sector, often presenting the image of a comprehensively 
rational ideal by which health policy decisions can or should be made.
Yet at national level, the picture is often vastly different, with local prac-
tices, partisan interests and national politics seen to stand in the way of 
better uses of evidence. In this respect, the health sector may appear no 
different from other policy fields, despite the idea that health policy deci-
sions can use evidence to guide choices the same way that clinical practice 
has done through the methods of evidence based medicine. This raises 
important questions such as: Why are some countries more likely than 
others to take account of findings from research in the development of 
health policy? Why are some more successful than others in creating, and 
institutionally embedding, an architecture that supports long-term evi-
dence use and a wider norm of evidence informed policy making? Does it 
matter whether governments have more or less executive power, com-
pared to parliaments and the judiciary, to oversee and shape policy deci-
sions? And how do we explain these differences and analyse the ‘bigger 
picture’ of evidence use in national policy and politics?
For many advocating for ‘evidence-based policymaking’ today, politics 
is conceptualised as something detrimental to evidence use. From this per-
spective, political concerns, priorities and timetables, along with party 
political interests, are hurdles that derail efforts of making policy more 
evidence informed or even more ‘rational’. However, there is often little 
clarity as to what is meant by ‘politics’ in those authors who simplify the 
concept as a ‘barrier’ to evidence use.
Increasingly, however, a number of authors investigating the relation-
ship between evidence and policy have concluded that we need to engage 
with the nature of the policy process more fully and, in particular, the 
political nature of the policy making process (Ettelt and Mays 2011; Oliver 
et  al. 2014; Strassheim and Kettunen 2014; Cairney 2016; Parkhurst 
2017). Often starting from a policy studies or public policy perspective, 
these works argue that to see politics as a simple ‘barrier’ to evidence use 
presents a false dichotomy between political and rational-technocratic 
forms of decisions making. It is also to engage in a form of wishful think-
ing that we can somehow step outside of ‘politics’ to arrive at optimal, 
evidence-led policy decisions. Politics is not the barrier to identifying the 
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correct policy path to follow (a path presumably indicated by the evidence), 
but the process through which societies identify and agree upon which 
path to take in the first place. It is a process through which policy objec-
tives, solutions to problems and resource allocation are debated, consid-
ered, agreed, or disputed. Instead of a barrier to evidence use, politics 
must be accepted as a necessary and inevitable condition of the policy 
making domain. Political contestation over values, ideas and political pri-
orities thus characterise all forms of policy decision. This is particularly so 
in the context of squeezed public finances and limited time in which not 
all demands can be met and choices must be made, between often highly 
worthy claims to public resources.
It is therefore of critical importance to health sector actors to realise 
that health policy decisions are not placed outside political systems, but 
rather made within existing political systems and institutional settings. In 
this volume we argue that it is equally critical to consider the nature of 
political systems influencing the use of, and opportunities for, evidence to 
inform health policy decisions. A public policy lens thus not only requires 
recognition of the multiplicity of social concerns at stake within a health 
policy decision, it also mandates consideration of the structures, rules, 
processes and norms, i.e. the political institutions, in place in different 
country settings to understand when, why, and how pieces of evidence 
may be used to inform health decisions.
The book is based on a five-year research project supported by the 
European Research Council entitled ‘Getting Research into Policy in 
Health’ (the GRIP-Health project) which aimed to improve the under-
standing and practices of evidence use by examining health policy pro-
cesses in six different countries. These countries were selected to allow for 
a number of comparisons both in relation to different regime types, differ-
ent levels of socio-economic development and different approaches to 
health policy-making. The book investigates how governments in these 
countries used evidence to inform policy decisions, the type of contesta-
tion policy-makers are exposed to, and the scope of actors that have an 
influence on health policy-making in various institutional forms, both 
within and beyond government. By examining evidence use in different 
country contexts we can better understand the institutional factors and 
settings that shape policy processes and therefore shape the opportunities 
for building and embedding mechanisms that institutionalise the use of 
evidence in policy processes.
viii PREFACE
It is in the nature of these types of research endeavours to start with a 
broad perspective which then becomes more focused on individual case 
study analyses. This book attempts to combine both perspectives: The first 
part brings together a number of in-depths analyses of health policy deci-
sions in individual countries, using a spread of health policy topics to 
explore the institutional dynamics in high-income countries (Germany, 
England), middle-income countries (Ghana, Colombia) and lower-income 
countries (Ethiopia, Cambodia1).
The second part provides an overview of the dynamics within relevant 
institutional settings such as the structures in which evidence use is embed-
ded in Ministries of Health, the role of parliaments and the judiciaries as 
key institutions of the (democratic) state in relation to evidence use, and 
the power divergence associated with aid dependency in low income coun-
tries and its potential impact on research uptake in policy decisions.
Chapters share a public policy perspective that is concerned with the 
political nature of contested decisions and/or the institutional structures 
in which decisions are made. Cases in each chapter apply these ideas to 
analyse or reflect on evidence use for health decision making in each set-
ting. The directions each case study or country analysis takes, however, is 
unique and a reflection of the realities of the nature of the problems and 
issues emerging in each situation. Ultimately, then, the book applies a 
multidisciplinary lens to institutional analysis of the role of evidence in 
health policy, which we hope our readers will find interesting and 
illuminating.
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CHAPTER 1
Studying Evidence Use for Health 
Policymaking from a Policy Perspective
Justin Parkhurst, Stefanie Ettelt, and Benjamin Hawkins
IntroductIon
Individuals working within the health sector very often see their work as 
guided by collectively shared normative values. In particular there is an 
overarching goal of improving people’s health. Indeed the field of public 
health has been defined as “the science and art of preventing disease, pro-
longing life and promoting health through organized efforts of society” 
(Acheson 1988, p. 1). This is often linked, either implicitly or explicitly, 
to a concern for improving health equity (or reducing health inequali-
ties) – for instance within the World Health Organization’s calls to achieve 
‘health for all’ (Detels and Tan 2015; Whitehead 1991). In recent decades, 
efforts to improve population health and to reduce health inequalities 
within countries and globally between states, have been linked with calls 
for evidence based policy (EBP). Drawing on the idea of evidence based 
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2 
medicine (EBM), health policy actors see engagement with policy-relevant 
evidence to identify more effective, and by extension cost effective, inter-
ventions as the way to achieve their overarching policy objectives.
EBM as a concept is based on the idea that medicine should be prac-
ticed by making “conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best 
evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients” (Sackett 
et al. 1996, p. 71). The origin of this idea is often attributed to Archie 
Cochrane, who wrote in the early 1970s about the need to use evidence of 
effectiveness to guide clinical practice (Cochrane 1972), although it was in 
1993 that the formal establishment of the Cochrane Collaboration further 
served to provide both a global repository of evidence for specific clinical 
interventions, and an authority for best practices on how to review or 
select evidence to inform medical practice (Starr et al. 2009).
The notion of ‘conscientious, explicit, and judicious’ evidence use is 
relevant to consider in this context. From the earliest origins of the EBM 
movement, there was recognition that it is not necessarily appropriate to 
rely solely on research evidence when making decisions on diagnoses and 
medical treatment. Professional experience and judgement on the part of 
medical practitioners, in light of the evidence base and relevant inferences 
from this, remain important (Sackett et al. 1996). However, over time, the 
principles of EBM have gravitated towards specific types of evidence with 
clear preferences for certain study designs  – encapsulated in so-called 
‘hierarchies of evidence’ (Petticrew and Roberts 2003) – reflecting con-
cerns about the internal validity of studies and the potential for biased 
outcomes that, in medicine, “routinely lead to false positive conclusions 
about efficacy” (Sackett et al. 1996, p. 72).
The EBM movement has, overall, been heralded as a triumph and is 
credited with ensuring that medical treatments produce beneficial results, 
particularly compared to the past, when many interventions were pro-
moted solely on the basis of hypotheses of potential cause and effect that 
may, in fact, have been incorrect (Howick 2011). The Academy of Medical 
Royal Colleges, for instance, has argued that EBM “is the key to the suc-
cess of modern Healthcare” (Sense About Science and Academy of Royal 
Medical Colleges 2013, p. 1), co-authoring a report providing examples of 
how EBM has improved health outcomes on a range of issues from HIV/
AIDS treatment to emergency allergy care and mental health treatment 
(Sense About Science and Academy of Royal Medical Colleges 2013).
The success of EBM has been seen by many authors as the inspiration 
for calls to expand the concept to other forms of decision making  including 
‘evidence based policymaking’ in health and other social policy areas 
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(Berridge and Stanton 1999; Wright et al. 2007; Lin and Gibson 2003; 
Parkhurst 2017). This is despite recognition of the challenges in appropri-
ating ideas from clinical practice and applying them to shape policymaking 
processes. For example, Black (2001) urged the medical community to 
‘proceed with care’ with the idea of evidence based policy due to the quali-
tatively different nature of policymaking compared to medicine. A num-
ber of other authors have similarly argued that the political realities of 
policy decisions mean policy cannot simply be ‘based’ on evidence in the 
same way as clinical decisions and that the notion of a linear-rational rela-
tionship between evidence and policy is a fallacy (c.f. Lewis 2003; 
Hammersley 2005; Greenhalgh and Russell 2009).
Russell et al. (2008), for example, have explained that:
…academic debate on health care policy-making continues to be couched in 
the dominant discourse of evidence-based medicine, whose underlying 
assumptions – that policies are driven by facts rather than values and these 
can be clearly separated; that ‘evidence’ is context-free, can be objectively 
weighed up and placed unproblematically in a ‘hierarchy’; and that policy- 
making is essentially an exercise in decision science. (p. 40)
These messages appear to have had only limited impact on the concep-
tual vocabulary of health policy making and scholarship. Despite these 
warnings, the language of ‘evidence based policymaking’ has become 
firmly established in health policy discourses, particularly in the United 
Kingdom (UK), Canada, and within many global health networks. As 
such, recent publications have continued to critique examples of the over-
simplified or idealised embrace of evidence on which to ‘base’ policy (c.f. 
Hammersley 2013; Cartwright and Hardie 2012; Parkhurst 2017). In 
addition, recent systematic reviews have found limited engagement with 
the political nature of policymaking to help explain evidence use. Oliver, 
Innvaer, and Lorenc (2014a) concluded from one such review that while 
studies of evidence use have spread from health to other sectors, few works 
actually engage with aspects of the policy process or provide sufficient 
details to draw firm conclusions. In a related paper, the authors argue that:
The agenda of ‘getting evidence into policy’ has side-lined the empirical 
description and analysis of how research and policy actually interact in vivo. 
Rather than asking how research evidence can be made more influential, 
academics should aim to understand what influences and constitutes policy, 
and produce more critically and theoretically informed studies of decision- 
making. (Oliver et al. 2014b, p. 1)
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Another review by Liverani et  al. (2013) (undertaken as part of the 
research programme making up this volume), similarly reviewed literature 
on evidence use related to health policymaking and found few examples 
that explicitly addressed politics to help explain the use of evidence to 
inform health policymaking.
Given this state of affairs, this book aims to contribute to a greater 
understanding of the political nature of policymaking and how it shapes 
the potential for, and resultant outcomes of, evidence use in health policy-
making. In particular, we focus on scientific evidence arising from research 
and related systematic processes of data collection (e.g. data collection for 
monitoring the health system) as our principle subject. This is because, 
while we recognise that the term ‘evidence’ can take many meanings – 
including personal experience and legal argumentation – it is the formal 
results of research activity and the application of the scientific method that 
have been seen as essential to the aspirations of both the EBM and the 
EBP movements.
We argue that while policy advocates have pursued their normative 
goals of improving health outcomes through ‘better’ policymaking, asso-
ciated with reliance on research evidence, this has brought about a dis-
course that too narrowly focuses on certain conceptions of what counts as 
policy-relevant evidence. In addition, it overstates the role which evidence 
is able to play in the policy making process whilst paying insufficient atten-
tion to the politics of that process, including the competition of values, 
ideologies, and policy objectives which cannot themselves be determined 
by recourse to evidence.
There is thus a need to examine the complex interrelationship of evi-
dence use and politics to form a more nuanced conception of the health 
policy process. This starts from an explicit recognition of the fundamen-
tally political nature of the policy process that recognises that, while evi-
dence can and should be an important factor informing policy debates, it 
cannot provide the sole basis for policy decisions or is usually insufficiently 
suited to resolve policy conflicts.
The Multiple Meanings of ‘Use’ of Research Evidence
The point of departure for developing our conceptualisation of how evi-
dence informs policy is to start by questioning what it means to ‘use’ evi-
dence in policymaking. Unlike clinical decision making, which often 
involves a choice between clearly circumscribed interventions for a fairly 
J. PARKHURST ET AL.
 5
specific purpose (to improve patient outcomes), using evidence to inform 
policy usually does not fit this model. More often than not, policy is not a 
clearly delineated object, and there may be disagreement not just about 
the preferred policy ‘solution’, but also about the nature and definition of 
the problem to be addressed.
That evidence use in policymaking is not entirely compatible with 
notions of instrumental rationality has been known for some time. Indeed, 
Carol Weiss (1979) described a number of different meanings of research 
utilisation in the late 1970s. She discusses social science research more 
widely, but her models of research use are conducive to health policy 
research as well. In particular, she identifies seven variants of research utili-
sation, including a ‘knowledge-driven’ model in which basic research 
identifies new social problems; a ‘political’ model in which research is stra-
tegically used to achieve pre-existing goals; and an ‘enlightenment’ model 
in which research influences broader thinking more generally.
The model that perhaps best aligns with the current dominant rhetoric 
in the health sector, however, is Weiss’ so-called ‘problem solving’ model 
of research utilisation, which sees direct application of a study’s findings 
(for example findings from an evaluation of an intervention) to inform a 
specific policy decision (for example, a decision about which intervention 
to fund). Weiss, however, notes that it requires a tremendous, and incred-
ibly rare, alignment of circumstances to see research used in this way. 
Indeed, this requires the identification, and agreement on the definition of 
a problem that policy and research are expected to address. In practice, of 
course, both problems and their solutions tend to be highly contested. For 
example, to some, health inequalities run counter to accepted norms of 
social justice and are thus identified as legitimate targets of government 
intervention, while for others inequalities are seen as the outcome of per-
sonal choices and thus beyond the remit of the state. Similarly, for some, 
governments are seen to have a responsibility to care for all, while for oth-
ers government intervention in health is seen as an unwelcome overreach 
or intrusion on individual and market freedoms.
Contestation between groups who have different sets of values or 
beliefs in many ways is at the heart of many theories of policy change 
which perceive policymaking as a competitive process rather than a tech-
nocratic one (Sabatier 2007; John 1998). Yet it has been argued that the 
level and nature of these competitive environments can incentivise the 
manipulation of scientific or empirical evidence to achieve desired political 
goals (Parkhurst 2016). As a result, strategic, rather than instrumental 
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uses of evidence appear commonplace in many policy arenas where politi-
cal interests exist – often decried as ‘policy-based evidence-making’ and 
seen as a fundamental challenge to the ideal rational use of evidence that 
many social sector stakeholders champion (Marmot 2004; Strassheim and 
Kettunen 2014).
Nutley et al. (2007) have also provided a comprehensive mapping of 
many potential meanings of evidence use/utilisation that includes, but 
expands on Weiss’ original concepts. They identify that “the most com-
mon image of research use is of an instrumental process that involves the 
direct application of research to policy and practice decisions” (p.  34). 
However, the authors detail a number of other ways to conceptualise 
research use beyond this simple view. This includes producing typologies 
of evidence use (similar to Weiss’ (1979) model), as well as models which 
see practices of evidence use as a continuum from more conceptual to 
more instrumental uses, or instead considering evidence use as a process 
or series of stages rather than as one or more types.
These works highlight the limitations of instrumental approaches to 
evidence use, even if this continues to be held up as an ideal in many aca-
demic and professional circles. Yet mapping the different ways research 
and evidence are used does not, on its own, explains neither why we see 
different forms of evidence use arise at different times and in different 
contexts, nor what constitutes a ‘good use of evidence’ in particular policy 
areas. This is particularly important when reflecting on the specific goals of 
health sector actors, and the common belief across that sector about how 
robust use of evidence (and in particular of research evidence) will help to 
achieve those goals. In this volume we thus attempt to move forward from 
these initial mapping exercises to directly engage with the political nature 
of policymaking to reflect on how evidence is used within the health sec-
tor. This approach allows explicit consideration of the systems in place that 
work to provide evidence to policy decision makers, or seek to improve 
evidence use in some way.
A PublIc PolIcy PersPectIve
A public policy perspective on evidence use accepts that political dimen-
sions of health policymaking will affect the relevance and use of evi-
dence within those policy processes. Yet the policy sciences are a broad 
field, consisting of a wide range of theories and concepts that can each 
be used to provide insights into policy processes and outcomes. Thus 
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calling for more public policy insights requires consideration of how 
precisely to apply this field of work to study evidence use in a compara-
tive perspective.
Previous authors have engaged with theories of policy change to help 
explain when or how evidence might be used within policy processes. Yet 
what is apparent from these works is that there is a tremendous range of 
theories that could provide insights in one or another way to this question. 
Cairney (2016) highlights the relevance of a number of theories, frame-
works, and approaches including: multiple streams theory, punctuated 
equilibrium theory, social constructionism, narrative frameworks, the 
advocacy coalitions framework, studies of policy transfer or diffusion, and 
complexity theory (see Cairney 2016, chapter 2). Cairney, however, 
embraces the usefulness of the concept of bounded rationality in particu-
lar, due to his work having a central focus on policy makers’ perspectives 
and a need to overcome the comprehensive rationality underlying the 
evidence-based policymaking thinking. Smith (2013a) reviews many of 
the same theories as Cairney, including theories of policy change, but 
focuses on the ‘power of ideas’ to shape what is considered relevant evi-
dence, and to affect the roles and actions of policy actors for two contrast-
ing health policy issues: health inequalities and tobacco control.
The variety of policy studies theories thus provides a range of explana-
tory perspectives to consider different questions about policymaking and 
policy change. For example, if one was concerned with how evidence fits 
within ongoing processes of policy change, Kingdon’s multiple streams 
approach or the Advocacy Coalitions Framework could be the most appro-
priate approaches to adopt. We are sympathetic to this wide variety of 
approaches and the insights they can provide into particular questions of 
evidence use.
However, in this volume we focus on two particular approaches derived 
from the policy sciences. First, we engage with the contested nature of 
policy decisions between multiple stakeholders who may be pursuing dif-
ferent interests, and conceptualising policy problems in different ways. 
Second we consider the influence of the political institutions that work to 
shape when and how particular forms of evidence influence policy deci-
sions in different settings. Our decision to focus on these factors arose 
primarily from a desire to explore how the political nature of the policy 
process affects evidence use in different settings; as well as a desire to 
understand which forms of evidence use arise in different institutional 
contexts.
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Politics as Power and Contestation
One of the most widespread criticisms of calls for ‘evidence based policy-
making’ comes from authors who point to the inherently contested nature 
of policy decisions. Unlike in clinical decision situations, policy is, as 
Lasswell (1990 [1936]) classically observed, about ‘who gets what, when 
and how’, emphasising the possibility of conflict over the distributive 
effects of policy. Ultimately, policy-making is about power and influence, 
and the ability of policy actors to generate or withhold support and influ-
ence an outcome. It is therefore not possible to separate policymaking 
from politics. Scholars have historically noted that policymaking repre-
sents decisions, made on behalf of society, to decide on what collective 
goals that society should pursue (Brecht 1959). As such it can be argued 
that these processes require some form of democratic legitimation that 
would typically be derived from ensuring that multiple interests are articu-
lated or considered in the decision making process (even if some are 
excluded in the final choice of outcome) (Young 2000). In such a process, 
however, competing stakeholders participating in this process will seek to 
frame the terms of policy debates in way amenable to the objectives in 
order to shape decisions (Russell et al. 2008), with the recourse to ‘evi-
dence’ serving as one mechanism through which policy discourses can be 
shaped in favour of (or against) a particular outcome.
In many instances there are wide asymmetries of power between differ-
ent actors with obvious consequences for their ability to influence the defi-
nition of the policy problem, for example through issue framing, and the 
type of intervention put in place to address them (Lukes 2005). Trans- 
national corporations, for example the global tobacco and alcohol indus-
tries, have enjoyed high degrees of success in shaping policy and the wider 
debates which surround policy decisions, not simply through direct lobby-
ing, but through their use of media consultants, public relations and cor-
porate social responsibility campaigns (Hawkins and Holden 2013).
The importance of issue framing in policy debates is thus critical to 
understand, both in relation to the construction of policy-relevant concep-
tualisations of evidence and in relation to what can be achieved by appeals 
to evidence in the context of highly contested policy debates. The framing 
of an issue can shape the way in which a policy problem is seen; the very 
essence of what it ‘is’ for the observer. This affects what the correct and 
legitimate policy response to this is considered to be, and thus what is 
identified as the most relevant body of evidence in assessing the policy 
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problem under consideration and the proposed responses (c.f. Bacchi 
2009; Fischer 2003). If we accept multiple, often mutually exclusive, fram-
ings of policy problems are possible, each claiming support from different 
(sometime overlapping) bodies of evidence, then the impossibility of set-
tling policy dilemmas through recourse to the evidence becomes acutely 
apparent. This is why Russell et al. (2008) noted that it is ‘naively rational’ 
to assume that evidence can simply direct policy making in a linear way, 
with Hammersley (2013) going so far as to claim that ‘evidence- based 
policy’ is nothing more than a slogan used to discredit opponents.
Recognising the contested nature of decision making means that the 
specific form of issue contestation, the strength of relevant interests, the 
power of stakeholders and their networks, and their ability to frame prob-
lems and solutions, can be expected to play important roles in shaping 
how evidence is used within health policymaking processes. From this per-
spective, the actors involved in policymaking take centre stage analytically, 
with regard to the interest they may represent, the strategies they pursue 
and the behaviours they display to achieve their desired outcome. Focusing 
on contestation therefore allows for a deeper analysis of the role of actors, 
their interests, and agency. It also allows an alternative conceptualization 
of evidence use in policy processes. As Weiss (1979, 1991) already 
observed, actors can use evidence strategically or tactically to support a 
decision and to delegitimise other positions that are not supported by 
evidence (or by evidence of the same methodological robustness). 
Likewise, it is conceivable that evidence is used to build support and gen-
erate ‘buy-in’ and consensus, especially from audiences that are likely to 
support the notion that evidence should be a key ingredient of policy-
making. In practice such efforts can fail as well as succeed. It will therefore 
be difficult to clearly separate different uses of evidence, which may be 
simultaneously instrumental and strategic.
Lines of contestation can be studied through a variety of case study 
types, including analysis of a single health issue in a single context; of 
 multiple health issues in a single context; or for the same health issue in 
different contexts. We have examples of all of these within this volume. 
However, policy contestation is merely a starting point to apply the policy 
sciences to the study of evidence use, even with the depth of conceptual 
insights this initial step allows. Our driving interest was not only to look at 
single decision events or policy choices, but to consider longer term and 
systemic uses of evidence within the health sector. This means recognition 
that evidence use in decision making is not just a single occurrence or 
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event, but rather it is an ongoing process integral to the policy process. 
Thus the second main component to our conceptual approach is to engage 
with concepts of institutionalism in order to explore how institutions 
shape and direct the ongoing use of evidence affecting health decisions 
across multiple decision points and over longer time frames.
An Institutional Perspective to Analyse 
Evidence Use in Policy Processes
Lowndes and Roberts (2013) posit that “[i]nstitutions are central to the 
subject matter of political analysis (p. 1),” and, indeed, institutional anal-
ysis is well established in the fields of political analysis and international 
public policy comparisons, including comparisons of health systems and 
reforms (Immergut 1992; Tuohy 1999). Given its history with EBM, 
many look to the health sector in particular as leading other social sectors 
in its engagement with evidence use (Parkhurst 2017); but even in this 
field, only a small number of studies to date have directly analysed institu-
tions in relation to evidence use for policy. Some of these have focussed 
on organisational arrangements that facilitate or hinder the uptake of 
pieces of evidence; for example in relation to drug policy in England and 
Scotland (Nutley et  al. 2002), in health inequality policy in England 
(Smith 2013b), or, in relation to clinical practice, in routine nursing prac-
tice in US hospitals (Stetler et al. 2009). The interest in organisational 
arrangements is also reflected in some current work on organisational 
‘embeddedness’ of evidence use as well within health policymaking bod-
ies (c.f. Gonzales- Block 2013; Koon et al. 2013). Other work has looked 
at institutionalised processes of evidence use to inform fairly circum-
scribed sub-fields of health policy, such as coverage decisions relating to 
publicly funded health services and pharmaceuticals, with the use of 
health technology assessment (HTA) a prominent example (Garrido 
2008; Turchetti et al. 2010).
However, our own systematic review of studies on evidence use, could 
find only a limited engagement with the concept of institutions, especially 
political institutions relevant to policymaking, to help explain the use of 
evidence in policymaking in the health-related literature (Liverani et al. 
2013). This echoes an earlier finding by Nutley et al. (2002), who looked 
at public policy more broadly and concluded that “insufficient attention 
has been paid to the institutional arrangements for connecting research 
(and other evidence) to policy (p. 77).”
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Therefore, we find that a significant gap in the literature still exists to 
consider institutions more directly in relation to their role in shaping evi-
dence use for health policy making. In this volume, we draw on the 
broader concepts typical of new institutionalism, as explored by authors 
such as Peters (2005, 2008) and Lowndes and Roberts (2013), who see 
new institutionalism as a way to move beyond historical work that focussed 
solely on formal arrangements of political systems, to additionally consider 
how institutional rules, practices, and narratives work to shape policy actor 
behaviour.
From this perspective, and based on the analyses in the chapters that fol-
low, we stipulate that institutional structures, norms, practices, and narratives 
will influence evidence use in policymaking in two ways. First, institutional 
arrangements will shape the processes of policymaking and thus determine 
which actors have access to policy and whose positions are considered rele-
vant or legitimate. This can be formal, for example through stipulations as 
to who will be involved any given policy decision, or informal, with actors 
having an implicit understanding, or a shared perception, of the appropri-
ateness of who should be involved in and who excluded from the decision 
process. This focus on the roles of key policy actors helps to capture the 
institutionalised features of policy contestation in different settings, akin to 
what Peters (2005) describes as a rational choice branch of new institutional-
ism which maintains a focus on policy actors pursuing their interests within 
institutional arrangements. We have used this perspective in a number of 
different countries to analyse how different institutional arrangements 
influence which stakeholders bring evidence of different kinds to policy 
processes, often in the pursuit of particular interests.
Second, efforts to improve the use of evidence in policymaking can 
themselves lead to the creation of new structures, rules, practices, and nar-
ratives that inform future policy decisions, i.e. evidence utilisation of one 
form or another can become institutionalised, described elsewhere as 
‘governing’ how evidence is used (c.f. Hawkins and Parkhurst 2015; 
Parkhurst 2017). For example, governmental or non-governmental bod-
ies have been set up in countries with the explicit aim of generating, assess-
ing or synthesising evidence to develop a more consistent (and often a 
more instrumental) approach to evidence use in policy. In order to exer-
cise their mandate, these bodies have, over time, created a set of rules and 
practices that guide how they execute their mandates and go about their 
tasks. These rules and practices are typically accompanied by ideas about 
the ‘right’ types of evidence (e.g. the ‘hierarchy of evidence’), methods of 
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appraisal and synthesis, and ways of using them in decision-making (c.f. 
Sutherland 2001; Petrisor and Bhandari 2007; Evans 2003; Borgerson 
2009). Bodies such as these also operate with a legal framework set by 
government or legislatures, which can lead to instances where their deci-
sions may be challenged or overridden by other political institutional 
structures (c.f. Chap. 5 in this volume and Ettelt forthcoming).
Critically exploring these concepts can utilise what Peters (2005) 
describes as normative institutionalism, which applies ideas such as March 
and Olsen’s (1989, 2006) ‘logics of appropriateness’. This concept is in 
many ways the antithesis of rational choice perspectives that see individuals 
as pursuing their own interests, and instead explores how, within institu-
tional arrangements, individuals work towards outcomes guided by collec-
tive normative principles of what is seen to be the correct thing to do, or 
what is the right outcome to achieve. This can therefore be used to explore 
how practices play out within key administrative bodies in relation to domi-
nant ideas about evidence use (or about evidence-based policymaking) 
within the health sector; and further allows consideration of how alterna-
tive logics play out when health related policymaking takes place across 
institutions and policy sectors with their own distinct normative goals.
Institutions can be formal and informal, as well as explicit and implicit, 
which means that at times they can be difficult to pin down analytically or 
observe empirically. Yet all permutations may play out in important ways to 
shape evidence use in different political contexts. Rules such as legislation 
would be at the formal, explicit end of the spectrum, while narratives and 
discourses about which behaviours of policy actors are appropriate are 
more likely to be informal (and potentially implicit). In combination, insti-
tutional elements form structures and logics that shape how actors behave, 
how they relate to each other, and how they relate to policy processes, both 
individually and collectively. Ultimately these factors can play important 
roles in shaping which of the many forms of evidence use arise in different 
health policy processes – be it instrumental uses in line with idealised views 
of the health community, strategic uses by policy actors to pursue their 
interests, or some other form or combination of the types of evidence use.
outlIne of the book
The remainder of this book presents a set of chapters consisting of country 
case studies and comparative analyses that arose from a five-year research 
project supported by the European Research Council entitled ‘Getting 
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Research into Policy in Health’ (the GRIP-Health project). The project 
aimed to improve the understanding and practices of evidence use by 
examining health policy processes in six countries cutting across low, mid-
dle, and high income settings, as well as varying in their geographic loca-
tion and administrative arrangements. Specifically cases come from 
Cambodia, Colombia, Ethiopia, Germany, Ghana, and the United 
Kingdom (analysed as the UK in Chap. 7, but more narrowly focussing on 
England in other comparative chapters).
The first set of chapters presents findings from individual country- 
focussed investigations. These examined one or more health policy topics, 
as well as processes of decision making, with explicit consideration of the 
contestation of the issues and/or the institutional arrangements in place 
that end up affecting the use of evidence.
Chapter 2 presents the first of our country examples with a case study 
from Cambodia that specifically looks at the differences in evidence use for 
three contrasting health policy issues – HIV/AIDS, tobacco control, and 
performance based financing of midwifery services. The chapter illustrates 
that despite the broad rhetorical embrace of the concept of evidence based 
policymaking within the health sector, the extent to which evidence is 
used in instrumental ways can vary substantially depending on the political 
realities of specific policy topics, including competing governmental inter-
ests in issues or the conceptual framing about what evidence is meant to 
achieve in different cases. The chapter considers the differing logics of 
actors in each policy process and how these shape evidence use for differ-
ent health issues.
Chapter 3 follows with an analysis from Ethiopia that looks specifically 
at the challenges to multisectoral planning for nutrition in that country. It 
continues the concern over logics of appropriateness in relation to  evidence 
use by reflecting on how different sectors (health, agriculture, finance, 
etc.) may see their goals and thus their perceptions of policy relevant evi-
dence in different ways. The chapter also reflects on the constructed nature 
of the framing of nutrition policy in the country, which could reflect com-
peting goals between differing policy sectors. Overall it considers how 
these features make multisectoral planning, and the use of evidence within 
such planning, a challenge.
Chapter 4 presents a case from Ghana that, rather than looking at a 
specific policy topic, focusses on a key part of the evidence advisory system 
of the country. Specifically, the Chapter investigates the institutional sys-
tem in place which dictates how routine local data is used to inform annual 
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health sector planning and policy reviews. The chapter considers how the 
data and evidence review process has been institutionalised in ways that 
not only shape which data and pieces of evidence inform certain planning 
activities, but which also may have governance implications in terms of the 
systems of accountability in the country, and the role or influence of inter-
national funding agencies.
In Chap. 5, a case study in Colombia further expands the institutional 
lens to look more broadly at the role of the legislature within ongoing 
health systems reform debates. The chapter also engages directly with the 
importance of policy contestation in shaping when evidence will, or will 
not, have a role in influencing legislative outcomes. The analysis illustrates 
that even though scientific evidence was found to be available to decision 
makers, it was unable to provide common ground or positions of compro-
mise within the highly contested and fragmented health policy field.
Chapter 6 presents a case study from Germany that particularly explores 
the instrumental and strategic uses of evidence to inform debates about 
minimum service volumes in hospitals (i.e. whether facilities should have 
to provide a minimum number of procedures to be allowed to offer the 
service). The analysis illustrates how the interests of key actors can lead to 
strategic uses of evidence, but further highlights the dynamic relationship 
between evidence use and the political and institutional context, exploring 
how the legislative nature of policy-making, corporatism, and the role of 
the judiciary in Germany influence these uses of evidence in this case.
The final country case study in this section comes in Chap. 7 presenting 
the case of electronic cigarette policy in the UK. This case study focuses on 
the contested nature of policy debates, but further considers the importance 
of how alternative constructions or framings of the policy issue itself by com-
peting groups may help to explain how evidence is used. The chapter then 
discusses why appeals to particular forms of evidence do not have the impact 
that many health actors might expect. It concludes by reiterating a core 
theme of this volume that the political nature of policy debates must be 
engaged with explicitly to understand evidence use for health policymaking.
Following these country specific chapters, we present a set of three 
comparative analyses that draw lessons from across multiple country cases 
to address key themes arising from the project. Chapter 8 begins with a 
direct consideration of the institutional systems in place that work to pro-
vide evidence to inform decision making by Ministries of Health. It begins 
by considering the roles that Ministries of Health have as stewards of 
national health care, considering how this can also extend to having a 
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mandate to shape the evidence advisory systems which will inform health 
policy decisions. It then looks across all six of our country cases to con-
sider whether such systems provide relevant information in a timely man-
ner to key decision points. The chapter illustrates how key structural and 
practical differences exist between countries, and also notes that, at times, 
key health decisions lie outside the authority of Ministries of Health, pro-
viding further challenges to the roles that formalised evidence advisory 
systems might play to inform those decisions.
This recognition of non-ministerial authority over health decisions 
leads directly to Chap. 9, which discusses insights about the roles of 
legislatures and the judiciary in shaping evidence use for health deci-
sions. The chapter draws out lessons from multiple country case studies 
to illustrate the different ways that these bodies may use evidence to 
classic ideas of instrumental or problem-solving use embraced by many 
health sector actors. Ultimately the chapter draws out just how different 
evidence use can look within national policy processes based on existing 
institutional systems embedded in the legal or constitutional frame-
works of countries.
Chapter 10 presents the final comparative chapter, drawing lessons on 
evidence use in relation to the role and potential influence of international 
aid donors in our lower-income, aid-dependent case study countries 
(Ethiopia, Cambodia, and Ghana). The chapter draws out the importance 
of factors such as: the levels of local technical capacity, differing stake-
holder framings of issues, and the influence of external actors on underly-
ing systems of decision making. The chapter discusses how these were seen 
to affect which evidence was used and for what purposes – illustrating how 
the broader political economy of aid and development can play out in 
multiple ways in terms of evidence use in health policymaking.
Finally, Chap. 11 provides a discussion chapter that allows us to reflect 
on the issues raised in this introduction. We revisit what our cases show in 
terms of the many meanings of research utilisation, and consider what has 
been learned in terms of how political and institutional factors shape the 
form of evidence use arising in health policy processes. The chapter syn-
thesises insights about how political contestation, issue construction, and 
institutional arrangements all work (and at times work together) to shape 
and direct evidence use. The chapter, however, concludes by recognising 
that the insights from this volume only present a starting point to under-
standing the politics of evidence use from a public policy perspective, 
merely scratching the surface of the many areas of research that can further 
be done in this field.
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IntroductIon
In this chapter, we investigate the evidence perceived to be relevant to 
policy decisions for three contrasting health policy examples in Cambodia – 
tobacco control, HIV/AIDS and performance-based salary incentives. 
These cases allow us to examine the ways that policy relevant evidence may 
differ given the framing of the issue and the broader institutional context 
in which evidence is considered.
It is widely agreed, including within the global health community, that 
data and evidence are essential to inform policy formulation and implemen-
tation (Lavis et al. 2004; Katikireddi et al. 2011; Macdonald and Atkinson 
2011; Franklin and Budenholzer 2009). However the rhetoric of evidence-
based policy – one based on the assumption that research is objective or 
unbiased, and its uptake is a priori positive, with particular emphasis given to 
pieces of evidence classified at the top of so-called ‘hierarchies of evidence’ – 
has long been critiqued by social science scholars (c.f. Oliver et al. 2014a, b; 
Cairney 2015; Cairney et al. 2016; Wesselink et al. 2014; Guyatt et al. 2008; 
Tunis et al. 2003; Liverani et al. 2013; Smith 2013a; Smith and Joyce 2012; 
Smith 2014; Hawkins and Parkhurst 2016). For example, Weiss (1990) has 
argued that research alone ‘is almost never convincing or comprehensive 
enough to be the sole source of political advice’, and ‘there are always issues 
that research doesn’t cover’. Increasingly policy-studies scholars have 
explored aspects of the political system that may shape when, how and the 
types of evidence used within policymaking (Cairney 2015). These can 
include both how political institutions (such as formal structures, and less 
formal rules and norms) (Lowndes and Roberts 2013) and how key ideas 
(including the way that issues are framed and understood) influence which 
types of evidence appear to be relevant for, and are used within, different 
policy processes (Smith 2013a; Shiffman and Smith 2007; Parkhurst 2012).
However, as described by Oliver et al. (2014a), little empirical analysis 
has been undertaken of the processes or impact of evidence use in policy 
and the way that research and policy processes interact. This paper seeks 
to help address this gap, through a comparative examination of the role 
that institutional and ideational factors play in shaping evidence use for 
three contrasting health policy decisions within a single country context. 
Specifically this paper presents findings from research conducted in 
Cambodia, where the Ministry of Health (MOH), like many government 
departments in countries elsewhere (Cabinet Office 1999; Government 
Office for Science 2012; DEFRA 2011), has explicitly embraced the 
overarching language of using ‘evidence-based’ approaches to health 
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policymaking. One example of this endorsement is in the country’s sec-
ond Health Strategic Plan (2008–2015), which defines priorities and 
goals for the entire health sector, highlighting the need “to strengthen 
and invest in health information system and health research for evidence-
based policymaking, planning, monitoring performance and evaluation” 
(Ministry of Health 2008). In this context, our study aimed to examine 
and compare the ways evidence was discussed or used in three contrasting 
health policy areas  – tobacco control, HIV/AIDS and performance-
based financing (PBF)  – in particular for PBF we focus on a widely-
praised government midwifery incentive scheme (GMIS) that was 
introduced to increase deliveries at public health facilities.
Tobacco control represents a policy decision for which there is a long 
history of acknowledged corporate and governmental financial interests 
that have often attempted to influence how health-related evidence is used 
in regulatory policy-making (Bero 2003, 2005; Ong and Glantz 2000; 
Tong and Glantz 2007). HIV/AIDS, on the other hand, is an issue with 
strong donor and global interest, and which has seen policy ideas particu-
larly shaped by global civil society movements and consensus (Parkhurst 
2012; Schneider 2002; Buse et al. 2008; Doyle and Patel 2008). Finally, 
PBF tends to have much less external contestation or debate, but is largely 
seen as a more technical matter related to health economics, health service 
provision or health systems functioning (Mills 2014; Meessen et al. 2011). 
As such, these three examples provide useful ways to reflect on how the 
different institutional settings in which policymaking takes place may 
influence evidence use, including how interests and ideas of key actors 
within the differing institutional arrangements play out in relation to evi-
dence utilisation.
Methods
The paper draws on findings from in-depth semi-structured interviews 
conducted in Cambodia in 2015 and 2016 with stakeholders from key 
health sector organisations, as well as a related documentary analysis. The 
interviews were undertaken as part of a wider research project examining 
political aspects of evidence use for health policymaking in multiple coun-
tries. In case-study countries, key informants were first asked questions 
about the systems and processes through which evidence was used to 
inform health policy broadly, followed by asking for multiple examples of 
recent health policy decisions that could be illustrative of different aspects 
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of evidence use. In all countries we subsequently investigated evidence use 
within tobacco control policy – given the importance of tobacco use for 
health in virtually every country context, as well as the existence of both a 
well-established evidence base and a global policy framework (i.e. the 
World Health Organization’s global framework convention on tobacco 
control). After consultation with local stakeholders, we then selected addi-
tional country-specific health policy decisions of interest or importance to 
enable comparative analysis. As noted earlier, this approach led to the 
selection of three examples in Cambodia: tobacco control, HIV/AIDS 
and performance-based financing.
Key participants were identified though purposive and snowball sam-
pling strategies. In line with our approach, we first approached high-level 
policy makers likely to be knowledgeable about major policy develop-
ments across the entire health sector, and thus could provide a general 
overview of systems and structures in place to use evidence and advice on 
the selection of case studies. Subsequently, a scoping review of relevant 
documents (i.e. published studies and grey literature in the public domain 
such as policy documents and reports) was conducted to collect back-
ground information on each policy issue. This was followed by identifica-
tion of individuals who could comment further on the use of evidence to 
inform the selected policy decision. We endeavoured to conduct inter-
views with people who represented a diverse range of perspectives for the 
health decisions investigated. In total, 26 participants were interviewed, 
including both government representatives as well as individuals repre-
senting influential stakeholders in the policy process, particularly from aid 
providers, non-governmental organisations, multi-lateral organisations, 
and local research institutes.
Interview guidelines focused on the following broad topics, which were 
tailored to the different roles of informants and the specific expertise or 
insights they would bring: (1) perceptions about the policy process, 
including the role of different actors and contextual factors; (2) the nature 
and source of evidence that was used to inform the policy decision; (3) the 
way in which evidence was presented and evaluated; (4) general views on 
institutional structures and practices of evidence use within the Cambodian 
health sector. Interviews were conducted face-to-face by the authors, 
recorded (if permission was given), and subsequently transcribed and 
coded into themes in an iterative process (Bourque 2004). Citations from 
interviews and documents are included in the presentation of results to 
illustrate key points and emerging themes.
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Consent was obtained at the initiation of each interview, with respon-
dents given options on levels of anonymity desired. Ethical approval to 
undertake the study was provided by the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine; and research permission obtained from the Cambodia 
National Ethical Committee for Health Research (n. 0120; 06/05/2014).
PolIcy studIes PersPectIves
It is now reasonably well-established that national policy contexts can vary 
considerably with important implications for evidence use. Yet even within 
a single country, the characteristics of evidence use for different health 
issues may also vary considerably. Previous work has made it clear that the 
political nature of policymaking means that there can be multiple compet-
ing interests and concerns at stake for any given policy decision – even 
within the health sector (Parkhurst 2017; Russell et  al. 2008; Cairney 
2015). This indicates that multiple pieces of evidence may be relevant or 
considered in the policy process, depending on the differing concerns at 
stake, rather than any single piece or body of evidence. Thus an important 
step in moving beyond an over-simplistic treatment of evidence use is to 
understand the differing interests of stakeholders holding varying power 
and influence over a given policy decision. Indeed, Cairney notes that 
there can be such contestation at each step of the policy process – from 
defining the problem, to deciding which evidence to generate (or presum-
ably which evidence to consider), to choosing solutions (Cairney 2015).
Scholars have thus begun to apply a range of theories and concepts from 
the policy sciences to help deepen our understanding of evidence use given 
these realities. Pearce (2014), for instance, describes a ‘mistaken consensus’ 
that local climate policy can be based on emissions data, instead drawing 
out how ideas and arguments are also used, and needed to construct local 
policy responses. This view is similar to that of Wellstead et al. (2017), who 
argue that climate change adaptation science advocates are too narrowly 
functionalist in assuming that policies will change in response to feedback 
about climate change. Instead they argue that understanding policy changes 
in this area requires looking not just at the specific problems climate science 
identifies, “but also at the political and institutional factors that transform 
situations into problems and attempt to address them (p. 13)”.
This shift away from thinking about policy problems as fixed, but instead 
to consider how issues become ‘problematised’ directly draws on the field 
of interpretive (or critical) policy studies, which considers the roles of rhet-
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oric or discursive framing in shaping policy outcomes (c.f. Fischer 2003; 
Bacchi 2009; Stone 2002). It is not just climate science, however, which 
has seen such developments in analysis. In looking at health policy, Smith 
(2013a), for example, argues that it is the roles and interplay of ideas (and 
ideas about evidence) that can be critical to understand evidence use within 
differing health-related concerns (Wesselink et al. 2014).
The policy sciences have thus been increasingly applied to questions of 
evidence use in health policymaking and beyond. These perspectives allow 
consideration of the multiple interests and multiple bodies of evidence 
that are important to a policy decision, while further recognising the ways 
that institutional and ideational factors can lead to differing constructions 
of what evidence is seen to be appropriate to address any given interest in 
the first place – with institutional forms and ideas closely linked to the rela-
tive influence of different stakeholders in policy processes.
In this paper, we embrace this approach, applying ideas from new insti-
tutionalism to explore the competing or contrasting constructions of evi-
dence use for a set of three differing health policy concerns in the setting of 
Cambodia. On the one hand, new institutionalism highlights the not just 
the structures in place that shape decision making processes and outcomes, 
but also the importance of rules and norms within organisations that guide 
actor behaviours or decisions (Lowndes and Roberts 2013; Peters 2005). 
The approach also expands the focus of analysis beyond classic comparisons 
of state bureaucracies or legislative forms to consider the nature of institu-
tionalised forces directing policy-relevant action across a much wider set of 
organisational forms, including non-state bodies, collections of stakehold-
ers, or contrasting elements within a government system.
Applying such an approach to the question of evidence use for health 
thus allows us to focus on multiple issues. First we can consider the power 
or influence different stakeholders have over policy processes based on 
their structural positions for a given policy issue – reflecting on how differ-
ent bodies of evidence may be more or less relevant to given stakeholders 
with influence. This approach also, however, allows exploration of the 
institutional logics which those stakeholders possess (c.f. March and Olsen 
1989, 2006) that further shapes uses and understandings of policy- relevant 
evidence. In order to achieve these goals we first provide an overview of 
the three policy areas addressed, followed by a description of the types of 
evidence seen to be applied or important in each case. This is then fol-
lowed by our analytical section that applies this institutional and ideational 
lens to explore such questions.
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one country, three health PolIcy Issues
Tobacco Control
Tobacco smoking became increasingly prevalent in Cambodia in the 
1990s when the country was recovering from its civil war. At this time, 
there emerged the presence of many transnational tobacco companies in 
the country, the most prominent of which was British American Tobacco 
(BAT). The need for foreign investment and lack of regulation of advertis-
ing at this time, was explicitly recognised by British American Tobacco 
(BAT) who described Cambodia as “an attractive and strategically impor-
tant target” (Mackenzie et  al. 2004). A 1993 BAT industry plan, for 
example, acknowledged that awareness of the relationship between smok-
ing and morbidity/mortality would increase in Cambodia through the 
activities of the World Health Organization (WHO), but estimated that 
“the significant revenues generated by tobacco advertising [for the gov-
ernment] will, in the short term, delay anti-smoking initiatives until alter-
native forms of revenue are guaranteed” (Mackenzie et al. 2004). BAT’s 
preferred option was reportedly to become a majority shareholder in a 
joint venture alongside local interests. Such an arrangement would pre-
sumably allow industry control of the composition of company board of 
directors and significant influence over corporation activities, whilst also 
encouraging a local stake in the corporation’s success. BAT achieved this 
in 1995 (Mackenzie et al. 2004).
According to Mackenzie et al. (2004) there was also at this time, owing 
to the lack of regulation, huge scope for tobacco-control advertising and 
promotional activities (Mackenzie et al. 2004). Indeed, a 1994 survey of 
twelve main streets in the country’s capital Phnom Penh recorded 49% of 
the advertising signs (8495  in total) were advertising tobacco products 
(Smith 1996).
HIV/AIDS
HIV/AIDS in Cambodia has a very different history to tobacco smoking. 
In the mid-1990s, Cambodia had one of the fastest growing HIV preva-
lence rates in Southeast Asia, with injecting drug use and commercial sex 
driving HIV transmission (Weiss and de Cock 2001). Adult prevalence 
peaked at approximately 2.0% in 1998 (Pean et al. 2005). Since then, a 
number of prevention and treatment programmes have been introduced, 
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however, and the country’s prevalence has reduced, to an estimated 0.7% 
in 2013 (UNAIDS 2015; Vun et al. 2014).
The response has been divided into three phases: in phase I (1991–2000), 
a nationwide HIV prevention programme targeted brothel-based sex 
work, introduction of voluntary confidential counselling and testing and 
home-based care, and peer support groups of people living with HIV 
emerged; phase II (2001–2011) was characterized by expanding antiret-
roviral treatment (covering more than 80% of the population) and conti-
nuity of care, linking with other health services, accelerated prevention 
among key populations at higher risk (entertainment establishment-based 
sex workers, men who have sex with men (MSM), transgender persons, 
and people who inject drugs), engagement of health workers to deliver 
quality services, and strengthening health service delivery systems; and 
phase 3 (2012–2020) aims to attain zero new infections by 2020 through 
sharpening responses to high-risk population groups, maximizing access 
to community and facility-based testing and retention in prevention and 
care, and accelerating the transition from vertical approaches to linked/
integrated approaches (Vun et al. 2014). In recognition of the country’s 
success in halting and reversing the spread of HIV (relating to the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goal or MDG 6), Cambodia was in 
2010 presented with an MDG Award (UNAIDS 2010).
Performance-Based Financing, and the Case of the Government 
Midwifery Incentive Scheme
The final health issue we explored in relation to the use of evidence was 
that of performance-based financing (PBF), with specific discussion in 
interviews about the role of evidence in supporting the government mid-
wifery incentive scheme (GMIS). In many low and middle-income coun-
tries, PBF is increasingly being used to redress particular aspects of health 
system underperformance, particularly the productivity and quality of 
healthcare providers. It involves offering incentives intended to redress 
underperformance, particularly high worker absenteeism, which is fre-
quently observed in poorly funded public health systems with poor 
accountability (van de Poel et al. 2016). Support for PBF has spread rap-
idly in many countries in recent years (van de Poel et al. 2016). But whilst 
there is considerable enthusiasm for PBF policies, according to a Cochrane 
Collaboration review (2012) of pay-for-performance to improve the deliv-
ery of health interventions in low- and middle-income countries, the 
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current evidence base is too weak to draw any general conclusions regard-
ing effectiveness, with more robust and comprehensive study needed 
(Witter et al. 2012; van de Poel et al. 2016).
According to van de Poel et al. (2016), Cambodia was the first docu-
mented case of a low-income country to experiment with PBF of public 
health care. Since 1999, a variety of health programme funding of districts 
and facilities in Cambodia have been contingent on performance targets 
or have directly linked revenues to services delivered. The main PBF pro-
grammes implemented have specified performance targets relating to child 
vaccination, antenatal care, delivery in a public facility, and birth-spacing 
use. These funding arrangements have been intended to increase aspects 
of healthcare provision, and there has been considerable variation in the 
strength and conditions of the incentives offered (van de Poel et al. 2016).
The interviewees specifically identified the GMIS as a notable PBF pol-
icy, and described how the policy contributed to reducing Cambodia’s 
high maternal mortality ratio (MMR) over recent years. The GMIS 
became operational nationwide in late 2007, following a joint prakas 
(directive) from the MOH and MEF to allocate government budget to 
the incentive payments (Ir and Chheng 2012). The UNFPA was consid-
ered to be behind the policy change, for example through supporting a 
High-Level Midwifery Forum in late 2005 that bought together represen-
tatives from several government departments. However it was the prime 
minister who reportedly ‘gave the green light’ for the policy to go ahead. 
Other stakeholders were not thought to have had much direct influence 
over this decision, and the Cambodian Midwives Council, for example, 
was established after the implementation of the GMIS.
The GMIS aimed to boost facility deliveries by motivating skilled birth 
attendants (or trained health personnel) to promote deliveries in public 
health facilities. It did this by providing midwives (and other trained per-
sonnel) cash incentives based on the number of live births they attended 
in public health facilities – USD15 for a live birth in a health centre and 
USD10 for a live birth in a referral hospital. The reason for the higher 
payment in a health centre than a hospital was to provide a stronger incen-
tive for deliveries at health centres – the recommended facility for normal 
deliveries to be managed (Ir et al. 2015). According to the MOH’s guid-
ance, besides midwives, physicians and other trained health personnel can 
also receive these incentives when attending deliveries in public health 
facilities. Up to 30% of the incentives will be shared with other health per-
sonnel in the facility and eventually with other people such as traditional 
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birth attendants (TBAs) who refer women to the facility for delivery (Ir 
and Chheng 2012). The number of deliveries is reported monthly by 
health facilities through the routine health information system. Based on 
the number of reported deliveries, incentives are disbursed quarterly to 
the facilities through public financial disbursement channels (Ir and 
Chheng 2012).
the nature of evIdence used
In this section we begin to describe and examine the reported differences 
in evidence use between the three policy areas. The evidence relating to 
each issue can be categorised in various ways, including by evidence topic 
(e.g., health, economic) or type (e.g. epidemiological, pilot study), which 
relate to the issue framing by key stakeholders, and the sources relied upon 
(e.g. global literature, national statistics, government survey). What is 
clear, however, is that no single uniform construction of policy relevant 
evidence was seen across cases.
Tobacco Control
Global evidence on tobacco harms were at this time considered well estab-
lished, but local data on smoking rates were fairly limited. In the late 
1990s, Cambodia had some small regional surveys of smoking prevalence, 
but it wasn’t until 2005 that accurate nationwide prevalence data on 
tobacco use were available (Singh et al. 2009). In spite of a lack of local 
data on smoking, in May 2004 Cambodia signed the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), a global policy agreement that 
calls for a number of restrictions on tobacco advertising and promotion – 
restrictions which many global health authors present as ‘evidence based’ 
(Myers 2013; Rosen et al. 2013; Glantz and Gonzalez 2012). Many stake-
holders interviewed noted the importance of the FCTC locally, as it 
 dictated that the government could not engage with industry on develop-
ing tobacco control policy. However implementation of the elements of 
the convention were described as only occurring slowly or in limited ways, 
which interviewees suggested was due to industry influence.
For example, one independent health sector consultant explained:
The tobacco industry and lobby is massively powerful here. (IDI1-01, June 2014)
1 IDI, In-depth interview
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Another respondent, a senior civil servant in the MOH, explained:
We don’t know exactly why the law is very slow to be approved. Probably this is 
also due to lobbying of tobacco corporations, but we don’t have evidence to prove 
it. (IDI-10, August 2014)
This individual also noted that tobacco control did not appear to be a 
priority in the national health sector strategic plan.
The context of a deeply entrenched and powerful tobacco interest was 
also manifested in how respondents conceptualised the evidence that was 
relevant for moving tobacco control policies forward. A number of civil 
servants interviewed, for example, stressed the need to counter other evi-
dence the tobacco industry uses to frame tobacco control in a way that 
suits industry interests. For example:
They [tobacco corporations] always complain that if we increase taxes, farmers 
will lose their job. So, you have to explain to the government that, if you increase 
taxes, the margin will not affect the industry. Also, we have to explain that 
farmers do not rely on one crop only, so reduced tobacco production will not 
significantly affect them. (IDI-06, June 2014)
Tobacco industry is powerful and has money. Some people are lobbied by tobacco 
corporations. They [tobacco corporations] have a lot of experience. They can 
approach friends or members of the family and get confidential information 
about policy making. Then, people that are lobbied create opposition at the 
inter-ministerial meetings. They often say that tobacco control will impact on 
the economy and farmers. (IDI-08, August 2014)
Respondents also emphasised the importance of making different 
evidence- based arguments to different actors. In particular, it was noted 
that the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) needed different evi-
dence regarding tobacco control to the MOH to try to convince it to 
support policy action. As one civil servant explained:
You have to find a way to convince people… also because policy is multisectoral. 
It’s not that one minister decides. If you want to increase tax, this is not an issue 
of the Ministry of Health. We don’t have the power to do this. We can do a 
smoke-free policy, but tax is under the Ministry of Finance. So you have to work 
closely with the Ministry of Finance. In Cambodia, when you talk to the 
Ministry of Finance, first you have you prove to them they can make more 
money… The industry can say ‘oh if you increase taxes, you will lose revenue’. 
And you have to present evidence that increasing taxes is not a loss of revenue. 
(IDI-06, June 2014)
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We explain to the government that an increase in tax does not change the over-
all volume of cigarettes that are sold in the market. The case of Thailand shows 
this. Why? Because smoking prevalence decreases, but population increases. 
Cambodia is the same. Smoking prevalence has gone from 49.6% to 42.6%, how-
ever the absolute number of smoking is always 2 million because population 
increased… and you have to tell the government these facts. So you have to do a 
lot of work with the government to prove this. And of course, the tobacco indus-
try makes a lot of money. We cannot stop them. (IDI-06, June 2014)
This civil servant also explained how evidence from neighbouring 
countries was considered influential, as was the normative element of the 
FCTC.
Usually in Cambodia we present evidence or examples from ASEAN2 coun-
tries. How is Vietnam doing? Thailand? Indonesia? Then, we also do interna-
tional. But ASEAN is very important, also because we are approaching the 
ASEAN [Economic] Community in 2015, and member countries do not want 
to be left behind. (IDI-06, June 2014)
Overall, whilst many of the respondents spoke of the slow progress of 
tobacco control policy in Cambodia, the government has made substantial 
progress in tobacco control by banning the advertisement of tobacco 
products in 2011 as well as smoking in workplaces and public spaces in 
2016 using sub-decrees. However it wasn’t until April 2015 that the 
Cambodian National Assembly passed the country’s first-ever law on 
tobacco control, which was ratified later the same month. The new law 
tackles tobacco from a variety of angles, including through import and 
sales restrictions, and bans on sales to minors and pregnant women (FCTC 
Implementation Database 2014).
HIV/AIDS
HIV/AIDS policy-making illustrates a radically different political context 
in which the utilisation of health policy-relevant evidence can be explored. 
The United Nations AIDS programme (UNAIDS) has stated that 
Cambodia has “used high-quality strategic information to inform a [suc-
cessful] evidence-based response” (UNAIDS 2012); and interviews stood 
in dramatic contrast to those with stakeholders advocating for greater 
2 Association of South East Asian Nations.
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tobacco control who expressed the need to develop or discuss evidence of 
financial impact (e.g. on farmers or the treasury) to justify policy action. 
Instead, in discussions of HIV/AIDS, whilst a variety of evidence types 
were clearly brought to bear, NGO and donor-organisation respondents 
discussed how it has often been epidemiological modelling and cost- 
effectiveness analyses (IDI-21, 19, May 2016) – forms of evidence more 
typically advocated by public health actors for priority setting – that were 
seen as important evidence to guide policy. One of the respondents spoke 
about how this approach should be replicated in other areas of health 
policy-making:
I would say for HIV/AIDS it’s that way [evidence use more technical than in 
other areas of policy] every time. I feel like that’s brilliant and the model of 
HIV/AIDS [should] be replicated to other disease, for example we still have a 
very high number of death among pregnant women, the baby, the infant. So 
why don’t they learn from the HIV/AIDS program. (IDI-21, May 2016)
When interviewees were asked about the use of evidence within par-
ticular policy developments, a range of evidence types were described, in 
addition to epidemiological modelling and cost-effectiveness studies men-
tioned above. Other relevant evidence was said to include pilot studies, 
used for example to inform the development of a community-based test-
ing approach implemented in 2013, where the HIV testing is performed 
by lay counsellors – volunteers from population groups at higher risk of 
HIV infection. National prevalence estimates and international evidence 
were also evidence types that were frequently mentioned, particularly with 
international evidence from other Southeast Asian countries, and particu-
larly Thailand. The importance of international evidence may also reflect 
the strong role of donors in HIV/AIDS policy-making in Cambodia.
Yes they [policymakers] welcome [overseas evidence] in the HIV area. I don’t 
know about the other area. They welcome to learn the best practice from the 
region. This week one [NGO] staff member. He joined the field in Bangkok. 
(IDI-20, May 2016)
Epidemiological modelling of future prevalence scenarios has been 
considered key to informing policy as to the prioritization and targeting of 
interventions, preparation of operational plans, budgets and resource 
mobilization efforts (11) (12), and cost-effectiveness analyses such as 
modelling has highlighted areas where technical efficiency might be 
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improved. The National Centre for HIV/AIDS, Dermatology and STI 
(NCHADS) within Cambodia’s MOH, which is responsible for the health 
sector response to HIV and other sexually transmitted diseases, has led the 
analysis, in collaboration with relevant departments and centres of the 
MOH, the National AIDS Authority and other government institutions, 
as well as health service providers, non-governmental and other civil soci-
ety organizations, and development partners.
When asked about the reasons why HIV/AIDS policymaking stood 
out in terms of the use of what is more typically considered policy-relevant 
health evidence, respondents particularly spoke of the strong donor inter-
est and support for HIV policy-making in Cambodia. They felt that this 
was key to driving the type of evidence being used in policy-making, and 
also the relatively well-functioning institutional entry points for such evi-
dence, including here the relevant technical working groups (TWGs) of 
the MOH. One NGO respondent explained:
Yes it’s different [the policy-making process for HIV/AIDS compared to that 
for other health issues]. I think this is because donor support, and I think the 
other thing is because of resource, donor support and resource. Resource, I would 
say financial resource and human capacity resource, let’s say for HIV/AIDS 
they have more educated [staff] and they adhere to plan, they adhere to target 
and they target evidence and I feel like the government take that approach very 
well, participatory approach, it’s very well, because it’s an emergency situation 
but it is also in the situation where funding is allowing so that’s why we feel like 
they are open. (IDI-21, May 2016)
However there were downsides to a donor-driven approach also 
described, including in relation to siloed, non-integrated evidence gather-
ing. When asked what could be improved, one interviewee explained:
Well I think it’s coordination. Because there’s basically the different donor pro-
gramme, donors put all the evidence together. It sits on programmes that are… 
like some donors who are actually doing their own evidence, but not systemati-
cally led by the national programme and disseminated in a timely manner. 
(IDI-19, May 2016)
Interestingly, while HIV/AIDS policymaking has at times been seen as 
controversial or contested in some countries, related to the highly stigma-
tised nature of HIV transmission in some contexts (Rankin et al. 2005; 
Mahajan et al. 2008), we found little evidence of this in Cambodia. Whilst 
H. WALLS ET AL.
 35
stigma and discrimination towards groups at higher risk of infection (sex 
workers, men who have sex with men (MSM), transgender persons and 
people who inject drugs) were noted, these were perceived to be relatively 
low compared to in many countries elsewhere. Instead, one of the NGO 
respondents explained that in Cambodia policy-makers are relatively 
open – and increasingly so – to discussing these groups and considering 
evidence relating to these groups.
The policy-makers they are more open now… for HIV the policy maker they are more 
open and learn from the [experience of high-risk groups]. (IDI-20, May 2016)
The respondents from a key NGO also spoke at length about the effort 
made by the NGO to engage high-risk population groups in the policy- 
making process, particularly in regard to supporting representatives to 
speak at community meetings and at the MOH TWG meetings.
[The NGO] work to promote that involvement in the policy-making as well, not 
only [the NGO] but also civil society. But we try to involve the key representatives 
from each key population to enrol in the policy-making process… we use the num-
ber, we use the finding, we use the civil society. But also bring the key population to 
talk during the meeting is more powerful… So this is like an MSM person or a sex 
worker, an entertainment worker could stand and speak about their challenges 
and the law enforcement people they listen to this. They’re part of the meeting. 
Everyone is part of the meeting… They also listen and sometimes they [describe] 
their challenges and you can see some improvement. (IDI-20, May 2016)
Performance-Based Financing,  
and the Case of the Government Midwifery Scheme
In contrast to the evidence types seen as relevant for tobacco control and 
HIV/AIDS policy-making, when asked about evidence for policy-making 
in regard to PBF schemes generally, these schemes were described as reli-
ant almost solely on evidence from pilot studies. Interview respondents 
spoke of various pilot schemes of PBF that had been run over the years in 
different districts and by different groups, often by non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), but also in workplaces of NCHADS.  The per-
ceived dominance of pilots as an evidence type is likely due to specific PBF 
policies being scaled up based on a pilot, but such schemes are likely also 
informed by evidence from health economics more broadly (and indeed, 
from basic microeconomics) that incentives can achieve outcomes (Mankiw 
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and Taylor 2006). When pushed for further examples of evidence use in the 
PBF area, some respondents mentioned evidence from the Demographic 
and Health Survey, and also international evidence as informing the use of 
such schemes – but respondents didn’t provide specific examples of such 
evidence. Some mentioned the low payment of midwives and the lack of 
incentives for women to deliver in health facilities as evidence for needed 
change.
I don’t think anyone guided the government to design that policy. But it came 
clearly from many dialogues that the pay was not enough, that the arrange-
ments did not encourage midwives to work in remote health centres, and did 
not encourage mothers to use health facilities. (IDI-11, June 2014)
A few years ago there was a policy to put one midwife in each health centre and 
the midwifery incentive… Hun Sen acted on this, and the policy was imple-
mented immediately and very effectively… the. trigger was the Demographic 
and Health Survey… it has quite a bit of impact, and there was a lot of pressure 
from the international community… it was a relatively ‘easy fix’, a simple solu-
tion. (IDI-12, June 2014)
However, the dominance of pilots as an evidence type fits with observa-
tions from van de Poel et al. (2016) above, of Cambodia’s pioneering role 
in experimenting with PBF of public health care, and also with one of our 
respondent’s description of Cambodia as ‘a country of pilots’ (IDI-23, 
May 2016).
In contrast, however, there was also considerable discussion of that at 
times policy directives come from high levels of government – within the 
MOH, or as a decision made by the Prime Minister himself – and that in 
such situations evidence is perceived to be of limited importance. The 
GMIS was described as an example of this at times:
That [the GMIS] was an example of policy being changed by the government. 
It’s the government’s job, without any evidence. (IDI-15, May 2016)
You know, in the United States the evidence has, as far as can tell, no effect on 
congress. But what happens is they pass laws and then health and human ser-
vices when they’re putting out the regulations or something, that’s where the 
evidence comes in. Here it’s more like everything at the congress level, even there 
is no, it doesn’t get more rational as it comes down through the MOH… People 
have very set ideas about things and those aren’t going to change no matter 
what evidence is put in front of them. (IDI-22, May 2016)
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You can present the evidence and present it passionately and you can present it 
unanimously when you are heard, but there’s never really a proper policy dia-
logue. So saying well I could go and speak to the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance about that, we need extra money or we need to look at the budgets or 
perhaps we need to revise the [pre-service] training curriculum. You don’t get 
that. (IDI-15, May 2016)
We don’t even know who made it. There’s a re-writing of history that claims the 
MOH thought about it but there was no evidence. I was here right after it 
started and know many people here when it started. At the time no-one was 
claiming the MOH invented it, so it came out of the MEF, the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance. It was actually hugely successful. (IDI-22, May 2016)
Another respondent from a donor agency was unable to name evidence 
in support of the policy, and instead described how he saw the policy pro-
cess for the GMIS.
I think in Cambodia evidence [is not so important, rather] government want 
the community to deliver their baby at the health facility so the government 
just simply providing incentive to the health staff, community wide, so for 
delivery of one live birth delivery, they get $15.00 this is the decision by the 
government and government budget and then see if they implemented that. 
(IDI-17, May 2016)
This perception of success appears to come from data showing increas-
ing facility utilisation for delivery and falling mortality rates nationally 
after implementation of the programme. Since then, the percentage of 
deliveries in public health facilities has increased substantially, from 29% 
in 2006 to 57% in 2011, and the MMR has declined substantially from 
473 per 100,000 live births in 2005 to 206  in 2010 (Ir and Chheng 
2012). Care, of course, is needed with interpretation of such evidence. A 
number of evaluations of PBF schemes such as the GMIS have been 
undertaken, and PBF policies have been credited with developments 
including increasing utilisation by the poor, decreasing total family per 
capita health expenditure and encouraging better management (Eldridge 
and Palmer 2009)  – but drawing firm conclusions of causality can be 
problematic, particularly when such programmes have been implemented 
alongside other health sector reforms (Soeters and Griffiths 2003). One 
respondent further commented that the quality of evaluations undertaken 
is often poor.
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InstItutIonal features and logIcs of evIdence use
The three policy areas presented show few similarities in how pieces of 
evidence were used in various aspects of policy making, despite all being 
discussed or undertaken within a single MOH, and within a broad policy 
environment in which ‘evidence based policymaking’ is rhetorically cham-
pioned. In this section, however, we draw out some of the particular insti-
tutional and ideational features of the three health policy concerns that 
may help to explain these findings.
A starting point is to compare the institutionalised positions of influ-
ence of the key stakeholders in each case, to reflect on how the relevance 
of particular evidence types fit with the interests of such stakeholders. This 
can then be followed by considering any contrasting institutional logics 
that similarly might help explain differences in evidence utilisation. Such 
logics could either be direct thinking about which evidence is relevant and 
why (such as how public health actors explicitly embrace hierarchies of 
evidence at times), or they may be related to the overarching goals or 
expectations of the actors involved, which subsequently shapes their uses 
of evidence (such as when particular types of evidence more naturally align 
with or fit broader goals).
In the case of tobacco control, the historical influence of the tobacco 
industry appears particularly relevant, and the nature of contestation for 
this issue appeared to principally be framed in terms of financial implica-
tions of tobacco control. Our respondents described the financial impor-
tance of tobacco for the agricultural sector and the national economy as the 
paramount concerns for any policy change. Tobacco control were well 
aware of the need to present different evidence and frame the issue differ-
ently to address the concerns of the most influential stakeholders – with a 
particular distinction made between the health and economic evidence 
needed when speaking to policy-makers from the MOH and MEF, respec-
tively. The need for taxation and other regulatory policy to be made out-
side the MoH illustrated how limited health-related evidence of tobacco 
harms could be in driving tobacco control policy forward on its own.
Evidence from neighbouring countries, and the FCTC, were said to be 
influential. But even so, and despite considerable progress, policy change 
in line with these was described as particularly slow, as too was the devel-
opment of what were considered more appropriate forms of evidence to 
guide tobacco policy from a public health perspective, such as national 
smoking prevalence surveys. Despite global evidence on tobacco harms 
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and increasing local data on smoking, it was the concerns regarding eco-
nomic growth and the industry’s entrenched interests and lobbying docu-
mented in our study and elsewhere (Mackenzie et al. 2004; Collin et al. 
2004; Mackay 2004) that dominated the agenda. As such this significantly 
appeared to slow down the translation of the FCTC into local tobacco 
control policies; as well as the collection of, or action based on, forms of 
evidence typically seen as relevant to health promotion.
In contrast, the HIV/AIDS policy response in Cambodia developed in 
a rather different political context. With HIV/AIDS, there was no estab-
lishment of corporate interests, and little obvious financial interest at stake 
for any major stakeholders. Instead, the issue may have achieved a rela-
tively high level of priority for policy action in Cambodia due to the atten-
tion and resources this issue has been accorded by donor agencies, and 
possibly related to this, the well-functioning TWGs of the MOH for HIV 
policy-making, as described by our respondents. The institutionalisation 
of donor influence is, in fact, reflected within the country’s various strate-
gic documents for guiding programme implementation – including the 
National Strategic Plan for HIV/AIDS, 2011–2015 (NSP III) and 
Cambodia 3.0, a strategy developed by the country’s Ministry of Health 
to eliminate new HIV infections and congenital syphilis by 2020. Both are 
considered to be in line with the global targets and foci established by 
UNAIDS and the US PEPFAR programme (from which Cambodia is a 
recipient of funds) (PEPFAR 2015; UNAIDS 2015). These are highly 
technical global policy agencies, however, who routinely promote, or 
operate based around, particular forms of evidence types  – embracing 
international discourses of evidence-based policy making. This may trans-
late to the Cambodian context, particularly if there were no other strong 
interest groups to present alternative rhetoric or framing around the 
issue – and as such may have led to the use of evidence types in Cambodia 
more typically advocated by public health advocates in HIV/AIDS policy- 
making, and the observation of one NGO respondent that the National 
HIV/AIDS Centre is ‘big on evidence’ (IDI-25, May 2016).
Indeed, while in many countries the issue of HIV testing has been sub-
ject to debate or controversy – particularly around issues of disclosure or 
confidentiality of people living with HIV, and the challenges associated 
with addressing HIV in oft-stigmatised groups such as men who have sex 
with men, transgender people and sex workers – these concerns were con-
sidered by our respondents to have been relatively unimportant in 
Cambodia (even if admittedly seen as sensitive). That HIV/AIDS is an 
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issue with social connotations in Cambodia perhaps explains the use of 
narrative evidence  – stories of the lived experiences of marginalised 
groups – to influence policy-making. However, the relatively low level of 
moral contestation for this issue in Cambodia was noted – and used to 
explain the recent introduction of community-based rapid HIV testing 
(so-called ‘finger-prick testing’) by lay volunteer counsellors for high-risk 
population groups. Within this recent national policy, however, it was 
again evidence of effectiveness provided from a pilot study that could be 
seen to lead to policy change (KHANA 2014; Ministry of Health 2012).
The importance of pilots, however, was much more apparent, and 
described as the primary source of policy-relevant evidence for PBF. This 
was in contrast to tobacco policy appearing to require discussion of evi-
dence of financial impact (linked to the influence of one set of interest 
groups), and HIV policy drawing particularly on epidemiological models 
and surveys (in line with norms and expectations of global health agen-
cies). Again, however, we can look to the most influential stakeholders 
involved and their institutional logics to help explain the emphasis on 
pilots as a form of evidence in this case. Indeed, this helps to move away 
from the oft-criticised over-reliance on the idea that a single hierarchy of 
evidence can guide policy decisions, to instead consider the policy ‘appro-
priateness’ of particular forms of evidence (Parkhurst and Abeysinghe 
2014; Dobrow et al. 2004; Young et al. 2002).
Unlike the previous cases, the GMIS policy appears to have had few 
stakeholders outside the government itself. It was reportedly made from 
the highest levels of the government, with some interviewees speculating 
that it was driven by the Prime Minister’s office in particular in response to 
a feeling that some action must be taken to help achieve the maternal health 
millennium development goal by 2015. The power and influence in this 
case appeared to be particularly hierarchical, with decision making made 
through a planning and management orientation. Pilot studies, which 
examine feasibility of an intervention, are a first step in exploring novel 
interventions, novel applications of an intervention, or the feasibility of an 
intervention in a particular context when the effectiveness of that interven-
tion may be context dependent (Leon et al. 2011). For this reason, they are 
often considered important evidence of effectiveness as well as feasibility 
within a particular context and for complex interventions, on the premise 
that cultural appropriateness of interventions is important and can shape 
outcomes (Bernal et al. 2009). As such, pilot studies have been described 
previously as particularly applicable in health services and health systems 
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research (Craig et al. 2013), but they also could be seen to be particularly 
relevant when a government has decided that wide-scale implementation of 
an intervention is a primarily objective at hand, such as achieving an MDG 
target through reducing the high maternal mortality rate.
In Table 2.1, we present a summary of these findings. In particular we 
highlight the stakeholders established to have dominant influence in each 
policy case, and their institutional interests and logics that help to explain 
the evidence said to be used by our interviewees.
dIscussIon
Despite a common use of the language of evidence-based policy making in 
the health sector, there are in fact many types of evidence which can speak 
to a variety of political concerns and mandates that play out in the policy 
process. Sometimes evidence use differs because the evidence needs differ 
Table 2.1 Characterisation of the institutional and ideational factors related to 
the health policy issue
Health 
policy 
area
Established 
dominant 
stakeholders
Institutional 
interests and logics
Nature of evidence used
Types Topic Source
Tobacco 
control
Industry, 
MEF
Financial 
importance of 
tobacco for 
agriculture sector 
and national 
economy
Regional 
surveys
Health Local 
government,
Epidemiological Health Global 
repositories
Economic Finance Local sources
HIV/
AIDS
International 
donors
Hierarchy of 
evaluation 
evidence; 
importance of 
achieving global 
targets
Epidemiological Health Global, local 
sources
Economic Finance Local sources
Pilot studies Health Local sources
Narrative Social Citizens
PBF – 
GMIS
MoH, MEF, 
Prime 
Minister
Importance of 
achieving global 
targets; importance 
of achieving 
national 
implementation
Pilot studies Health Local 
(government, 
NGO)
Epidemiological Health Local sources
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to solve an agreed upon problem. At other times, there may not be any 
agreement on the nature of the problem, however, and as such it is fea-
tures of power, interests, and framing that serve as important drivers shap-
ing which evidence informs policy considerations. An institutionalist 
approach, however, can help to understand some of these dynamics. It can 
identify which stakeholders have established positions of power within dif-
fering health policy issues, linking their interests to the nature of evidence 
used. It can also reflect on the institutional logics of these stakeholders 
which further may influence when or how evidence is utilised.
For tobacco, large and expensive national prevalence surveys were con-
sidered necessary evidence for intervention, even given considerable evi-
dence from smaller studies of a high prevalence of smoking in the country, 
and the irrefutable global evidence linking tobacco to numerous diseases 
and mortality. Such surveys, however, were needed because of a demand 
for evidence that could speak to the dominant concerns of financial impact 
and the logic that evidence was needed to illustrate economic impact, 
rather than any public health logic of evidence to show medical harm to 
the population. The importance of the ministry of finance is thus apparent 
in this case – illustrating both its dominant policy concern in terms of the 
economy, but also its logic of what forms of evidence are required to speak 
to that concern. Furthermore, it is of course critical to understand the 
historical influence and role of the tobacco industry in the country, which 
no doubt has played an important role in shifting the terms of tobacco 
policy to one of revenue.
In contrast, for the case of HIV/AIDS, the dominance of global donors 
in supporting this health issue, and the apparent limited contestation at a 
local level, appears to have led to the explicit embrace of epidemiological 
evidence that is widely held to be appropriate for HIV planning within the 
global health community. In the final case of PBF, however, it was the 
government that drove both the initiation and implementation of the pol-
icy response. This state-controlled process appeared to reflect a belief that 
national action must be taken to address an existing priority (in the form 
of a Millennium Development Goal). This in turn naturally led to a logic 
which saw relatively micro studies focussed on implementation to be the 
most policy-relevant. Although it is worth noting that in the case of the 
GMIS, some believed that evidence was not perceived as important at all, 
due to the policy being driven by higher level political authorities. Indeed, 
some stakeholders simply referred to the GMIS policy when asked for 
good example of the use of evidence because it was national action based 
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around the ‘evidence’ that maternal mortality rates were too high – a much 
simpler logic of evidence informed policymaking whereby evidence of a 
problem is seen to justify widespread action, in contrast to more traditional 
health sector descriptions of evidence use being concerned with the effec-
tiveness of interventions or possible alternative priorities or approaches.
Policy studies scholars would not be surprised, however, that powerful 
stakeholders (or ‘vested interests’) end up shaping the understanding of 
evidence, or which pieces of evidence are championed as relevant for 
 policy making. This is perhaps most clearly illustrated in how evidence has 
been presented or selected by the tobacco industry in relation to policy-
making debates (c.f. Smith 2013b; Ulucanlar et al. 2014; Tong and Glantz 
2007; Bero 2005). For example, tobacco industry-funded studies have 
been shown to have misrepresented the association between second-hand 
smoke and CVD (Tong and Glantz 2007), or the evidence in support of 
standardised packaging of tobacco products (Ulucanlar et  al. 2014). 
Tobacco interests have also emphasised evidence in support of the eco-
nomic contributions of their product, whilst questioning the evidence 
suggesting that policy interventions are needed to protect health (Smith 
2013b). HIV/AIDS, on the other hand, touches on issues of gender and 
sexuality, drug use and sex work, which often leads to it being seen as a 
highly morally-contested issue. However these did not appear particularly 
relevant in Cambodia, serving as a reminder that we cannot assume a 
health topic will necessarily exhibit the same political characteristics in dif-
ferent settings, even if such features are commonplace in other cases.
conclusIons
In the three contrasting case studies of evidence use in health policy- 
making examined in this study, evidence types – and their framing – were 
found to differ greatly, despite them taking place in the same country set-
ting. The findings reiterate past authors’ understandings that ‘evidence’ is 
not a uniform concept for which more is obviously better, or where a 
single model of ‘evidence based policymaking’ can prevail, but rather that 
different constructions and pieces of evidence become relevant given the 
politics involved in policy decisions, the nature of institutions involved, 
and the framing and conceptualisations of the issues themselves. Our com-
parative analysis helps to begin to trace out themes in linkages between the 
nature of contestation of health issues, the interests of established domi-
nant stakeholders, and the logics by which those stakeholders operate – all 
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of which work to shape which evidence is utilised or seen as policy relevant 
to inform health decisions. Whilst considerable further empirical research 
is needed in this area, this more nuanced understanding of evidence use 
may be of relevance to health policy-makers and others considering how 
to improve the role of evidence in health policy making.
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IntroductIon
Malnutrition is the single greatest contributor to the global burden of 
morbidity and mortality, affecting one in three people worldwide, with the 
majority of cases arising in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) 
(Kassebaum 2014; Bhutta and Salam 2012). Initiatives to address this 
include including the 2025 World Health Assembly nutrition targets, the 
Sustainable Development Goal target of ending all forms of malnutrition 
by 2030, and global initiatives such as the Scaling Up Nutrition movement 
(Gillespie et al. 2013; International Food Policy Research Institute 2015).
Nutrition policy involves collaboration between the agriculture, health 
and environment sectors (c.f. Gillespie et al. 2013; Mendis 2010; Bonita 
et al. 2013; Reinhardt and Fanzo 2014). However, this adds considerable 
complexity to the implementation of effective programmes (Balarajan 
and Reich 2016), with need for better understanding of the linkages 
between sectors to improve nutritional outcomes. Several countries have 
achieved considerable success with addressing malnutrition in recent 
years (WHO 2013). However, global progress has generally been slow, 
with many countries failing to achieve nutrition targets (International 
Food Policy Research Institute 2015; Roberto et al. 2015; Heaver 2005; 
Lachat et al. 2013).
Achieving nutrition goals requires policy action at the national level. 
This raises questions about why or how relevant policy change may come 
about within different country settings. As Chap. 1 in this volume dis-
cusses, the global health community has increasingly embraced the lan-
guage of ‘evidence-based policy’ (or ‘evidence-informed policy’) to describe 
the ways in which research evidence provides clear policy solutions to health 
policy concerns. However, several case studies, including from LMICs, 
have illustrated the difficulties in applying these ideas in practice. Nabyonga-
Orem and Mijumbi (Nabyonga-Orem and Mijumbi 2015), for instance, 
reflected on the Ugandan experience of evidence utilisation, stating:
although there is a general agreement on the benefits of evidence informed 
health policy development given resource constraints especially in low- 
income countries, the definition of what evidence is, and what evidence is 
suitable to guide decision-making is still unclear. (p. 285)
Similarly, Shiffman (2006) found that, in aid-recipient countries, donor 
funding for communicable diseases did not reflect the evidence base on 
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disease burden, which offer a rationale for prioritising policy action. Rather 
than there being any single process by which evidence is applied in policy 
development, complex political dynamics and normative ideas shape 
 processes of evidence use (c.f. Nutley et al. 2007). The political nature of 
decision-making involves multiple contested interests, making it difficult 
to achieve agreement on which policy problems and policy outcomes 
should be prioritised (Parkhurst 2017). This has led Smith (2013) to 
argue that it more important to analyse ideas (about evidence) and how 
they shape policy rather than assuming evidence itself will have any consis-
tent influence.
Ideas about evidence use exist collectively and are embedded within 
particular institutional norms and practices. Policy decision-making 
behaviours within institutions can thus be shaped and constrained by so-
called ‘logics of appropriateness’ that serve to direct ways of working or 
thinking for individuals within particular institutional arrangements 
(Lowndes and Roberts 2013; March and Olsen 1984; Peters 2008). 
While the dominant way of thinking about evidence use to inform deci-
sions in the global health community can therefore be conceptualised as 
one particular institutional logic, the multi-sectoral nature of nutrition 
policymaking raises questions about how health sector actors can engage 
with stakeholders that have differing priorities, and potentially different 
logics of evidence use.
Studying the process of nutrition policy formation can thus provide a use-
ful lens to explore these issues of the roles and use of evidence in the context 
of multi-sectoral nutrition policy planning. Our perspective focusses primar-
ily on the health sector yet our findings highlight different sectorial perspec-
tives and logics in regard to a particular policy formulation. This chapter 
focuses on a case study of Ethiopia, which provides a unique example of the 
challenging nature of multi-sectoral nutrition policy- making, even with 
strong coordinating infrastructure. Although the government of Ethiopia 
implemented a National Nutrition Programme (NNP) in 2008 and inte-
grated it with the overarching national strategic framework, the Growth and 
Transformation Plan 2010/11–2014/15 (GTP I) (Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia 2011), problems with multi-sectoral working have 
been acknowledged (Government of Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia 2016, pp. 20–21). Consequently, the structure for multi-sectoral 
working was strengthened in the third NNP, NNP-II (2016–2020) 
(Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2016) and in 
the GTP- II, 2015/16–2019/20 (Ethiopia 2016).
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This chapter illustrates the challenges with nutrition policymaking 
expressed by health sector stakeholders in interviews undertaken in 
December 2014. It examines the problems observed in multi-sectoral 
working from the health sector perspective. Furthermore, it uses these – 
reflections on the likely success of NNP-II.  It suggests that although 
Ethiopia has made progress with the coherence of its strategic planning, 
tensions remain with inter-sectoral alignment of nutrition concerns. The 
paper highlights three issues which we argue remain unresolved: the fram-
ing of nutrition in Ethiopia; the development of internal nutrition logics 
in complementary sectors; and the remaining gaps in the evidence base.
The Case of Ethiopia
Ethiopia has historically faced nutrition challenges in regard to drought 
and famine, and undernutrition remains a significant challenge in the 
country today (Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute 2014). 
Nearly 8 million people in Ethiopia are considered to be chronically food 
insecure and thus supported through a national social protection pro-
gramme, the ‘Productive Safety Net Programmes’ (aiming to “enable the 
rural poor facing chronic food insecurity to resist shocks, create assets and 
become food self-sufficient”), through multi-annual transfers of food and 
cash (World Food Programme 2017). Recent (2016) USAID figures indi-
cate that 10 million more people are in need of emergency food assistance 
(USAID 2016).
Increasingly, however, Ethiopia is also facing problems of overweight, 
obesity and related non-communicable diseases (NCDs) (Zello 2015; 
Tebekaw et al. 2014), although this is mainly confined to urban settings. 
The 2011 Demographic and Health Survey estimated 6% of women (aged 
15–49  years) to be overweight or obese (Ethiopia Central Statistical 
Agency and ICF International 2012); a low prevalence by global standards 
(Malik et  al. 2013). Yet, the ‘double burden’ of co-existing issues of 
underweight and overweight presents a new and significant challenge for 
Ethiopian nutrition policy (Walls et al. 2016b).
Ethiopia’s political-administrative structures for nutrition policy have 
been shaped by its history of cyclical drought and famines, civil conflict 
and insurgency (Keller 1992; Webb and von Braun 1994) and, more 
recently food insecurity resulting from increasing climate variability (Kassie 
et al. 2013, 2014). Today, the Ethiopian Public Health Institute (EPHI) 
is the advisory body mandated to provide research and evidence to inform 
nutrition policy in the country.
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Historically, nutrition policy in Ethiopia was focused on acute or emer-
gency food shortages (Embassy of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia 2016; Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 1996). However, 
in recent years there have been efforts to establish broader and more sys-
tematic policy responses to nutrition driven by the need to address the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Benson 2005; Ethiopian 
Academy of Science 2013), and provided the basis for the 2008 National 
Nutrition Strategy (NNS) (Federal Ministry of Health 2008).
A more comprehensive nutrition policy has been prioritised by the cen-
tral government in Ethiopia in recent years. Ethiopia’s first National 
Nutrition Programme (NNP) 2008–2013 acknowledged the role of mul-
tiple sectors including health, agriculture, education, and social affairs in 
addressing population nutrition, creating the National Nutrition 
Coordination Body (2008) and the National Nutrition Technical 
Committee (2009) and chaired and co-chaired by the State Minister of 
Health and State Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources respec-
tively (Ministry of Health 2015). The revision of NNP (resulting in NNP-I 
(2013–2015)) endeavoured to address problems arising from this multi- 
sectoral approach (Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of 
Ethiopia 2013). To supplement multi-sectoral working, the government 
established the National Nutrition Coordination Body (NNCB) and the 
National Nutrition Technical Committee (NNTC), with the intention of 
coordinating and mainstreaming nutrition into various sectors.
In terms of nutrition-related outcomes, official documents point to 
substantial declines between 2000 and 2015 in the prevalence of maternal 
anaemia, stunting, underweight children, and in anaemia among children 
under-five (Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
2016). However, the prevalence of wasting remained fairly static (p. 13) 
(Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2016).
Overall, however, high levels of malnutrition remain. Related to this, 
NNP-II found that most ministries “have lagged in mainstreaming nutri-
tion into their sectoral strategic plans. (Government of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2016, p.  21).” Sectoral departments 
lacked an effective organisational structure to mainstream nutrition; sec-
toral plans were not always reshaped to include nutrition goals; sectoral 
nutrition plans were not allocated a budget; responsibilities and account-
abilities were not clearly defined around shared goals; and finally, the 
mechanisms to capture nutrition-relevant data from all sectors were not 
developed (Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
2016). The NNP-II aimed to improve this situation by three broad sets of 
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actions: strengthening the NNCB and local coordination bodies;  requiring 
ministries to establish new nutrition capacity; and establishing both new 
evidence and new evidence-based decision-making systems (Government 
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2016).
To date, there has been only limited research conducted on Ethiopian 
nutrition policymaking; with little explicit consideration of the role of evi-
dence. Nisbett et al. (2015) explored leadership in tackling child undernu-
trition in Ethiopia and identified external challenges influencing individual 
leadership in nutrition policy, including a lack of local-level knowledge, 
evidence and data to inform policy. In particular, the authors highlighted 
the ‘siloed’ nature of local knowledge and data collection and advocated 
for a need to “look at the bigger picture and answer the big research ques-
tions” (Nisbett et al. 2015, p. 41). Kennedy et al. (2015), on the other 
hand, examined the governance of nutrition policy, finding general agree-
ment at multiple levels on the nature of the problem, but various chal-
lenges such as limited leadership, funding, coordination, and incentives 
for inter-sectoral collaboration (Kennedy et al. 2015).
This study extends earlier research and provides more evidence of some 
of the challenges documented above. By engaging with the specific theme 
of evidence use to inform policy decision-making for nutrition in a context 
of multi-sectoral planning, it focuses on a key issue that has been identified 
as constraining multi-sectoral coordination.
Methods
The article draws on findings from 23 in-depth semi-structured interviews 
with stakeholders from key health sector organisations. The interviews 
were undertaken as part of a wider research project on the political aspects 
of evidence use for health policymaking in multiple countries Interviews 
focussed on key themes including: the structures and functions of evi-
dence use within the Ethiopian health sector; the institutional mechanisms 
for evidence uptake; and investigation of the roles of evidence in influenc-
ing recent or important health policy decisions in the country; with a sub-
set of five interviews also specifically exploring the theme of evidence use 
for nutrition policy. Interview data were combined with a documentary 
analysis of federal and relevant international strategies, plans and reports.
Key participants were identified though purposive and snowball sam-
pling strategies. We endeavoured to conduct interviews with policy actors 
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representing a diverse range of perspectives for the health decisions inves-
tigated. Participants involved senior and mid-level stakeholder representa-
tives from a range of institutional types, including government (including 
from the Ministry of Health and Ethiopian Public Health Association), 
international donor agencies (including from UNICEF, Save the Children, 
the US Centers for Disease Control, and European Union), academic 
researchers and other independent non-for-profit groups (including from 
Addis Ababa University, the Ethipioan Academy of Sciences, and the 
Addis Continental Institute of Public Health), and corporate interests 
(including from the National Tobacco Enterprise).
Consent was obtained at the initiation of each interview, with respon-
dents given options on levels of anonymity desired. Ethical approval was 
provided by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine; and 
research permission was obtained from the Ethiopian Public Health 
Institute. As part of the questioning about evidence use for health policy-
making in Ethiopia more generally, respondents were asked for examples 
of particular health issues that could illustrate the application of the 
broader ideas and structures shaping evidence use. The respondents spoke 
about a range of issues, and nutrition was an important issue discussed by 
a number (5) of the respondents from a broad range of institutional types 
(government, academia and international donor agency), leading to fur-
ther investigation into this issue and the analysis undertaken in this paper.
Analysis of interviews involved manual coding of key themes emerging 
from the interviews. This included reading the interview transcripts and 
recording key themes, and then cross-checking these themes through 
searches of key terms of emerging interest. To refine our understanding of 
the information from interviews, this information was then compared with 
and supplemented by that obtained from the documentary review.
In addition to the published academic sources cited throughout this 
paper, the documentary review included a set of unpublished sources 
related specifically to Ethiopia.
FraMIng oF nutrItIon
Despite wide embrace of the idea that evidence should inform policymak-
ing, it has long been recognised that policy-relevant evidence is understood 
differently by different policy communities (c.f. Nutley et  al. 2007; 
Parkhurst 2017; Weiss 1979). As such, it is important to consider how 
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policy issues are framed and how this shapes which pieces of evidence, or 
what forms of evidence, are considered relevant. Unsurprising given its 
past famines, nutrition has historically been framed in Ethiopia as an acute 
or emergency issue. According to one interviewee, this focus could also be 
seen to affect the research agenda on nutrition in the country:
My impression is there is a lot of research especially on emergency nutrition… food 
shortage and acute malnutrition and that seems to affect a significant part of 
the population and it has been a constant focus for many NGOs and the govern-
ment. So much of the research that I have seen is usually around this. (IDI1-17)
As described above, many recent policy documents further illustrate the 
Government of Ethiopia’s focus on undernutrition, with an emphasis on 
key population groups such as children and mothers. These policy docu-
ments have considerably less focus on nutrition problems linked to over-
weight. In the NNP-I (2013–2015), for instance, the word ‘obesity’ is 
mentioned once, in regard to its increasing prevalence in urban areas, 
while ‘overweight’ is not mentioned at all (Government of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2013). Yet our health sector respon-
dents spoke frequently about a shifting conceptualisation in which nutri-
tion as a chronic issue – particularly in regard to overweight/obesity – was 
of increasing importance in policy considerations:
We have a high prevalence who are underweight, but we also have overweight, 
which is coming… The MOH has already prioritised both under and over 
nutrition because you will be surprised, you know in Addis and in the other city, 
in Dire Dawa, you see overweight is also a problem. (IDI-17)
Government policy documents such as the HSTP describe how risk fac-
tors for overweight, obesity and NCD, including physical inactivity and 
unhealthy diets, are widely prevalent in Ethiopia; and particularly in urban 
areas (Ministry of Health 2015). The NNP-II (2016–2020) (Government 
of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2016) has more informa-
tion relating to overweight and obesity, and also includes an indicator on 
overweight women. However, no indicators relate to overweight children, 
and core goals and objectives remain focused on undernutrition. The per-
ception of respondents was thus that any recent shift in research and evi-
dence generation to focus on overweight/obesity and associated NCDs as 
1 IDI refers to in-depth interview, with anonymous numbers assigned.
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described during fieldwork 2014, largely remained at odds with the 
national policy response; which was felt to only minimally address over-
weight and obesity in national strategies.
One potential explanation for this could be that global framings or con-
ceptualisations regarding nutrition were being picked up in  local dis-
courses – even if it appears to a much lesser extent in existing policy. The 
international literature has increasingly in recent years linked undernutri-
tion with overweight and obesity-related health issues, and there has also 
been a dominant discourse in the global health community on the need for 
more multi-sectorial and structural policy responses to addressing nutri-
tion (Kanter et al. 2015; Ruel et al. 2013; Dangour et al. 2013; Garrett 
and Natalicchio 2011; World Bank 2013). Such a push would address the 
underlying causes of malnutrition. This framing was also identified in local 
interviews, with individuals in four separate interviews raising the issue.
It’s now established, there are many studies which have proved this, people who 
have been affected by under nutrition during childhood in the first years of life, 
these are critical years, and … they will have a much higher risk of hypertension, 
overweight, obesity. (IDI-17)
The MoH [is the main actor in recent nutrition policy] and the second we can 
consider the other actors for example other sector, actually the nutrition issue is 
not only for the health issue it is the concern of other sectors like agriculture, 
education, water, actually nine sectors are involved [in revising the NNP]… 
Nutrition is a multsectoral and multidimensional issue. (IDI-23)
This thinking, however, was reflected in national documents as well. 
The HSTP, for instance, describes nutrition as a ‘cross-cutting’ issue 
(Ministry of Health 2015), and two of the five objectives of NNP-I and 
NNP-II relate to this emphasis on multi-sectoral action (Government of 
the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 2013). The Situation 
Analysis of the Nutrition Sector in Ethiopia also reflects this focus, with 
suggestions for greater multisectoral efforts, including a policy recom-
mendation to ‘revisit existing agricultural politics to make them nutrition 
sensitive with a clear result framework’ (p.  85) (FMoH/UNICEF/EU 
Situation Analysis of the Nutrition Sector in Ethiopia: 2000–2015 2016).
There was a suggestion from interviewees that this view in Ethiopia of 
nutrition as a multi-sectoral issue may particularly have been influenced by 
the 2008 Lancet nutrition series, which happened to be launched in Addis 
Ababa. As respondents explained:
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Nutrition is not only public health, it’s many other aspects. Like even globally 
even if you look at [it] from the Lancet for example the cause of stunting only 
20% is nutrition-specific the other is nutrition-sensitive which is not related 
health. So we are saying that nutrition is beyond the health. (IDI-13)
So one of the issues is actually the fact it needs really multi-sectoral action, and 
that is a big challenge and I was there following the launch of that [Lancet] 
strategy…. (IDI-17)
challenges to an ‘upstreaM’  
and MultIsectoral approach
The ‘upstream/downstream’ metaphor commonly used in public health 
captures concerns between paying attention to prevention versus treat-
ment of health issues; with prevention about consideration of the causes of 
health problems (Dorfman and Wallack 2007). An upstream focus would 
address the more distal causes of the problem, sometimes described as the 
‘causes of the causes’ (Marmot 2005), and with nutrition might be 
addressed through leveraging agricultural policy or larger political- 
economy drivers (Balarajan and Reich 2016). A downstream focus would 
be more proximal to the individual, focused perhaps on education and 
information, or provision of micronutrient supplements.
Whilst there may be a growing recognition and desire to respond to 
nutrition in an upstream or structural manner, policy interventions for 
nutrition globally have been described as traditionally focussing down-
stream  – on potentially less effective, or less sustainable interventions 
(Walls et al. 2016a, b). Such interventions can more easily lend themselves 
to measurable (though not necessarily greatest) policy impact, and clearer 
evidence generation.
Our interviews identified criticisms of downstream approaches to 
addressing nutrition in Ethiopia, with one interviewee criticising the gov-
ernment for supporting a micronutrients approach, instead of ‘an inte-
grated dietary approach’ which the respondent believed should start with 
food diversification and only rely on supplementation as a last resort (IDI- 
17). The first version of the NNP (2008–2013), launched prior to this 
report, gave little emphasis to the micronutrients approach. In fact, the 
National Food Fortification Programme was among the chief reasons for 
revising the original NNP (Government of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia 2013). Since then, food supplementation in the form 
of vitamin A for children under 5 and zinc supplementation for diarrhoea 
treatment had been implemented. In addition, legislation requiring salt 
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iodization has been put in place (Government of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia 2013).
Food fortification is considered a means to rapidly address nutrition 
challenges. Some health actors expressed the view that the reasons driving 
policy action in agriculture differ to those in health, and this reflected a 
more general challenge of enacting structural policy changes when doing 
so requires engagement from other sectors, especially the agriculture sec-
tor – seen to be key to a multi-sectoral nutrition response.
If you look at the causes of under nutrition it easily goes outside the health system. 
So one is for example food security, food security is a question of having sufficient 
land productive…the main target for the MOH is to decrease mortality and you 
can’t do that without addressing undernutrition. So I think it makes sense to 
give this assignment to the MoH but there should be also a way to give it more 
power so that’s the whole idea… The only thing is the MoH should have more 
strong department and representatives from all ministries. (IDI-17)
One respondent, for instance, explained that the MoA mandate is to 
increase productivity, and that it is evaluated by this target rather than on 
the nutritional outcomes of its policies per se. (IDI 13). This reflects the 
focus of the first GTP, as previously described (Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia 2011).
The advice to the public from the agricultural sector – advice regarding 
promotion of economic aspects of agricultural production and not its 
potential to improve nutrition  – was considered by respondents to be 
unhelpful from a nutrition perspective, and even in contradiction to advice 
from the MoH. Additionally, agricultural policy was considered not to be 
‘nutrition sensitive’.
[Much agricultural policy] now days is not nutrition sensitive, so the agricul-
ture people are just contradicting some of the messages [from nutrition]. 
Sometimes they say ‘just produce more and gain more money, not to eat’, and 
sometimes they are just promoting only the saving issue and sometimes they are 
not just promoting issue related with the consumption of high food and vegeta-
ble consumption of dense food for the children especially for the under five chil-
dren and for the mother. (IDI-13)
These findings resonate with a question raised by (Roberts 2008) as to 
whether it’s a conflict of interest when an agricultural department is 
“expected to champion and protect both farmers who sell and consumers 
who buy the same product”.
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Under GTP-2, the agricultural sector has a range of major targets (table 
19, GTP-2) in the areas of production, food security, productivity, trade 
and marketing and input supply. These may often be complementary to the 
goals of NNP-2. For example, GTP2 contains targets for improvement in 
the number of production safety net recipients, the size of the food reserve 
and in cereal output. It also contains targets around increases in export 
earnings from major commodities, and these have a complex relationship 
to nutrition improvement, depending significantly on the pay and condi-
tions of workers in export production (Cramer et al. 2017). In addition, 
the promotion of exports of food crops, most notably teff, the major staple 
of Ethiopia and hailed as a new ‘superfood’, may lead to sharp prices rises 
on local markets. Despite its success in earning scarce foreign exchange, 
there have been some criticisms of the partial lifting of export ban on teff, 
with concern that, however sensitive the policy was to nutrition concerns, 
it would reduce domestic food security (Secorun 2016; Reda 2015).
 – One interviewee explained that there could be difficulties when consen-
sus on the involvement of different governmental ministries could not be 
reached:
The whole idea of having a national overarching document was there for a long 
time before that… one of the issues which prevented the launch of even the docu-
ment was to decide which ministry [should coordinate it], so… they told me that 
people at parliament and the Prime Minister’s Office had to make the final 
decision. (IDI-17)
Even with the coordinating framework of the GTP and NNP, there can 
thus be obvious challenges when a policy problem is identified through 
one sector – in this case based on the indicators of malnutrition and related 
health – yet must be addressed by action within another sector (e.g. agri-
culture). There may be differences of opinion on the priority or impor-
tance of policy action, clashes in authority between departments who may 
vie for ownership of policy and interventions, and need for coordination 
and cooperation that adds additional levels of complication beyond what 
would be needed in single-sector policymaking (Pelletier et  al. 2012; 
Hoey and Pelletier 2011; Trivedi 2000; Mills 1990). Health sector respon-
dents certainly described that, under NNP-I and GTP-I, nutrition was not 
sufficiently prioritised in the policy-making of other sectors and that nutri-
tion targets were not sufficiently represented in overarching documents.
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These issues suggest questions as to why up-stream nutrition policy-
making proved difficult under NNP-I. The interviews also throw light on 
key issues in the NNP-II, and reinforce the argument that for multi- 
sectoral policy making, the issue is not only one of aligning interests under 
GTP-II and NNP-II but also of developing capacity around nutrition in 
sectors and producing nutrition-relevant evidence. Crucially they suggest 
that for nutrition to be appropriately framed, the MoA needs to adopt an 
internal logic that aligns its productivity and trade goals enshrined in 
GTP-II with NNP-II goals, and devises and monitors policy using 
nutrition- relevant evidence. More fundamentally, this also requires discus-
sion of trade-offs between multiple and at times competing interests and 
concerns typical within broader political thinking (Lasswell 1990 [1936]).
IMplIcatIons For ‘evIdence InForMed’  
nutrItIon polIcy
The challenge of developing and implementing multi-sectoral policy is 
multifaceted, but interviewees raised two specific challenges in relation to 
evidence use and policy response. First, although multi-sectoral plans and 
infrastructure to address malnutrition were in place, the mandate for 
addressing nutrition lay with the health sector, which was reinforced by 
the nature of nutrition data collected or used.
Ultimately in terms of evidence use, however, this presents a situation 
whereby the evidence that has globally (and locally) provided the motiva-
tion for action – evidence such as under-five mortality, rates of diarrhoea 
and infections, prevalence of overweight and obesity – may not have the 
same importance to many of the key stakeholders required for sustainable, 
effective, policy action. This is because such evidence may not be judged 
as relevant by non-health stakeholders if their own institutional logics are 
based around a different normative position or set of goals. Indeed, 
respondents reflected on how the framing of relevant evidence could vary 
between the international discourse and the relevant local institutions cut-
ting across a number of sectors – each with its own idea of what is relevant 
to justify policy action or inform policy decisions.
Respondents discussed the need for data and research evidence show-
ing impacts on more than just health outcomes (e.g. educational or eco-
nomic productivity) in order to achieve policy change. One respondent 
explained:
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The impact of malnutrition for example on economic development, you have to 
quantify it… you have to convert the malnutrition impact in money and the 
money for the national development. You have to convert the impact of malnutri-
tion for example on education; if a child is malnourished the performance for 
education will be just… you can tell just like this […] We get [information on] 
impact of malnutrition across different sectors. On health, on education on pro-
ductivity … At every advocacy place we are using those data actually. (IDI-23)
Indeed, as a way of providing multi-sectoral nutrition evidence, the 
Government of Ethiopia published a report: The cost of hunger in Ethiopia: 
Implications for the growth and transformation of Ethiopia, becoming the 
first country to engage in the Africa Union’s Cost of Hunger exercise 
(African Union Commission, World Food Programme, and Africa 2012). 
This report provides economic costing of the long-term impacts of under-
five undernutrition, exploring the cost of higher healthcare spending on 
this group, education costs when these people are in the school system, and 
the productivity costs as they enter the workforce – and estimates that in 
2009, the cost of child undernutrition was 55.5 billion Ethiopian Birr 
(16.5% of GDP – approximately USD$4.3 billion in Dec 2009).
Ethiopia’s early involvement in the cost of hunger exercise demon-
strates commitment to the creation of evidence relevant to other sectors. 
As such, it is a powerful tool to aid multi-sectoral policymaking, and pro-
vides evidence relevant to other targets in the GTP-2 plan. However, in 
itself, it only partially quantifies the goals of NNP-2. While NNP-2 is con-
cerned with the undernutrition of young children, it is also concerned 
with the undernutrition of adolescents and women. Equally, our health 
sector respondents described how rising rates of overweight and obesity 
and their NCD impacts were relevant to nutrition policymaking. So the 
Cost of Hunger exercise appears only to provide a partial multi-sectoral 
evidence base.
A final challenge raised in our interviews, however, was the perception 
that multi-level data from across the country (including decentralised 
information) was also needed to inform an appropriate nutrition strategy, 
but that these data were not yet available in sufficient volume. One respon-
dent, for instance, stated:
We are just starting to utilise the available resource at different levels. 
Information is important for different levels not only central level… I think 
within the next five years we can get a clear picture of information flow from 
across different sectors, horizontally as well as vertically. (IDI-23)
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These challenges in the evidence base may particularly undermine 
upstream intervention and planning – for nutrition or other health policy 
issues. Downie (2016) has described the Government of Ethiopia as par-
ticularly outcome oriented, with a centralised drive to achieve ‘near term 
development goals’ (pp. vi) While our study was not able to validate this 
claim, it is worth noting that if a principle focus of the government is for 
evidence that can show measurable outcomes aligned with core targets on 
undernutrition, this would presumably incentivise the use of forms of evi-
dence that focus on immediate and direct impacts that can more easily be 
quantified, such as supplemental nutrition for acute malnutrition cases. 
The evidence base required for, and useful for, informing the addressing 
of and evaluating the impact of interventions targeting upstream struc-
tural determinants of health including nutrition are much broader, less 
certain, and often harder to quantify (Bonnefoy et  al. 2007; Parkhurst 
2017). Accordingly, the intervention types given the greatest attention 
may be those that are less likely to bring about more systematic and sus-
tained progress over the longer term.
dIscussIon
The framing of nutrition in Ethiopia is changing, with greater discussion 
of considering malnutrition in all its forms: undernutrition and micronu-
trient deficiencies, as well as overweight, obesity and NCDs. Nutrition has 
also been seen at the highest level of Government as an issue that requires 
multi-sectoral action. However, our interviews provided a health sector 
perspective to the problems of target setting and evidence use.
Thus, while there has been a broader framing of nutrition amongst 
health stakeholders and to some extent in official nutrition policy, over-
weight- and obesity-related targets are less evident in key documents. 
While, in theory, responding to nutrition more holistically and multi- 
sectorally reflects the state of contemporary thinking about the most effec-
tive approach to addressing malnutrition, such approaches present 
particular challenges to the idea of an obvious body of evidence that can 
simply inform or guide policymaking. One way to understand the limits to 
this conceptualisation has been to apply an institutional lens, considering 
the structures in place that influence which evidence is brought to bear on 
policy decisions and the institutionalised logics that relate to evidence use, 
which may differ across agencies involved in nutrition policy.
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In public health, there is a recognised tension between the need for 
more structural interventions, and the realities that interventions focus-
sing on treatment or downstream individual approaches can be easier to 
conceptualise, measure, and evaluate. Even with increased recognition or 
calls for upstream action, the existing data and evidence may focus policy 
action on downstream efforts, which appears to remain a challenge for 
nutrition policy in Ethiopia. Without a solution, this may continue to 
hamper the implementation of NNP-2.
The more recent 2016 Situation Analysis of the Nutrition Sector in 
Ethiopia document attempts to make agriculture in Ethiopia more 
nutrition- sensitive through the adoption of dietary diversity as an out-
come indicator in the most recent iteration of the Agricultural Growth 
Program (AGP). It also describes how, for the agricultural sector, appro-
priate indicators of food security and dietary diversity should be chosen for 
evaluation of agricultural sector responsibilities (FMoH/UNICEF/EU 
Situation Analysis of the Nutrition Sector in Ethiopia: 2000–2015 2016). 
This suggests that while data may block how far dominant ideas may be 
able to progress in shaping policy, those ideas can work to re-shape which 
data are generated, potentially providing useful evidence for future 
approaches to nutrition policy.
An important insight into the challenges faced in evidence use to inform 
nutrition policy come from March and Olsen’s institutional concept of the 
‘logic of appropriateness’, which captures the ways that institutions 
develop their own internal norms, values, and understandings of how 
things should work, which are enacted in their operations (March and 
Olsen 1984, 2011). This idea provides an opportunity for reflection on 
the unexpected results that can arise when differing logics come into con-
flict in policy debates.
Different institutional norms, values and logics of appropriateness 
between the health and agricultural sectors were perceived by the health 
sector actors in our study (although we acknowledge that greater insight 
could be obtained by further work interviewing representatives of 
 agriculture and other sectors). Despite the framing given by NNP and 
GTP, agricultural interests were often considered by our respondents to be 
driven by productivity targets and associated evaluation, without appropri-
ate inclusion of nutrition objectives. This view resonates with the official 
acknowledgements of the weaknesses of NNP (above). Respondents also 
spoke of need for nutrition to be framed in terms of its impact on the 
country’s economic development at times. However, such challenges are 
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not unique to Ethiopia. Balarajan and Reich (2016) have described the 
challenges posed by different stakeholder narratives of nutrition globally 
(Balarajan and Reich 2016).
There are many targets that are complementary between sectors, and the 
The cost of hunger in Ethiopia: Implications for the growth and transformation 
of Ethiopia report helps identify these. In future, the new NNP-2 and GTP-2 
may provide a framework to produce rapid progress on those areas where 
evidence suggests strong mutual gains. An example of such synergy is the 
fact that one of the initiatives of the NNP-I (2013–2015) was to “promote 
and disseminate bio-fortified micronutrient-rich staple food products, such as 
orange sweet potatoes and quality protein-rich maize.” This initiative is under 
the direct influence of the MoA. By allocating necessary attention to this 
initiative, the MoA not only contributes to the realization of the objectives 
set forth in the NNP-1, and NNP-2, but also this is a core objective for the 
MoA itself. Obviously, these areas are particularly likely to advance strongly 
under the existing multisectoral coordination framework because they talk 
to evidence and targets that are equally recognised and valued.
conclusIon
This paper has discussed an area of acknowledged weakness in Ethiopia’s 
multi-sectoral nutrition policy framework: that of the role of policymaking 
with varied, conflicting and missing evidence. It focuses particularly on 
health stakeholder perspectives, and thus can only explore some of the 
issues involved. Despite this, it illuminates three issues. First, it helps 
explain the problems in the coordination of mandates and evidence in 
NNP-1 and suggests likely areas for continuing challenge under NNP-2. 
Second, we have argued that there is still a lack of clarity about the role of 
upstream interventions, and despite a framework for integrating targets 
through NNP-2 and GTP-2, this may be worsened by the tension with 
some agricultural sector targets. Here the point is that unified frameworks 
result from tense, often unseen struggles between conflicting political 
goals. Third, despite the improvements in the evidence base, we argue that 
further evidence is needed to inform nutrition policymaking in Ethiopia, 
and that more evidence is needed to inform policy in non-health sectors 
on nutrition-specific interventions.
Even though Ethiopia has made progress in terms of nutrition targets 
and has a strategic framework aiming to address past problems, it shares 
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the challenge of countries elsewhere in addressing nutrition as a multi- 
sectoral issue. It also provides a useful case of institutional logics and how 
assumptions about the type and role of policy-relevant evidence for nutri-
tion policy action may not hold across sectors.
Our study takes place at a key moment in nutrition policy making in 
Ethiopia. Whilst we found that respondents were aware of a variety of 
nutrition problems and approaches to nutritional issues, our findings con-
trast with those of Kennedy et al. (2015), who described a ‘general consen-
sus’ amongst their interview respondents that the ‘nutrition problem’ in 
Ethiopia is one of undernutrition (with respondents from a broad range of 
sectors). This difference may reflect the earlier (2013, rather than at the 
end of 2014) period of data collection, but may also reflect differences in 
the methodological and epistemological approach of the two studies. That 
said, the importance of the focus on undernutrition should not be under-
estimated. This was also recognised by our respondents as critical and a 
major challenge, but our research questions particularly endeavoured to 
probe about other aspects of nutrition policy beyond this dominant frame.
Finally, this paper explored the role that evidence and target-setting can 
play in informing and influencing the direction of policy development for 
nutrition. Rather than a simple one-way path from evidence to policy, the 
case of nutrition has shown the complex interaction of evidence within 
different conceptualisations of policy problems and responses. These pro-
cesses play out in a setting where there is a strong steer to unified approaches 
at the national level. Evidence may not always easily speak to preferred 
policy responses, and the importance or relevance of different types of 
evidence may vary across sectors based on varying institutionalised logics 
by which they purse policy goals. Evidence is not fixed, with new construc-
tions of data and evidence always emerging, and subject to influence by 
those stakeholders active in the particular policy arena. We thus expect to 
see continuing evolution of the body of evidence available to inform nutri-
tion policy in Ethiopia, as well as potential changes in how different stake-
holders conceptualise the importance of different evidence types.
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IntroductIon
This chapter explores some of the governmental implications of particular 
uses of policy relevant data and evidence for health policymaking in Ghana. 
In particular it looks beyond issues of technical capacity to include issues 
of political responsibility—namely responsibility to use evidence, to take it 
into account, and to account for it. It is worth noting that claims that 
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evidence can improve accountability practices and democratic decisions 
are seen within some current calls for ‘evidence-based policymaking’ 
(EBPM) (c.f: Weisburd and Neyroud 2011; Clarence 2002), but the way 
such improvement should occur remains vague and under-investigated. 
From a general decision-making perspective, the use of evidence serves to 
inform decisions and to make them more ‘rational’. In addition, explicit 
use of evidence potentially improves transparency and along with it the 
accountability of decisions. However, accountability is not an inherent 
property of decisions. It is a practice put into being by policy agents and 
procedures.
This chapter uses a case study of Ghana in order to explore how uses of 
evidence for national planning link with concepts of accountability, and 
what political effects particular uses of evidence can produce. The analysis 
focuses on a specific stage of the policy cycle, namely the evaluation pro-
cess of health policies and programs. Policy evaluation has indeed been 
assigned an ever important role in policymaking through the idea that 
decisions are ‘better’ when they can be tested (Weiss 1999). Under this 
view, policy evaluation combines governance needs for more efficient pol-
icy outcomes with legitimacy quests for more democratic decision pro-
cesses and outcomes. Evidence plays a prominent role in enabling such 
tests and validating decisions according to their outcomes. Indeed, the 
mechanisms by which evidence from evaluation systems work to inform 
future policy choices can be seen as a process by which technical measure-
ments of policy achievements take on political value in shaping policy 
directions. But questions remain about how such translation occurs in 
practice; and how it connects concepts of efficient and legitimate policy-
making. These are important questions which can be obscured by the 
apolitical calls for ‘evidence use’ in policymaking. In this chapter, the term 
‘evaluation’ principally refers to data related to performance monitoring, 
but also refers to how such data are used to evaluate policy choices as well.
As a parliamentary democracy and an aid-recipient country,1 Ghana 
provides an interesting arena in which to investigate the democratic impli-
cations of evidence use in policymaking, namely by applying the concerns, 
which have traditionally been applied to more high-income countries, 
over the expansion of expert-based decision-making structures outside 
1 A recent estimate from the U.S. Global Health Initiative in Ghana shows that 40% of the 
national budget comes from development assistance (available at http://www.ghi.gov/
wherewework/docs/ghanastrategy.pdf).
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national polities (Barnett and Finnemore 1999) and the  consequent bal-
ance between governance improvements and legitimacy decisions.
In order to investigate the practical applications of evidence use in pol-
icy evaluation in Ghana, and its links to accountability, this paper com-
bines theoretical and empirical considerations as follows: First, we briefly 
review theoretical arguments drawn from public administration and policy 
studies to understand how the concepts of accountability and evidence use 
have been associated in governance and policymaking studies. We then 
investigate such association through empirical analysis of health policy in 
Ghana. Finally, we discuss the theoretical contributions in light of both 
our empirical findings and sociological approaches to policymaking.
Our empirical analysis is principally informed by a set of 24 in-depth 
interviews following a semi-structured approach, conducted in 2014 with 
a set of stakeholders in Ghanaian health policy—including representatives 
of the Ministry of Health (MoH), the Ghana Health Service (GHS), 
international development partners (DP), local nongovernment organiza-
tions (LNGOs), and members of parliament (MP). When specific inter-
viewees are cited in this paper, they are designated by an anonymous 
number and one of these acronyms. The interviews aimed to understand 
the institutional role and position of each interviewee with respect to 
other actors in the health sector, as well as their perception and under-
standing of evidence use in health policymaking. Data analysis partly ben-
efitted from the use of qualitative tools, such coding using the Nvivo 
qualitative software package, and from the triangulation with other sources 
of data including official documents.
Evaluation and Accountability Within a Policy Space
In its simplest form, accountability links the capacity to evaluate decision 
outcomes to the idea of controlling political agency (Dubnick and 
Frederickson 2011). As per the principal-agent model, the elected principal 
confers the delegated administrative ‘agent’ the power to apply directives, 
while endowing the agent with a margin of discretion. Hence, the need to 
oversee her decisions by making the agent accountable for them (Pratt and 
Zeckhauser 1991). In principle, evidence helps operationalize account-
ability rules: by informing decisions within the range of discretion that 
authorities have over decisions, and by defining the legitimacy of 
decisions.
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Under this conceptualization of accountability and evidence use, the 
process of evaluating decisions becomes more than a simple managerial or 
technical function. Rather, evaluation evidence serves as a powerful tool 
for testing the achievement of policy objectives, directing policy discus-
sions, validating a particular policy strategy, and rewarding it by allocating 
more funds or prolonging its life cycle. However, the contribution of evi-
dence to accountability depends on the extent to which evidence also 
exposes decisions to judgment and contestation (Heidelberg 2015).
Precisely for these reasons of multiple functionality of evidence use, it is 
critical to analyze how pieces of evidence shift from being used for simple 
technical measurement, to more normative judging (valuation) of policy. 
Applying an institutional lens, however, means that we are particularly 
interested in how this shift can often occur within a specific policy space 
created by formalized evaluation processes. These insights provide a 
framework in which we can analyze how the policy evaluation process 
provides space for participation and contestation among stakeholders over 
the use of evidence to judge policy value. It further allows reflection on 
how rules of accountability within those evaluation processes serve to 
establish power relations and set the spaces through which such contesta-
tion takes place.
EvIdEncE and HEaltH SEctor aSSESSmEnt In GHana
Ghana is a lower-middle income country located in Western Africa. It is 
often considered one of the more democratic and developed of Sub- 
Saharan African nations, but it still suffers from significant resource limita-
tions. The structure of the health system in Ghana follows the basics of 
functional separation between decision making and implementation in 
policymaking (Cassels 1995). Due to concerns over efficiency, some func-
tions traditionally concentrated in the MoH were delegated to technical 
agencies benefitting from a certain degree of independence from govern-
ment and discretion. The GHS is an autonomous Executive Agency of the 
MoH and represents one of the most important policy implementation 
bodies in the health sector, responsible for managing and operating all 
public health facilities and tasked with planning, implementation, moni-
toring and performance assessment of health programmes and services 
(Adjei 2003). The GHS has considerable power in the health sector. It was 
set upon the managerial objective of improving service delivery in Ghana, 
namely by deconcentrating the vertical structure of programs under the 
E. VECCHIONE AND J. PARKHURST
 79
MoH (e.g., HIV, TBA, etc.) into local units of management and 
 implementation (Cassels and Janovsky 1992). In practice, however, the 
GHS provides a parallel structure of hierarchical governance (Cassels and 
Janovsky 1992) serving the broader political objective of bringing coher-
ence into the health system.
The Health Information Management Department (HIMD) of the 
Policy, Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluation (PPME) division was estab-
lished within the GHS as the focal unit responsible for the collection, 
analysis, reporting, and presentation of health service information (Adjei 
2003). Regional and the District level offices were established with each 
having their own Health Administrations (RHAs and DHAs) and each 
should report to the higher hierarchical level (Adjei 2003) (see Fig. 4.1) 
(Couttolenc 2012). In spite of some problems—e.g. overlapping respon-
sibilities at times emerging across managerial units and local political 
authorities (Couttolenc 2012),2 a fairly well formalized structure of 
accountability exists (within the GHS and between the GHS and the 
MoH), integrated with a systematic practice of reporting and reviewing 
performances of implementation policies, as widely acknowledged by our 
interviewees at the GHS.
The connection between evidence use and accountability in the Ghana 
health system can be seen in the integration of the Health Information 
Management Department (HIMD) within this national system of account-
ability. The HIMD’s specific task is to gather health information such as 
administrative, demographic, and clinical data—typically collected through 
desk review, although sometimes accompanied by interviews (Zakariah 
2014). This is fed upwards from facility to district to region and, ulti-
mately, to central health management levels in order to inform health sec-
tor performances (for more details see Ghana Health Service 2012, p. 30). 
The Centre for Health Information Management within the HIMD col-
lects the data from the district level through the software called the District 
Health Information Management Information System, and then sends it 
to the regional level. The aim of this procedure is to collect information 
2 Confusion and overlapping responsibilities are mainly due to the fact that the deconcen-
tration of health services as under the Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospitals Act 525 
of 1996, has not yet produced full delegation of power to the local assemblies representing 
the political authority at the district level as in the Local Government Act 462 of 1993 
(Couttolenc 2012). For instance, one local key informant explained that, as consequence of 
incomplete decentralization, there exists a dual hierarchy in the lines of accountability of the 
DHA, which has to report back to both the district assembly and to the regional director.
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from the district up to the national level in order to support each Ministerial 
Agency within the health sector—not only the GHS—with the implemen-
tation of their respective strategies established in their ‘Programmes of 
Work’ (POWs). Each Agency assesses its progress in implementing the 
POWs through an in-house Monitoring & Evaluation (M&E) plan, which 
relies on the information produced by the HIMD. The results of M&E 
outcomes should finally converge each year into the Interagency/Health 
Sector Performance Review.
Therefore, a combined mechanism of information diffusion and evalu-
ation of performance exists in Ghana that ties the health governance struc-
ture into a system based on a structured review process: operating internally 
at each administrative level and vertically between district, regional, and 
headquarter managers via peer-review meetings.
accountabIlIty, EvaluatIon and PowEr 
In GHanaIan HEaltH PolIcy
In addition to the process described above combining information and 
evaluation within the Ghanaian hierarchy, a ‘Holistic Assessment tool’ has 
been developed to guide interagency performance review. The Holistic 
Assessment tool was established within the framework of the Common 
Management Arrangement (CMA), which governs and set the rules for 
partnership between the MoH and international donors.
As we will discuss, the tool functions as interface between the MoH, 
responsible for the health sector performance, and international donor 
agencies, which demand accountability of performances to the MoH.
The CMA was conceived to address the problem of parallel donor systems 
and increased aid transaction costs. Now in its third iteration (CMA III), the 
CMA itself was originally introduced in 1997 with the national health sector 
reform of decentralizing service delivery—the creation of the GHS being 
one of the main outcomes—under the sponsorship of the World Health 
Organization (Ghana Health Sector 2012, p.  5). A health- sector- wide 
approach was established along with a pooled funding account of donor 
funds managed by the MoH (Pallas et al. 2015). The method to govern this 
new framework of collaboration was the Holistic Assessment (IHP+ 2003).
The use of sector-wide indicators, milestones, and targets are a key com-
ponent of the Holistic Assessment tool. These are established at the national 
level within the four-year Health Sector Medium Term Development Plan 
(HSMTDP) and are (re-)formulated each year with the programme of 
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work (POW) that the MoH prepares in line with the objectives of the 
national health strategy as set in the HSMTDP.3 Milestones, targets, and 
indicators at the local level are derived from national equivalents. The data 
generated by the HIMD from the district to the national level are devoted 
to fill sector-wide indicators specified in the HSMTDP from which health 
sector agencies draw their own POWs and implementation strategies 
(Nyonator et al. 2014). Targets, are negotiated between the GHS and rel-
evant decentralized bodies to administer DPs’ funds across the national, 
regional and district level.4
The Holistic Assessment tool is also used by international partners to 
assess health sector performances. Thus, international donors are involved 
in the process of selecting indicators, targets and milestones. Information 
appears to indicate that performance indicators get established and revised 
each November of the year during the Business Meeting between the MoH 
and DP (Ghana Health Sector 2012).5 Based on these indicators, the 
Holistic Assessment reports a score for each health sector objective estab-
lished within the annual POW, e.g., bridging equity gaps in health care, 
improving efficiency, and effectiveness in the health system. A score of +1 
is attributed if the indicator has attained the set target, 0 if it just show a 
good trend, −1 if the target has been missed (IHP+ 2003, pp. 37–38).
Interviews conducted with both administrative officials of the MoH 
and DP confirmed that, besides the senior managers meeting at the GHS, 
the main venue for research dissemination and discussion of evidence was 
3 The HSMTDP is prepared by the MoH and its Ministries, Departments, and Agencies 
under the guidance of the National Development Commission and sets the objectives of the 
national health strategy over a period of four years.
4 There are several Budget and Management Centres spread throughout the three admin-
istrative and facility levels. The headquarters of the GHS is managed as one of them; 10 
Regional Health Administration, 8 Regional Hospitals, 110 District Health Administrations, 
and 95 District Hospitals (GHS, available at http://www.ghanahealthservice.org/ghs-sub-
category.php?cid=&scid=43).
5 There are three business meetings. The business meeting during the April health summit 
will assess the sector Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) to feed into the Multi-
Donor Budget Support dialogue. The second business meeting in August will review the 
sector’s progress from the beginning of the year to date and provide an opportunity to table 
new issues. The business meeting in November will be devoted to planning and budgeting. 
The meeting will discuss and agree on health sector plans and associated budget for the ensu-
ing year. It will also agree on indicators for the PAF based on the sector program that was 
presented and discussed. Finally, and “Aide Memoire” will be signed by the Ministry of 
Health and representatives of Development Partners that records the decisions taken during 
the business meeting of November.
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the Health Summit—the annual meeting in which DP and government 
discussed the Holistic Assessment of the health sector (Interviews MoH- 
1, DP-1, DP-2, DP-3). Indeed, according to one MoH official, the Health 
Summit is “the key policymaking structure within the sector” (MoH-1). 
The presentation of the Holistic Assessment to the Health Summit is to 
provide the mechanism for all sector partners to review performance and 
assess the level of compliance with the CMA. However, this mechanism of 
data utilisation serves another purpose besides coordination between dif-
ferent levels of health system governance: it makes the system evaluable by 
external reviewers. However, the CMA clearly states that the use of the 
Holistic Assessment tool should be made “in line with the principles of 
mutual accountability” between the MoH and the donors (Ghana Health 
Sector 2012, p.  7—emphasis added) showing that the Health Summit 
represents not only an additional venue of evaluation, but also an addi-
tional system of accountability in which the MoH is accountable to DP for 
the overall performance of the health sector.
The Accountability Implications of Uses of Evidence
The creation of a second system of accountability external and parallel to 
the hierarchical structure of management of the Ghana health system 
could in theory be managed through the use of common tools for evalua-
tion, which might ensure the alignment and coordination between the 
two systems of accountability (and evaluation). However, the scores 
attributed to each target in the Holistic Assessment entails some political 
judgment of success and failure, raising questions of responsibility and 
authority to decide on these outcomes (Bovens et al. 2006). Having two 
accountability systems driven by different stakeholders thus can make it 
unclear to whom responsibility and liability issues should be referred.
The World Health Organizatoin’s description of Ministries of Health as 
having key ‘stewardship’ roles in country health decision making (World 
Health Organization 2000) could imply that the MoH is responsible for 
the health sector performance and should have overarching authority over 
relevant stakeholders, active in the health sector including NGOs, interna-
tional donors, health agencies, academics, health associations, etc. In prac-
tice this is not the case, as each stakeholder has its own power to influence 
the outcome of policy evaluation and, accordingly, influence or bypass 
accountability structures in place. The ability to do this, in turn, depends 
on the capacity of each stakeholder to use evidence as a tool for applying 
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its scrutiny to policy performances and defining its discretion in guiding 
future policy directions; hence, evidence appears as a powerful tool for 
stakeholders to negotiate their own position with respect to the other 
participants.
tEcHnIcal EvaluatIon and accountabIlIty 
mEcHanISmS
Indicators aim to ‘indicate’ (rather than prove) whether some program-
matic situation is still relevant to be considered within a certain policy per-
spective or whether new situations have emerged that affect policy 
trajectories. As in the case of Ghana, the HIMD has primarily the duty to 
‘fill’—rather than create—indicators, as indicators are generally established 
by international bodies such as the WHO; however, our interviews stated 
that some margin of discretion over data selection always exists, especially 
when data are lacking. Also, discretion exists in the very use of indicators to 
produce reports and draw political attention. So, for instance, one inter-
viewee indicated that the Director General of the GHS can request specific 
data or indicators that do not fall into the HSTMDP (GHS-1). The discre-
tion over data and indicators could also be seen in the way that particular 
pieces of data, or particular results of analysis, are promoted by bureaucrats 
within the HIMD to influence policymakers (GHS-1).
The discretion in filling indicators with data is not a problem per se, 
neither is selecting specific indicators to promote political awareness over 
certain issues; on the contrary, discretion is a typical characteristic of tech-
nical agencies supposed to simplify very complex situations and enhance 
the quality and pace of policy decisions. However, discretion raises ques-
tions if it is exclusively driven by bureaucracy, in the absence of political 
engagement to use information in a way that reflects political priorities. As 
a general consideration, this is a technical problem of managerial account-
ability relationships: in a typical principal-agent perspective, the ‘principal’ 
should guide the ‘agent’ in the implementation of policy objectives (Pratt 
and Zeckhauser 1991). In the case of Ghana, an additional concern relates 
to the fact that the production of indicators and the political values built 
into them will be used as a policy tool for negotiation (i.e., the Holistic 
Assessment tool) during the Health Summit. The holistic assessment of 
progress is indeed meant to be presented and discussed during the Health 
Summit and negotiated and agreed upon by the MoH and Partners at the 
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immediately subsequent business meeting in April (Ghana Health Sector 
2012, p. 20). Indeed, the outcome of the health sector assessment serves 
as the basis for discussing the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) 
for Multi-Donor Budget Support during the business meeting following 
the Health Summit (Ghana Health Sector 2012).6 Therefore, the CMA 
sets the framework for both constructing evidence—by specifying how the 
Holistic Assessment tool should be used—and deciding which evidence 
should be taken as relevant for future planning.
The case of Ghana shows that the use of evidence does not respond to 
a purely informative concern of enhancing the quality of decisions and 
anticipating the consequences of actions; it also responds to the need to 
justify decisions at the moment of the Health Summit, hence to negotiate 
the value of the actions that may follow (Boltanski and Thévenot 2006). 
Further, the power of DP to influence the selection and evaluation of indi-
cators influences the outcome of the negotiating process and the setting of 
future policy directions. Indeed, the capacity that stakeholders have to 
influence each other’s views often reflects an adversarial process, in which 
the construction of policy meaning occurs through negotiation between 
competing views over policy performances and the subsequent judgments 
on future policy directions (Bovens et al. 2006). Evidence can be used to 
arbitrate such adversarial process, but at the same time, where disparity 
emerges as to the capacity to employ it, evidence can end up determining 
policy directions.
Excluding coercion, the power that each actor has to influence the pro-
cess in which policy value get shaped partly rests in the way accountability 
structures establish common rules for participation and value discussions. 
These rules, in turn, get operationalized by stakeholders through the 
selection, activation, and evaluation of policy evaluation tools (Pearce 
et al. 2014). And indeed these tools create the conditions for setting dif-
ferent types of public spaces of discussion while realistically admitting only 
those participants with the capacity to provide insights and feedback. For 
instance, one of our interviewees from the MoH complained about the 
superior technical capacity of DP to produce evidence of performances 
(GHS-1). This asymmetry is problematic in two respects: on the one 
hand, Ghanaian officials have little capacity to enter the technical discus-
sion, hence to raise issues of political relevance connected to them, due to 
a lack of counteracting arguments.
6 See supra note 6.
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On the other hand, the absence of clear problem setting and policy 
directions established by the MoH makes the discussion dominated by 
technical considerations of policy implementation performance. 
Interviewees from both DP and NGOs (DP-3 and LNGO-1) recognized 
such absence as problematic. In the wording of one representative of an 
international agency (DP-3), health policy in Ghana is only conceived in 
operational and strategic terms by the government and never in terms of 
policy objectives; accordingly, indicators are set only in the form of out-
comes (e.g., how many new hospitals have been built?) rather than impacts 
(e.g., how much child mortality has diminished?). On a different level, an 
NGO representative (LNGO-1) explained that the Ghana Coalition of 
NGOs in Health (http://www.ghanahealthngos.net/) has recently 
decided to challenge the government on health priorities by creating a 
concurrent space of advocacy and evidence use; the objective being to 
produce an alternative evidence-based report and submit it to the parlia-
ment select committee on health in order to influence health financing. 
However, it has been reported that the Parliament has very little power in 
influencing actual health policy outcomes (Ayee 2002) as some of our 
interviewees confirmed. It was explained, for instance, that the Parliament 
lacks the financial resources to /commission its own inquiries and studies, 
which could allow it to have greater say in the direction of health policy. 
This makes Parliament’s influence over domestic policy dependent on 
external aid provided directly to the legislature, for instance for organizing 
meetings with the civil society (DP-3, MEP-1 DP-1); at the same time, 
such dependence renders the Parliament practically impotent to have a say 
in the approval of sectoral budgets (Ayee 2002).
Therefore, evidence use in this policy space centres mainly on the use of 
common indicators, which might fail to link evaluation to ‘accountable’ 
(and potentially more democratic) decisions. The reason draws precisely 
on the duality of both evidence use and accountability relationships. In the 
first case, evidence use is both an informative and justificatory policy tool; 
in the second, accountability relationships envisage at the same time 
reporting on performances and policy achievements, and exposing perfor-
mances to some judgments and deliberation.
Evidence Use and Policy Value Judgements
As much as a practical investigation on the use of evidence in policy evalu-
ation has revealed the existence of structures of power, it has also revealed 
that policy evaluation is not only a technical process of assessment, but a 
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political process of value formation and judgment. In the case of Ghana, 
the health policymaking process sees the two typical phases of policy eval-
uation: (i) evidence synthesis and (ii) learning (i.e. evaluation and valua-
tion), disjointed into two separate spaces of accountability. One is 
structured around a decentralized structure of governance, whereas the 
other relies on the partnership between donors and the MoH. Whereas 
the use of evidence—inscribed in the Holistic Assessment tool—is in prin-
ciple envisaged in bringing these two spaces together, they remain sepa-
rated. This situation demonstrated that the relation between technical 
evaluation and political accountability is not always linear, nor can it be 
fixed by calls for more evidence use. Instead, looking at the systems of 
accountability in place along with the practices inscribed into them is cru-
cial to understand the democratic implications of evidence use. In con-
ducting policy evaluation, accountability relationships are important in 
that they help to set, or reconfigure, the power and influence between 
stakeholders and decision makers. Accountability is a quite elusive but 
powerful concept that, broadly speaking, indicates the range of respon-
siveness of policymakers to stakeholders’ interests and values. During—
and in contribution to—policy evaluation, interests and ideas of 
stakeholders become actionable through the way policy outcomes are 
assessed and policy directions are then selected or altered.
Further, by making political values exposed to public judgment and 
contestation (Heidelberg 2015), accountability goes beyond simplistic 
checks of stakeholders’ interests and enables a process of continuous 
reconstruction of political values. In this sense, accountability structures 
are important not only to shape authority relationships, but also to activate 
a social mechanism of participation in which the principles of an ideal rela-
tionship between those who govern and those who are governed (Bovens 
2010; Flinders 2011; Heidelberg 2015; Koppell 2005; Salminen and 
Lehto 2012) are continuously recreated each time they are ‘tested’ against 
legitimacy considerations (Rosanvallon 2011). In turn, the capacity to use 
knowledge and evidence becomes crucial to (re-)organize such principles 
through mechanisms of responsiveness and degrees of scrutiny over poli-
cymakers’ decisions; hence, crucial to operationalize accountability.
concluSIonS
In this chapter, we have explored the implications of the use of evidence 
for democratic decision making by looking at the accountability structures 
in Ghana. The Health Summit in Ghana revealed the importance of the 
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policy evaluation stage within the policymaking process for understanding 
the effects of the use of evidence in policymaking—in terms of how the use 
of data goes beyond technical measurement, and serves to establish politi-
cal judgements and affect policy choices. In this process, we found that use 
of evidence is a means through which power is exercised. Also, the use 
policy evaluation within the Health Summit reveals the role of evidence 
use in both informing and justifying decisions and its relevance for under-
standing how accountability relationships matter in structuring power 
relations. The structure of the accountability relationship, therefore, pro-
vides the basis for discussing issues of democratic decision making con-
nected to the use of evidence in policymaking. Indeed, the involvement of 
international donors, responsible for funding a significant amount of 
health services, can challenge national structures of authority and account-
ability that exist within the existing governance structure of the state.
International donors often champion the language of evidence based 
policymaking, while simultaneously embracing the language of good gov-
ernance and democratic representation in aid-recipient countries. As the 
case of Ghana has showed, however, it is important that donors involved 
in processes of evidence use to inform policy—either by extracting local 
data to generate their own assessments or in constructing indicators to 
serve as evaluation tools—consciously consider the potential implications 
these practices have over local accountability mechanisms along with pos-
sible legitimacy concerns. Data created to evaluate (or monitor the perfor-
mance of) a health sector’s functioning may often be described as purely 
technical tools. Yet when such data are used to inform policy and plan-
ning, they can have direct political implications, reflecting the political 
realities of decision making and planning structures in a country. As shown 
here, their use can create new accountability systems and thus raise ques-
tions over governance and influence over local policy decisions.
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CHAPTER 5
Using Evidence in a Highly Fragmented 
Legislature: The Case of Colombia’s Health 
System Reform
Arturo Alvarez-Rosete and Benjamin Hawkins
IntroductIon
This chapter examines how evidence is used in major policy health policy 
initiatives in a highly contested political context. Through a case study of 
legislation proposed in the context of Colombia’s ongoing health systems 
reformed process, it explores how such use is affected by the specific role 
played by the legislature within a highly fragmented polity. We use an 
institutionalist framework to identify three concentric layers of fragmenta-
tion: at the social, political and administrative levels. The former refers to 
macro levels social structures and factors shaping Colombian society and 
politics, including the ongoing armed conflict as associated social cleav-
ages which have loomed over Colombian society for decades. At the sec-
ond level, Colombian politics is characterised by deep divisions and 
political cleavages along party lines, coupled with weak party structures. 
This results in a highly fluid political terrain in which new parties may 
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quickly emerge and disintegrate, and are often held together by ‘political 
strongmen’ around which actors coalesce. At the administrative level, the 
weakness of the legislative and executive branches and corruption endemic 
in Colombian politics lead to further fragmentation and inefficiency in 
decision making with the judiciary stepping into the power vacuum to 
address the most pressing health systems issues (Hawkins and Alvarez 
Rosete 2017).
The role of the Colombian legislature in the health policy process has to 
be understood against this challenging backdrop of its recent political and 
societal history. In the last decade, Colombia’s democracy began the long 
and difficult process of addressing and moving beyond deeply embedded 
political and societal conflicts in the form of terrorism, internal armed con-
flict, the illicit drug trade, clientelism and political corruption, which collec-
tively led to the “partial collapse” of the state in the late 1980s (Bejarano and 
Pizarro 2002). This was reflected in Colombia’s low ranking in the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs) project on “Political 
Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism”, “Rule of Law” and “Voice 
and Accountability”.1 However, in September 2016, the World Bank presi-
dent Jim Yong Kim welcomed advances in the peace process aimed at ending 
the internal armed conflicts, stating that “the country is closer than ever to 
putting an end to this vicious cycle, and to starting the long and challenging 
process of transformation and territorial development” (Kim 2016).
1 The Worldwide Governance Indicators project reports aggregate and individual gover-
nance indicators for over 200 countries over the period 1996–2015, for six dimensions of 
governance: Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism; 
Government Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption.
“Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism” captures perceptions of the likeli-
hood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. In this dimension, Colombia 
scored a percentile rank of: 8.2 (1996), 0.97 (2003), 12.3 (2011) and 12.38 (2015).
“Rule of Law” captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. In this 
dimension, Colombia scored a percentile rank of: 22.01 (1996), 26.32 (2003), 47.42 
(2011) and 44.71 (2015).
“Voice and Accountability” captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citi-
zens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. Percentile ranks indicate the country’s rank among 
all countries covered by the aggregate indicator, with 0 corresponding to lowest rank, and 
100 to highest rank. In “Voice and Accountability”, Colombia scored a percentile rank of: 
29.33 (1996), 34.13 (2003), 46.48 (2011) and 45.81 (2015).
See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#reports
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Despite these improvements in recent years, analysts have argued that 
the various threats faced by Colombia have undermined the legitimacy of 
state institutions. This in turn can explain much of the current configura-
tion of Colombian politics and the poor institutional performance of key 
bodies, including the legislature, which has been characterised as highly 
fragmented and decentralized (Pachón and Johnson 2016; Botero et al. 
2010; Bejarano and Pizarro 2002).
The chapter examines evidence use in a fragmented and conflict-riven 
political environment such as Colombia, focussing on the long-standing 
and highly politicised attempts to reform the Colombian health system. It 
shows that policy relevant evidence has consistently been used to inform 
and provide the rationale for draft laws submitted to Congress over the 
period of the reforms and appropriate and robust research had indeed 
entered onto policy making agenda and was cited in the legislation exam-
ined. However, reflecting the role of the legislature in the highly contested 
political system and the health policy subsystem, evidence was not able to 
change actors´ initial positions and opinions and thus, political consensus 
on the direction of reforms could not be forged on the basis of the evi-
dence cited. Thus while the importance of evidence to both the substance 
and politics of the proposed reforms was acknowledged, the inability of 
policy relevant evidence to overcome political divisions and form the basis 
of political compromise and consensus is also clear. The analysis presented 
here supports the conclusion that, in highly contested and fragmented 
political environments, evidence tends to be secondary to other political 
and ideological factors influencing policy change. The chapter focuses on 
the reform process of the Colombian health system and the uptake of 
research within draft laws submitted to the Colombian Parliament between 
1993 and 2016.
Methodology
This chapter draws on data generated from an analysis of draft laws which 
are available in the public domain as well as from data gathered from semi- 
structured interviews with policy actors in Colombia. As in many countries, 
Colombia has a hierarchical legal structure with the constitution on top, 
followed by laws produced by the Congress, which can be Statutory laws 
(leyes estatutarias), Organic laws (leyes orgánicas) and Ordinary laws (leyes 
ordinarias) (Vanegas 2012). Any draft law in Colombia has to have an 
introductory preamble (exposición de motivos) which explains the nature and 
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scope of the problem that it aims to tackle, reviews the regulatory gap that 
it aims to fill and presents the broad content of the law. It is in the introduc-
tory preamble of draft laws where research, if it has been reviewed to formu-
late the policy proposal, will be referred to. Thus, an analysis of the evidence 
cited in the introductory preambles allows us to examine whether research 
evidence has been at all up taken during the policy formulation phase and 
the body of research which had informed the wider policy debates.
As detailed in Annex 1, 62 draft laws were identified and selected which 
were then reviewed independently by the present authors of this chapter 
to assess whether they cited evidence to sustain their policy proposals and, 
if so, which type of evidence was considered. The criteria used for this 
assessment was whether the draft law included: (i) data produced by gov-
ernment and its agencies and/or academic studies to consistently define 
the nature and scope of the problem; and/or (ii) existing national and 
international research (i.e. international organizations reports, research 
published in peer-review journals, etc.) to sustain policy proposals. This 
research, however, did not seek to evaluate the “quality” of the evidence 
considered and eventually taken up in the draft laws.
We conducted a total of 26 interviews in Colombia in February 2014. 
Respondents included policy advisers and civil servants at the national 
level, interest groups representatives, academics, health policy experts and 
commentators. Through the interviews, we sought to understand the 
structure and of recent health policy debates in the country and the type 
of evidence discussed within the policy making processes. In particular, we 
sought to identify the factors and conditions which helped or hindered the 
use of evidence to inform those decisions. Interview responses were trian-
gulated with the analysis of draft laws described above and a wider review 
of relevant policy reports and government documents. To ensure anonym-
ity of respondents we refer to interviews by number. Where it is essential 
to the understanding or evidentiary weight of quotations, the sector from 
which respondents came will be detailed. Quotes in Spanish from the 
interviews and from other bibliographical sources were translated into 
English by the authors.
the role of the legIslature In coloMbIa
The current institutional configuration of the Colombian state is defined 
by the Constitution of 1991. Colombia is a presidential system in which 
the President of the Republic is elected directly by the citizens for a set 
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period of four years. The Colombian Parliament is formed of a bicameral 
Congress with a Senate (Senado), and a Chamber of Representatives 
(Cámara de Representantes), elected also for a four year period via a pro-
portional representation system. The political party system is weak: parties 
do not have strong bureaucracies and structures, and are dependent 
instead upon individual leaders who act as figureheads, tying together oth-
erwise loosely connected political allegiances. Under the current 
Constitution, the two-party system that had dominated politics prior to 
the 1990s was replaced by a highly fragmented, multi-party system, with 
later reforms, in 2003, aimed at reducing this fragmentation. The present 
system is characterised not only by weak party structures (with parties 
serving as electoral vehicles for candidates to promote their own personal 
agendas), but by high electoral volatility, whereby new parties frequently 
emerge but often cease to exist in one or two elections cycles (Botero et al. 
2011; Milanese 2011; Pachón and Johnson 2016).
Within this institutional architecture, what is the role of the legislature 
in the policy process in Colombia? Saiegh (2010) has suggested a number 
of factors that can drive a legislature’s policymaking role: (a) the extent of 
its formal powers; (b) the amount of political space/discretion afforded by 
other power holders, mainly the Executive branch; (c) the capacity 
afforded by its procedures, structures and support; and (d) the goals of 
members and leaders of the legislature body itself. The following section 
explores how these factors combine to grant a specific role to the 
Colombian legislature in policy making.
First, the Colombia legislature performs both traditional parliamentary 
roles of developing legislation and scrutinizing government through both 
chambers of Congress  – the Senate (Senado), and the Chamber of 
Representatives (Cámara de Representantes)  – which have largely sym-
metrical roles and powers. Each chamber is divided into a number of com-
missions which deal with specific policy matters. For example, the First 
Commissions of Senate and Chamber of Representatives deal with ‘consti-
tutional, ethnic and peace’ matters, while the Seventh Commissions of 
Senate and Chamber of Representatives discuss ‘health, social security, 
housing’ issues, etc. New draft laws are registered in one of the Chambers 
or in both (twin projects) and are allocated to a specific Committee of that 
Chamber for analysis and discussion.2
2 At registering in Congress, the project law receives a number, which different for each 
chamber, and thus is known by such code, the year of registration and a S or C letter depend-
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Second, regarding the power of the legislature vis-à-vis the President of 
the Republic, the 1991 “constitution strengthened the checks and bal-
ances of the political system in an effort to endow political institutions 
with greater legitimacy after decades of limited participation and low rep-
resentation” (Cárdenas et al. 2008: 202). This meant that “the president 
lost some capacity as an agenda-setter relative to the previous period, while 
congress and the constitutional court gained relative power” (Cárdenas 
et al. 2008: 202). However, the President of the Republic in Colombia 
continues to be extremely powerful within the Colombian system; enjoy-
ing several key powers to influence the legislation and the wider political 
process (including urgency message; legislative decrees; capacity to veto 
Congress projects; freedom to initiate laws in key policy areas, which are 
detailed below) (Saiegh 2010). The role of the President was further 
strengthened during the administration of President Álvaro Uribe Vélez 
(2002–2010), who succeeded in pushing through reforms to allow him 
(and future Presidents) to be re-elected for a second term. Among Latin 
American countries, Colombia (together with Chile, Brazil and Ecuador) 
grants the greatest legislative powers to presidents vis-a-vis legislatures 
(Saiegh 2010). However, the position of the President (and by extension, 
the executive) versus the legislative branch should not be overstated 
(Saiegh 2010). It is not “imperial presidency” but rather “limited central-
ism” (Milanese 2011) as the President is obliged to seek compromises 
with parliamentarians in order to secure the passage of legislation.
Third, law making processes in Colombia are highly institutionalised. 
All laws, must undergo the same basic process. The first step is that the 
draft law is published in the official congress bulletin (Gaceta del Congreso). 
The process starts either in the Senate or in the Chamber of Representatives, 
depending on which chamber the draft was first registered. This first 
debate occurs in the permanent commission of the chamber after which it 
is voted on. If it’s approved it moves on to the plenary of the chambers. 
Once the plenary has approved the draft is sent to the remaining  chamber’s 
permanent commission to be debated, voted and if successful, passed to 
the plenary. If there are differences between the approved texts in each 
chamber, a conciliatory draft is produced by an appointed group c onsisting 
ing on whether it refers to the Senate or the Chamber of Representatives. For example, the 
Statutory Law Project (Proyecto Ley Estatutaria, PLE) registration in Senate was 
PLE209/2013S and its Congress twin-project is PLE267/2013C – this is represented in 
this chapter in the following way: PLE209/2013S [+ PLE267/2013C].
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of an equal number of members of each chamber. Finally, the draft requires 
the President’s signature to enter into law. In the case of statutory laws 
(and those issued under any of the extraordinary procedures), review by 
the Constitutional Court is required before the President’s signature.
The regulations governing Congress allow for a series of extraordinary 
procedures to deal with specific situations. One of them is an “urgency 
message” whereby the President requests a higher priority be assigned to a 
draft law in an expedited process which should last no more than 30 days 
in each Chamber. The procedure means deliberation and voting on the 
proposed law are conducted jointly between the Commissions of the Senate 
and the Chamber of Representatives. Then, the draft statutory law is voted 
separately by each Chamber on a plenary session. A final “conciliatory” 
draft is produced and reviewed by the Constitutional Court to confirm that 
the legislation enacted is compatible with the Constitution, before being 
signed into by the President of the Republic. The high turnover of MPs 
and the weak party structures limit the institutional knowledge and techni-
cal capacity of the legislative branch in Colombia (Scartascini 2008: 47). 
There is very low party discipline and party leaders have only limited con-
trol of the legislative agenda (Pachón and Johnson 2016).
Finally, one of the most prominent elements of Colombia’s legislature 
is the “personalist” nature of political candidacies (Pachón and Hoskin 
2011), in which political parties serve mainly as conduits for prominent 
individuals, in a system favouring ‘client’ relations over partisan identities 
(Saiegh 2010; Milanese 2011; Pachón and Johnson 2016; also confirmed 
in interviews). Often, this involves prioritizing what Pachón and Johnson 
(2016) have called “distributive pork-barrel projects”: obtaining resources 
to benefit the constituency that gets them elected (see also Milanese 
2011). Saiegh (2010) highlights in addition that “legislators orientate 
towards satisfying narrow geographic interests”. National policy makers 
are discouraged from making radical reforms through Congress which 
may affected established networks of vested interest and reforms are 
instead passed incrementally through executive decrees [Interview 8] or 
brought about through rulings of the Constitutional Court on the provi-
sion of health services (see Hawkins and Alvarez Rosete 2017).
The core of the legislature’s activity is also not directed by party groups 
but by the Commissions of the Chamber of Representatives and the Senate, 
which are not under the control of party leaders but exercise significant 
control over the Congressional agenda (Pachón and Johnson 2016). Since 
the Commissions in Colombia constitute the first stage of bill approval, 
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they “can prevent bills from ever getting to the floor. This contrasts with 
the situation of most legislatures in Latin America, in which committees 
only advise the floor with positive or negative reports” (Pachón and 
Johnson 2016: 73). Thus, legislators seek election to key Commissions, i.e. 
those which allocate resources or which play key gatekeeping functions, 
such as Commissions I of the Congress and the Senate in ballots held 
amongst parliamentarians on the first day of the legislature term (Pachón 
and Johnson 2016). This may mean competing for seats with members of 
the same party while getting support from other political groups, and again 
reflects the personalist, highly fragmented and decentralised nature of the 
Colombian legislature. Consequently, the Colombian legislature is not an 
arena which facilitates consensus building and constructive approaches to 
policymaking, with clear implications for evidence use.
coloMbIa’s hIghly contested health  
PolIcy subsysteM
The divisions and fragmentation in Colombian society and politics are 
reflected in its health policy debates. The health system has suffered from 
a lack of fundamental consensus over its most basic organising principles 
and structures since its inception with the passage of Law 100 in 1993. 
This lack of consensus has continued throughout the almost constant pro-
cess of reform which the system has undergone. Despite successive pro-
posals for reform, high levels of political contestation have resulted in 
policy stasis. Deep ideological disagreements have been sustained on issues 
such as the financing of the system (insurance versus taxation based mod-
els); the involvement of private sector providers; and whether limits should 
be placed to the right to health care. This reform process reflects in part 
the role played by competing coalitions of actors present within the 
Colombian health sector, and their various attempts to shape the health 
system in ways amenable to their underlying interests and values. We have 
analysed elsewhere the interactions between three principal coalitions of 
actors involved in the health system reform process in the context of 
Colombia’s antagonistic politics (Hawkins and Alvarez Rosete 2017; 
Álvarez and Hawkins 2018).
It is possible to identify two key phases in the health system reform 
process. In the first phase (1993–2010), a “dominant” coalition of gov-
ernment technocrats, congressmen, insurance companies, the financial 
sector and the private health providers (including the pharmaceutical 
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companies) emerged and was able to shape the health policy agenda. 
Between 2003 and 2009, under the administration of President Uribe, a 
set of actors began to emerge which sought to challenge the dominant 
coalition but were not at this juncture effectively coordinated as a coali-
tion of actors, and so no solid agreements on a shared policy agenda 
between different groups were reached.
The second phase began under the current Presidency of Juan Manuel 
Santos in 2010 and is still ongoing. This chapter analyses the period up to 
2016. A gradual coalescing of actors into distinct advocacy coalitions, 
increasingly coordinated and mobilised around shared beliefs and policy 
solutions, began to challenge those of the “dominant coalition”. The emer-
gence of “challenging” coalitions occurred in parallel with the weakening of 
the “dominant coalition” and the gradually weakening relationships between 
this coalition and successive Ministers of Health. However, as the recent 
passage of Statutory Law 1751 – which confirmed the principles and values 
of the existing health system, whilst clarifying the rights and responsibilities 
of patients – demonstrated, the two challenger coalitions of actors have not 
been powerful enough to override the hegemony of the dominant coalition 
and cross-coalition agreements have not been achieved.
evIdence use In the fIrst Phase of health  
reforM (1992–2010)
Law 100 of 1993, which set up the current health system, was passed dur-
ing the government of President César Gaviria (1990–1994), in the con-
text of a wider programme of the state reforms, which included the 
enactment of a new constitution in July 1991 (Vega-Vargas et al. 2012; 
González-Rosetti and Bossert 2000; Jaramillo 1998). As mentioned 
above, these political reforms had strengthened the power of Congress, so 
that it was able to impose policy initiatives on the Executive, including 
health reforms (González-Rosetti and Bossert 2000: 24). As González- 
Rosetti and Bossert comment (2000: 26): “The health reform was not 
part of [President Gaviria’s] initial policy agenda, which focused on the 
social security reform. Instead, it was the concession the Executive had to 
make to Congress in order to have the pension reform approved.” Indeed, 
the first version of Project Law PL155/1992S submitted to Senate by the 
Executive in September 1992 (and its twin draft law in the Chamber of 
Representatives PL204/1992C), which eventually became Law 100 later 
in 1993, proposed reforms of the pension system but did not include 
health, so Commission VII of the Senate vetoed the draft and requested 
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the government to adopt a comprehensive approach to social security 
reform which also included the health system (Uribe 2009). At that time, 
the Minister of Health was Gustavo de Roux, who belonged to the centre- 
left party the Alianza Democrática M-19 and whose ideas on the health 
reforms were not aligned with President Gaviria’s view.
In November 1992, de Roux was replaced by Juan Luis Londoño, who 
had been deputy director of the National Planning Department 
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación) and who assembled a small group 
of national experts to take the reform task forward, supported by the 
group of international consultants of the Colombia Health Sector Reform 
Project of the Harvard School of Public Health (Bossert et al. 1998). In 
that same month, Londoño submitted to Congress an addition to 
PL155/1992S which proposed the setting up of a subsidised health 
scheme for the poor; but it was again vetoed by the Commission VII of 
the Senate, which argued again that this was only a partial reform to the 
health sector (Uribe 2009).
Thus, the process of negotiations on different policy options started 
again and a number of parties and pressure groups presented legislative 
projects during the first months of 1993 (Uribe 2009). These proposals 
were considered by a group of experts, which, under the coordination of 
Londoño’s team, produced a new version of PL155/1992S, which was 
registered in Congress in April 1993. As Glassman et al. (2009: 7) state, 
with this proposal “[t]he administration committed to accelerating the 
expansion of subsidized health insurance for the poor; developing a pro-
gram to support the redesign, reorganization and modernization of public 
hospitals and to ensure their financial sustainability; and strengthening the 
national immunization program.” This version of PL155/1992S passed 
quickly through Congress between May and December, becoming Law 
100 on 23 December 1993.
Key characteristics of the Colombian legislature discussed above are 
evident in the process of legislating the PL155/1992S into Law 100 of 
1993. First, discussions within the legislature took place and a wide range 
of stakeholders had the opportunity to present proposals and put forward 
policy demands. Whilst the policy initiative came from the executive, the 
legislature became the central arena for these policy discussions. Indeed, 
the legislature managed to influence significantly the final outcome of the 
policy process (Uribe 2009). The vetoes to two government’s versions of 
PL 155/1992S within Commission VII confirms Saiegh’s (2010)  assertion 
that legislatures can be active players in policy making by being blunt veto 
players, forcing the executive to take alternative paths.
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Second, this process also shows that the different policy proposals were 
not submitted by the political parties with representation in the legisla-
ture, but by individual congressmen representing interest groups or social 
movements. This reflects Colombia’s weak party system and the “person-
alist” nature of political candidacies explained above.
Third, evidence from scientific research was available to (and thus 
potentially used by) decision makers and legislators. On the executive side 
in particular, the consultancy team from the Harvard School of Public 
Health provided a continuous flow of information and knowledge at 
demand from Londoño and his team. According to one of our interview-
ees, Londoño did not want “one-off consultancy” but continuous support 
in designing and implementing the law and in providing answers to policy 
questions [Interview 8]. Research produced by academic institutions and 
think tanks (i.e. Fedesarrollo) was also available to other key participants 
of the policy process.
As an attempt to generate knowledge to support the implementation of 
Law 100, the government set up the Program for Supporting the Health 
Reform (Programa de Apoyo a la Reforma de Salud, PARS) in 1996 with 
the financial and technical support of the Inter-American Development 
Bank. The Program aimed to provide technical assistance and capacity 
building, to produce specialised research and strategies to transfer such 
knowledge to decision-makers at the Ministry of Health. More than 100 
analytical studies and consultancy projects were developed until the pro-
gramme finished in 2008 (MPS and Gesaworld 2008). Alongside the 
PARS, the strategic policy documents produced by the National Council 
of Economic and Social Policies (Consejo Nacional de Políticas Económicas 
y Sociales, CONPES)3 on specific economic and social policy areas became 
a key tool to support decision making at the national level.
Despite these efforts, by 2001 the health system was facing a “severe 
and generalized financial crisis” leading to successive attempts to address 
these through reforms (Glassman et al. 2009: 7). A first wave of legislation 
designed to reform the health system was submitted to Congress in 2003 
and 2004, but none of it was ultimately passed (Hernández 2005). The 
first was draft law proposed to reform Law 100 was PL180/2004S, to 
which other projects such as PL236/2004S and PL241/2004S were lat-
ter added for joint discussion in Congress. Supporting evidence does not 
appear prominently in the preambles of the draft laws, with the exception 
3 DNP website, https://www.dnp.gov.co/CONPES/DocumentosConpes.aspx
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of PL180/2004s. However, the evidence is cited only in passing and with-
out an attempt to detailed engagement. The legislative term closed in 
June 2004 without these draft laws having progressed, and so they were 
abandoned (Hernández 2005).
In 2004, a second wave of 14 draft laws was submitted to Congress, 
starting with PL19/2004S and followed by others such as PL31/2004S 
and PL33/2004S. These and the rest of the 14-strong list were accumu-
lated to the PL52/2004S submitted by the government for parliamentary 
discussion. These stalled in Congress, where health insurers managed to 
orchestrate strong opposition, with the support of the Ministry of Finance. 
Furthermore, other legislative priorities such as pension reform and legis-
lation to allow the re-election of President Uribe relegated the importance 
of PL52/2004S, and it was ultimately abandoned (Guzmán 2006). Three 
of these draft laws– (PL52/2004S, PL31/2004S and PL33/2004S) did 
include discussion of relevant supporting evidence. Although watered 
down in terms of scope and depth of the reforms it proposed, PL52/2004S 
was well supported by research evidence, including most recent data from 
the 2003 National Health Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Salud), the 
Quality of Life National Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Calidad de Vida) 
and the 2004 CONPES document on social policy issues. More promi-
nently, PL31/2004S made use of extensive evidence from various sources: 
it brought in data from a 2003 CONPES and other official statistics (i.e. 
Ministry of Social Protection, SIVIGILA) as well as data from Pan- 
American Health Organization (PAHO) studies, the PARS studies, etc. 
National and international statistics were also referred to in PL33/2004S.
No further legislative initiatives were reintroduced in Congress until 
the summer 2006. The beginning of a new legislative term saw the regis-
tration of PL40/2006S in Senate [the twin draft law in Chamber of 
Representatives was PL2/2006C] to which 16 other draft laws – many 
registered by individual legislators – were progressively accumulated. Of 
all these draft laws, only two – PL116/2006S and PL122/2006S – drew 
on official statistics and linked arguments to published research, to sustain 
their proposals while the twin draft laws [PL40/2006S + PL2/2006C] 
registered by Minister of Social Protection, Diego Palacio, were not firmly 
grounded relevant evidence. PL40/2006S [+PL2/2006C] and its accu-
mulated projects were discussed over the second half of 2006 and approved 
in a joint commission debate in December, leading to the passage of Law 
1122 on 9 January 2007. The scope and aim of Law 1122 ultimately 
became to strengthen system regulations and de-judicialise health care, i.e. 
the tutela system of protection writs through which citizens are able to 
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seek access to health service via the courts (for a more detailed discussion 
of tutelas and the effects of judicialisation on evidence use see Hawkins 
and Alvarez Rosete 2017) (Restrepo 2007; Bernal et al. 2012: 25). Law 
1122 led to the creation of the Regulatory Commission for Health 
(Comisión de Regulación en Salud, CRES), a decision-making body at 
arm’s length affiliated to the Ministry of Health, with the role of updating 
the basket of benefits through the use of high quality evidence and a 
strong and transparent decision-making methodology. The creation of the 
CRES reveals the attempt to bring more evidence into the policy making 
process, although this too would be subject to later reform.
Ultimately, all these initiatives to address the sustainability of the health 
system stalled and “by the end of the decade, the health system was in 
deep crisis” (Bernal et al. 2012: 25) and with seemingly little prospect of 
reform. Scientific research was available to policy makers in Colombia and 
even informed the different draft laws submitted to Congress between 
1993 and 2010. However, none of these draft laws was able to pass suc-
cessfully through Congress. This suggests that while evidence was impor-
tant in informing policy debates, and proposed legislation, it was unable, 
in the context of deep politicization and embedded vested interests, to 
bring about effective reforms of health system and to relieve the mounting 
pressures it faced.
evIdence use In second Phase of health  
reforMs (2010–2016)
In the last month of President Uribe’s Presidency in July 2010, draft law 
PL01/2010S was registered in the Senate [along with its twin draft in the 
Chamber of Representatives PL106/2010C]. President Santos replaced 
Uribe as President with proposals for an ambitious programme of state 
reforms, to align the public administration with the goals of the 2010–2014 
National Development Plan (Strazza 2014). The reforms transformed the 
centre of government in Colombia and resulted in a step change in the 
availability of policy-relevant evidence, and the concern with evidence use 
in health policy making.
Draft laws PL1/2010S [+PL106/2010C] were discussed alongside 
another 10 draft laws accumulated to it, leading to the passage of Law 
1438 in January 2011. Only the preamble of PL01/2010S included refer-
ences to evidence. Nevertheless, Law 1438 regulated the setting up of the 
Institute of Health Technology Assessment (Instituto de Evaluación de 
Tecnologías Sanitarias, IETS), which was established in September 2012 
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and, only a few months later, in December 2012, the CRES was abolished 
and the Ministry of Health “re-assumed its role of resource-allocation 
decision-maker” (Castro 2014: 22, 131). As Dargent (2015) notes, the 
Santos reforms led experts and technocrats to “regain salience” at the 
Ministry of Health. According to Minister of Health Gaviria, the Ministry 
is now “a technocratic fortress”, in which “decisions are now made inde-
pendently of electoral politics” (Gaviria 2015). Whilst decision making of 
this kind is never completely apolitical, these claims speak to but a desire 
to introduce evidence into the decision making process more systemati-
cally and the potential for this to rationalise decision making processes.
During the second half of 2010 a new wave of reforms were introduced 
to Congress by different parliamentarians. Four draft statutory laws  – 
PLE186/2010S and the accumulated draft laws PLE189/2010S, 
PLE131/2010C and PLE198/2010S  – which aimed to define “the 
essential core of the right to health” were discussed in Parliament. Research 
evidence was provided in the preambles of 3 of the 4 draft laws submitted 
to Congress. PLE186/2010S analyses in detail the dramatic increase of 
health care costs and its causes, while PLE189/2010S included an exten-
sive commentary on the vision and recommendations of the World Health 
Report 2008 on primary care (WHR 2008). PLE198/2010S provided 
figures on equity and access to health services based upon official statistics, 
for example, and includes references to specialised literature to back up the 
proposals suggested. All these draft laws however did not complete the 
process in a single legislature and hence had to be abandoned.
A new window of opportunity for policy change opened up in the sum-
mer of 2012 with the submission to Congress of four draft statutory laws 
(PLE48/2012S; PLE59/2012C; PLE105/2012S; and PLE112/2012S) 
and one ordinary draft law (PL51/2012S, which was consequently accu-
mulated to PL210/2013S which came later). Of the four statutory laws, 
PLE48/2012S was informed by good quality research obtained from 
international comparisons, published studies and interviews with experts. 
PLE105/2012S and PLE112/2012S also referenced publications and 
official data, while PLE59/2012C did not mention any specific research.
With the impetus brought by the newly appointed Health Minister 
Gaviria, the government sought to take the initiative on the reform of the 
health system and develop both a Statutory Law and an Ordinary Law. On 
19 March 2013, the government registered two draft reform laws in 
Parliament: President Santos registered the draft Statutory Law PLE 
209/2013S at the Senate [and twin project PLE267/2013C at the Chamber] 
and Minister Gaviria registered the draft Ordinary Law PL210/2013S at the 
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Senate [and its twin project PL147/2013C at the Chamber]. Both 
PLE209/2013S [+PLE267/2013C] discussed in Commission I and 
PL210/2013S [+PL147/2013C] discussed in Commission VII were sup-
ported by extensive official statistics and underpinned arguments on pub-
lished research.
Draft Statutory Law PLE209/2013S was enacted on 16 February 
2015, became Statutory Law 1751. However, Ordinary Draft law 
PL210/2013S could not to be approved within two legislative periods 
and hence was abandoned. The re-election of President Santos in May 
2014, and the continuation in office of Minister of Health Gaviria, pre-
sented a second opportunity to pass legislation in a new legislative period. 
A new draft law PL77/2014S was registered on 29 August 2014 to bring 
back some of the financial instruments considered in the failed 
PL210/2013S.  Thus, PL77/2014S got accumulated to PL24/2014S 
[+PL109/2015C]. However, none of the proposed laws referred to scien-
tific evidence in their preambles. After a long legislative process, the proj-
ect was finally passed as Law 1797 on 13 July 2016.
conclusIon
The analysis of the more than 20-year long process of reforming Law 100 
shows that evidence can, and indeed did, inform health policies in a highly 
contested and fragmented political setting. The analysis of draft laws 
designed to reform the health system shows that policy relevant evidence 
was available to actors involved in reforming the health system and was used 
to inform a number of key draft laws submitted to parliament. We identified 
high levels of contestation and fragmentation at different levels of Colombian 
society: the social, political and policy levels, which provide the institutional 
context in which policy problems emerge and policy actors seek to address 
them. In this context, the availability of policy relevant evidence offers a 
potential means of circumventing and overcoming, political fragmentation 
and contestation. However, the deep seated nature of the vested interests in 
the Colombian health system and the health systems models which they 
favoured, meant that reform proposals were often stymied. Whilst it is not 
possible to depoliticize or solve policy dilemmas through recourse to evi-
dence alone, it is possible, at times, to use evidence as a means of generating 
consensus or providing the impetus towards compromise. To overcome the 
endemic problems of weak political and legislative structures, and engrained 
political cleavages, new bodies were formed which were tasked with the col-
lection, interpretation and deployment of policy relevant evidence.
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However, despite the institutionalised mechanisms of evidence genera-
tion and synthesis, the translation of research into policy and legislation 
remained limited and piecemeal. Many draft laws provided only minimal 
data on the extent of the problems facing the health system in Colombia, 
and their reform proposals were mostly based upon general commentaries 
of the functioning and challenges of the system (i.e. PL229/2010S; 
PLE59/2012C; PL51/2012S; PL233/2013S; etc.). A small number of 
other draft laws, which quoted academic studies to back up their analysis 
of the extent of the problem, tended however to refer to a biased selection 
of studies (that is, research which would fit their ideological stances; i.e. 
PLE105/2012S; PLE112/2012S). However, those draft laws submitted 
by the government, especially during the last phase of the reform, included 
extended empirical and analytical sections. For example, the 
PLE209/2013S and PL210/2013S provide a deep and wide analysis of 
the problems of the Colombian health system.
Reflecting the role of the legislature in Colombia’s highly contested 
political system and health policy subsystem, evidence cited in draft laws 
was unable to forge consensus amongst relevant policy actors over the 
direction of the health system reforms. The deep confrontations within 
the Colombian legislature did not facilitate political agreements nor play a 
constructive role in health policymaking. Scientific research was available 
and at the disposal of legislators, but it was unable to provide the common 
ground on which to overcome embedded policy positions and form the 
basis of compromise over the direction of health systems reforms.
annex 1: laws and draft laws revIewed
*underlined = preamble refers to/quotes research
1992–2010
1993–2002
• PLs that led to Law 100: PL155/1992S [+PL204/1992C]
2003–2004
• PL180/2004S and accumulated: PL236/2004S; PL238/2004S; 
PL241/2004S; PL242/2004S
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• PL52/2004S and accumulated: PL19/2004S; PL31/2004S; 
PL33/2004S; PL38/2004S; PL54/2004; PL57/2004S; 
PL58/2004S; PL98/2004S; PL105/2004S; PL115/2004S; 
PL122/2004S; PL151/2004S
2006–2007
• PLs that led to Law 1122: PL40/2006S [+PL2/2006C] and accu-
mulated PL20/2006S; PL26/2006S; PL38/2006S; PL67/2006S; 
PL116/2006S; PL122/2006S; PL128/2006S; PL143/2006S; 
PL1/2006C; PL18/2006C; PL84/2006C; PL130/2006C; 
PL137/2006C; PL140/2006C; PL141/2006C and PL1/2006S 
[+PL87/2006C]
2010–2016
2010
• PLs that led to Law 1438: PL1/2010S [+PL106/2010C] and accu-
mulated: PL95/2010S; PL143/2010S; PL147/2010S; 
PL160/2010S; PL161/2010S; PL182/2010S; PL87/2010C, 
PL35/2010C; PL111/2010C; PL126/2010C
• PLE186/2010S and accumulated: PLE189/2010S; PLE131/ 
2010C; PLE198/2010S
• PL229/2010S
2012
• PLE48/2012S and accumulated: PLE59/2012C; PLE105/2012S; 
PLE112/2012S;
2013–2014
• PLEs that led to Law 1751: PLE209/2013S [+PLE267/2013C]
• PL210/2013S [+PL147/2013C] and accumulated: PL233/2013S; 
PL51/2012S
2014–2016
• PLs that led to Law 1797: PL77/2014S and accumulated PL24/2014S 
[+PL109/2015C]
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IntroductIon
In Germany, the idea of evidence-based policy as a model of modern 
policy- making has not engendered as much enthusiasm as in other coun-
tries, particularly in the Anglo-Saxon world (Jun and Grabow 2008; 
Knieps 2009). German policy-makers and researchers are broadly in agree-
ment that scientific evidence has become more relevant to policy-making 
over time to address increasingly complex policy problems and to provide 
legitimacy for potentially unpopular decisions (Renn 1995; Mayntz 2009). 
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There is also an ever growing demand for expertise met by an array of 
scientific advisory committees, research institutes, expert commissions and 
expert networks providing advice to government (Kloten 2006; Siefken 
2007; Jun and Grabow 2008; Blum and Schubert 2013). This is particu-
larly visible in health care policy, in which scientific evidence use has 
become institutionally embedded, for example, through the creation of 
the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (Institut für 
Qualität und Wirtschaftlichkeit im Gesundheitswesen, IQWiG) (IQWiG 
2015) as a provider of independent health technology assessments in the 
corporatist sector.
However, much scepticism about the role of scientific evidence exists 
outside the narrow confines of health technology assessment, with some 
commentators seeing references to evidence representing little more than 
‘scientifically cloaked lobbyism’ (Knieps 2009). The complexity of the 
policy process in Germany – with its multitude of actors that exist within 
a federal, corporatist system, and the dominance of legislation over other 
forms of policy-making  – would not lend itself to support notions of 
evidence- based policy.
Policy scholars have frequently noted the role of corporatism in health 
policy in Germany, which has given organised interests a central role in 
decision-making (Lehmbruch 1988; Lijphart and Crepaz 1991). The 
state has delegated a wide range of governance tasks to the respective asso-
ciations of office-based doctors (i.e. family doctors as well as specialists), 
hospitals and sickness funds, which include, for example, decisions about 
public reimbursement of pharmaceuticals and medical services, and the 
definition of rules relating to quality assurance and reimbursement 
(Bandelow 2004). The same organised interests also have substantial 
influence on law making both at federal and state levels. For a long time, 
political parties had clear allegiances to specific interests, for example, the 
Social Democrats (SPD) tending to support the role of sickness funds 
while the Free Democrats (FDP) sought opportunities to extend the scope 
of private insurance, although these allegiances are not as clear as they 
used to be.
Provider organisations, especially those representing office-based doc-
tors, used to be particularly influential and able to influence, and stymie, 
policy proposals as veto players within decision-making processes (Tsebelis 
2011). Yet over the years the power dynamics between actors have 
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changed, bringing about new patterns of organisational behaviour 
(Bandelow 2009). Consecutive reforms have strengthened sickness funds 
vis-à-vis provider organisations (e.g. by changing voting rules in commit-
tees) thus shifting the balance between payers and providers (Bandelow 
2009). The federal government has also become more assertive in setting 
the national framework for corporatist decision-making. This was accom-
panied by the creation of new organisations through the merger of several 
associations of sickness funds into one, the Gemeinsame Spitzenverband, 
and by bringing together several committees to form the Federal Joint 
Committee (Gemeinsamer Bundesausschuss, GBA). The latter was aimed 
at professionalising and formalising the process of health policy-making 
and now forms the top decision-making body within the corporatist sec-
tor (Gerlinger 2010).
Traditional alliances have also weakened and lines of opposition have 
become blurred. Physicians associations now face the difficulty of repre-
senting doctors in primary and secondary care who are often pitched 
against each other in questions of resource allocation. Likewise, the 
German Hospital Association (Deutsche Krankenhausgesellschaft) repre-
sents all hospitals providing publicly funded services, irrespective of their 
size, ownership status and type of services provided. Policy changes such 
as the introduction of activity-based payments has also increased the com-
petition between hospitals for patients and funding. Thus changes in pol-
icy  – be they targeted at cost control or at securing quality of care  – 
increasingly affect provider organisations in different ways, making it 
more difficult for top associations to present a unified front. Commentators 
noted that while corporatist actors still wield substantial influence, the 
nature of corporatism has changed over time and become more pluralist, 
yet also more adversarial and less consensual in style (Bandelow 2004). 
These dynamics also play out in the ‘legalistic culture’ of German policy-
making, in which law-making and legal adjudication are crucial constitu-
ents of the policy process (Strueck 2013). In this chapter, it is argued that 
the changing style of decision-making is also demonstrated in the increased 
role of evidence use for both substantiating and legitimising decisions.
This chapter will explore how health policy actors in Germany have used 
scientific evidence to promote their aims and objectives, using the case of 
minimum volumes as a pertinent example. Based on the idea that quality 
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improves with greater experience in a given procedure (‘practice makes 
perfect’), minimum volumes have been introduced for a number of highly 
specialised hospital services as a measure of improving quality of care. The 
policy has also been introduced at the time of the formation of the GBA as 
the top decision making body of the self-administration in health care. 
Given that the latest lawsuit only concluded in December 2015 the discus-
sion about minimum policy allows for an analysis of the role of the GBA in 
professionalising health policy-making, which also changed the role of sci-
entific evidence.
The chapter will examine the role of evidence at three different stages 
of the policy process:
 – The making of the legislative framework taking place in the two 
chambers of parliament, the Federal Assembly (Bundestag) and 
Federal Council (Bundesrat);
 – The definition of minimum volumes by the ‘corporatist’ self- 
administration, represented by the GBA; and
 – Legal adjudication in the social courts, charged with reviewing the 
legitimacy of minimum volumes set by the GBA.
It is not without irony that the idea of regulating minimum volumes as 
a measure of quality improvement was initially inspired by research: Studies 
in the United States suggested that hospitals that performed a larger num-
ber of highly complex surgeries produced better outcomes for patients 
than hospitals that provided these services less often (e.g. Birkmeyer et al. 
1999). The idea of turning volume-outcome relationships into a policy 
proposal has been credited to health economist and university professor 
Karl Lauterbach who, at the time, was an influential policy advisory to the 
Federal Minister of Health Ulla Schmidt. Minimum volumes were passed 
into law in 2002 and have been specified and operationalised in the years 
that followed, attracting much controversy as well as legal challenge from 
hospitals.
The following section provides an introduction into the literature on 
strategic evidence use, followed by a description of the study methods and 
a summary of the scientific evidence base for minimum volumes. The mid-
dle section of the chapter is devoted to the analysis of the role of scientific 
evidence at different stages of the policy process. The chapter finishes with 
a discussion and conclusion.
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Table of key organisations and committees
German English Function
Ausschuss Krankenhaus Hospital 
Committee
Committee representing hospitals and 
sickness funds, mandated with decision- 
making for the hospital sector before 
2004
Bundesrat Federal Council Chamber of parliament representing the 
governments of the states (Länder)
Bundestag Federal 
Assembly
Chamber of parliament representing 
elected political parties
Deutsche 
Krankenhausgesellschaft
German 
Hospital 
Association
Federal-level association of hospitals
Gemeinsamer 
Bundesausschuss (GBA)
Federal Joint 
Committee
Top decision-making body of the 
corporatist self-administration in health 
care, since 2004
Gesundheitsausschuss Health 
Committee
Parliamentary committee, preparing 
health related legislation for the Bundestag
Vermittlungsausschuss Mediation 
Committee
Parliamentary committing, mediating 
between Bundestag and Bundesrat
StrategIc uSeS of evIdence In HealtH PolIcy-MakIng
Carol Weiss observed in her 1979 paper that scientific evidence can be 
used for at least seven purposes (Weiss 1979). ‘Instrumental’ use is what 
proponents of evidence-based policy usually have in mind when they 
demand for research findings to be taken account of in policy decisions. 
However, Weiss argued that research typically influences policy in more 
indirect ways, with knowledge from research filtering through to policy- 
makers over time and in often far more convoluted ways than ideas of 
straight forward application would suggest. ‘Political’ use implies that 
policy-makers utilise scientific evidence in a more active manner, yet for 
specific, politically driven purposes. Such use, also often called ‘symbolic’ 
or ‘tactical’, is therefore always selective, with policy-makers choosing 
those pieces of evidence that best promote their case. For the purists of 
evidence-based policy, strategic use comes close to ‘policy-based evidence’, 
defeating the purpose of ‘objective’ science of making policy better 
informed and more rational (Marmot 2004).
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However, for scholars of the policy process, selective use is by no means 
a surprise. Majone (1989) was one of the first to argue that evidence is 
typically used as a means of persuasion as part of a political argument. 
Greenhalgh and Russell (2007) found that evidence is often selected to fit 
an “argumentation game” played by policy actors by employing rhetoric 
and mobilising considerations of plausibility and reasonableness to achieve 
their aims. From that perspective, evidence use is better described as con-
stitutive of the “social drama” of policy-making rather than seen as an end 
in itself. Yet there is always the question of who uses evidence strategically 
and for which purpose. Hind, for example, has warned that both the state 
and corporations use science to legitimise their actions, which in his view 
constitutes a serious threat to reasoning and rationality, the core values of 
modern societies (Hind 2007).
The role of scientific evidence in legitimising decisions has also been 
extended to organisations. Boswell (2008), for example, has argued that 
scientific knowledge plays a key role in legitimising the role of the European 
Commission in immigration policy, a field that is frequently inflicted with 
controversy. A similar observation was made by Bijker et al. (2009) in their 
study of the Gezondheidsraad (Health Council) in the Netherlands. They 
observed that the Council successfully utilised the authority of science to 
legitimise its advice to policy, which occurs – paradoxically, as they argue – 
despite the fact that contemporary society has become more critical of 
research and more aware of the limits of science (for example in relation to 
genetically modified food) (Weingart 1999). McNulty (2012) noted that 
aid organisations increasingly commission programme evaluation for the 
purpose of demonstrating compliance with expectations of accountability 
and transparency.
To be clear, the focus on strategic evidence use does not imply that scien-
tific research is useless in informing policy-makers and in substantiating 
policy thinking in view of improving outcomes. However, it does raise the 
question of the motivation of policy-makers to use evidence and highlights 
the existence of considerations that have more to do with the nature of the 
policy process, the need to demonstrate accountability and the contested 
nature of decisions that affect the interests of policy actors than with concep-
tions of purely instrumental evidence use (Suchman 1995; Hansson 2006).
The case study of minimum volumes policy provides a pertinent exam-
ple of evidence use in the face of conflicting interests played out in a cor-
poratist system of health policy-making. The case also parallels controversies 
surrounding other decisions taken by the GBA, especially those to exclude 
or limit publicly funded services using health technology assessments 
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(HTA) (Perleth et al. 2009; Kieslich 2012). Such decisions can be highly 
controversial and pharmaceutical companies often take the GBA to court 
to challenge unfavourable outcomes. The threat of legal challenge requires 
the GBA to demonstrate the legitimacy of such decisions and it does so by 
reference to evidence reviews, commissioned from IQWIG, among other 
things. The role of HTA in legitimating potentially unpopular decisions 
about resource allocation (i.e. prioritisation, rationing) has also been criti-
cally discussed in relation to NICE, the National Institute of Health and 
Clinical Excellence in England (Syrett 2003; Littlejohns 2012), which is 
internationally recognised as a leader in this field. Yet while the GBA has a 
similar mandate and procedural arrangements are in place that are compa-
rable to NICE, the legal framework and corporatist structures in which 
the GBA is embedded differ from the institutional context of NICE. NICE 
decisions are ultimately politically sanctioned by Government (not corpo-
ratist actors) and are less likely to attract legal redress due to differences in 
legal practice, while the GBA as a corporatist decision-maker is exposed to 
both influences of corporatist interests and opportunities for legal chal-
lenge (Syrett 2004; Gress et al. 2005; Francke and Hart 2008; Landwehr 
and Böhm 2011; Klingler et al. 2013).
MetHodS
This case study is informed by documentary analysis and interviews. 
Documents include published protocols of parliamentary committees; 
published records of court decisions; selected articles from several broad-
sheet newspapers reporting on minimum volumes such as Der Spiegel, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Die Zeit and from professional jour-
nals such as Deutsches Ärzteblatt; scientific reports published by IQWIG 
and by researchers commissioned to undertake evidence reviews; materials 
from websites such as policy documents relating to minimum volumes 
published by the GBA and by corporatist organisations, as well as press 
releases published by these organisations.
The documentary analysis has been supplemented by a number of 
interviews with key informants (n  =  9), representing various types of 
policy- makers (government bureaucracy; corporatist organisations) and 
researchers. Interviewees were selected because of their knowledge of, 
and/or known involvement in, the process of developing minimum vol-
umes policy. The roles of individual interviewees will not be identified in 
the following analysis to ensure the level of anonymity and confidentiality 
agreed at interview.
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MInIMuM voluMeS In HoSPItal: PolIcy Idea 
and ScIentIfIc evIdence
Since the 1970s, health services research in the United States and else-
where suggested that for certain services, typically complex surgery, hospi-
tals that provided the service to a larger number of patients achieved better 
outcomes for patients (i.e. lower mortality and morbidity) than hospitals 
that provided the same service to a smaller number of patients (Luft et al. 
1979). Interviewees suggested that studies published by Birkmeyer and 
colleagues in the 1990s and early 2000s were particularly influential in 
turning a statistically observed association of volume and outcomes into a 
policy idea (Birkmeyer et al. 1999, 2002, 2003; Finlayson et al. 2003). The 
idea also appealed to policy-makers as it resonated with the common sense 
notion that ‘practice makes perfect’. Minimum volumes had already been 
ubiquitously used in medical training and accreditation, although they had 
not been used before to exclude hospitals from providing a service.
Regulating minimum volumes also fitted with the wider reform agenda 
for hospitals at the time. There were two concerns specifically: the per-
ceived inefficiency and costliness of hospital care compared to other coun-
tries and emerging concerns about variation in the quality and outcomes 
of care. The first concern was to be addressed by the introduction of 
activity- based payments as the main method of funding hospitals (Busse 
and Blümel 2014). For their proponents, namely sickness funds, mini-
mum volumes promised to speak to the second concern and to counter 
perceived risks to quality associated with the first.
However, despite being a policy idea inspired by scientific research, the 
scientific evidence base for operationalising the policy proved challenging. 
Evidence reviews suggested that there was a statistically significant rela-
tionship between higher volumes and improved outcomes for a number of 
complex surgical interventions such as pancreatic resection or oesopha-
gectomy (Geraedts 2002; Rathmann and Windeler 2002; IQWiG 2005, 
2008). These studies were typically observational (i.e. non-experimental) 
and were not considered as providing ultimate proof of causality. There 
were also limitations with regard to the data used in these studies, which 
typically relied on routinely collected information and were limited to cer-
tain populations or countries or groups of hospitals (e.g. in the US), rais-
ing questions about the transferability of their findings.
A further challenge was the difficulty of using studies indicating statisti-
cal correlations to support or set precise minimum volumes for specific 
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procedures. Studies typically used definitions of ‘high’ and ‘low’ volumes 
of service provisions, but these were set by researchers and driven by data 
availability. In addition, most studies originated in the US, with studies 
using German data only emerging over time. But analyses of German data 
were also difficult to interpret and almost impossible to use to inform 
minimum volumes. For example, in 2006, IQWIG, the research institute 
associated with the GBA, published an analysis of data on volumes and 
outcomes of total knee replacement surgery, using two indicators of out-
come quality (postsurgical mobility and infection) that produced conflict-
ing findings (IQWiG 2006).
In sum, while there was scientific evidence to support the selection of 
services which could benefit from minimum volumes, there was limited 
evidence to guide the selection of the specific volumes to be set in these 
cases. This substantially reduced the potential for explicit “evidence based” 
decision-making when it came to setting volumes. Minimum volumes so 
far have not lent themselves to any straight forward translation of “evi-
dence into policy”. More importantly, however, they have been controver-
sial from the outset, pitching against each other sickness funds as their 
proponents and hospitals as their vocal opposition. This conflict between 
payers and providers played out through all stages of the policy process 
with controversy surrounding the interpretation of the evidence often 
being at the centre of the argument. In addition, minimum volumes – as 
a regulatory policy  – created winners and losers among hospitals, with 
smaller hospitals with fewer patients likely to lose out to large teaching 
hospitals. The opposition, represented in the German Hospital Association, 
was therefore not entirely unified, making it more difficult for hospitals to 
mount resistance.
devISIng tHe legISlatIve fraMework
In 2001, the Federal Government – then composed of Social Democrats 
and the Green Party – brought a proposal for major reform of hospital 
funding before parliament. The proposal involved replacing the previous 
method of paying hospitals via budgets and per diems (payments per day 
of hospital stay) through a funding approach predominantly based on 
activity-based payments using diagnosis-related groups. The aim of this 
reform was to reduce perceived inefficiencies in hospital funding, reduce 
the length of stay of hospital inpatients, which were one of the longest in 
Europe, and to increase competition between hospitals. Minimum volumes 
 THE POLITICS OF EVIDENCE USE IN HEALTH POLICY MAKING… 
120 
were introduced on the back of this reform, as a counter measure to 
known risks to quality associated with activity-based funding as its propo-
nents argued (Interview). They had the added attraction – especially for 
sickness funds and Social Democrats – of excluding hospitals with lower 
volumes from providing certain services, thus providing a lever for facili-
tating structural change in the (difficult to reform) hospital market.
Although the idea of regulating volumes of complex hospital services 
was inspired by research, scientific evidence, unsurprisingly, did not fea-
ture widely in the parliamentary discussion in which the legal framework 
for minimum volumes was developed. Instead, the procedural rules of 
parliamentary decision-making show a much clearer imprint on the result-
ing legislation, published as part of the 2002 Act on Case-Based Payment 
(Fallpauschalengesetz). In relation to minimum volumes, the 2002 Act 
stipulated that the relevant decision-making body of the self- administration 
(at that time the Hospital Committee and, from 2004, the GBA) should 
identify hospital services for which “the quality of outcomes particularly 
depended on the volume of services provided” and set minimum volumes 
for such services (Bundestag 2002b). The Act has since been integrated 
into Social Code Book V, now forming part of paragraph 137.
As the bill concerned hospital funding it directly touched on the legal 
responsibilities of the states and therefore required approval of both cham-
bers of parliament. In the Bundestag, the bill was discussed in the Health 
Committee, which introduced a number of amendments including that 
minimum volumes should only be applied to ‘planable’ services (planbar), 
thus excluding urgent or emergency services. The Health Committee 
(composed of members of the Bundestag reflecting the proportionate rep-
resentation of its constituent political parties) also requested transitional 
arrangements for hospitals that wanted to invest in expanding or creating 
new services, for example, by employing a new specialist (Bundestag 
2001a). While seemingly reducing the scope of minimum volumes, the 
Health Committee also sharpened the bill by making minimum volumes 
binding on hospitals (instead of using them as guidelines as an earlier ver-
sion suggested) and by preventing sickness funds from reimbursing ser-
vices if hospitals continued to provide them in insufficient numbers. Taken 
together, the changes introduced by the Health Committee both suited 
the agenda of sickness funds and, to some extent, may have mollified hos-
pitals by limiting minimum volumes to elective services only.
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The states, represented in the Bundesrat, also made amendments to the 
bill as the documents of the Mediating Committee suggest. Specifically, 
the Committee (composed of members of the Bundestag and the 
Bundesrat) made provisions that allowed states to exempt individual hos-
pitals from minimum volumes if they found access to services at risk within 
a given geographic area (Bundestag 2002a).
There is no indication in the documents examined that parliamentary 
committees concerned themselves with an interpretation of the scientific 
evidence available in support of minimum volumes. However, the result-
ing legislation, purposefully or unwittingly, included a clause where the 
specific wording lends itself to being interpreted as stipulating that specific 
minimum volumes had to be supported by scientific evidence. Specifically, 
the Act stated that “the quality of outcomes particularly depended on the 
volume of services provided” [emphasis added]. This clause had signifi-
cant influence on how the law was subsequently interpreted and applied 
both by corporatist policy actors (i.e. the associations in favour and against, 
as well as the GBA as decision-making body) and by social courts involved 
in legal adjudication.
SettIng MInIMuM voluMeS: tHe role 
of tHe federal JoInt coMMIttee
With the passage of the Act, federal legislators mandated the self- 
administration to identify hospital services suitable for minimum volumes 
and to set volume thresholds. This task fell initially to the Hospital 
Committee (Ausschuss Krankenhaus), formed by the top associations of 
sickness funds, the German Hospital Association and the Medical 
Association (Ärztekammer), and, from 2004, to the newly formed GBA.
The legal mandate required associations of sickness funds and hospitals 
(with participation from a number of other organisations such as private 
health insurers) to jointly identify the ‘catalogue of planable services’ and 
to set minimum volumes for these services (MMV 2002). As constituents 
of the committee, both (groups of) associations brought their own posi-
tions and interests of their members to the negotiating table. Sickness 
funds, as noted above, were keen to establish minimum volumes as a pol-
icy instrument for quality assurance and structural change. The hospital 
association, in contrast, wanted to prevent their introduction and, as this 
had failed, to limit the number of services minimum volumes would apply 
to and keep volume thresholds low.
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While unable to openly reject quality assurance as an objective, the 
main strategy of the hospital association was to highlight the risks to 
patients potentially arising from minimum volumes. These risks came in 
two flavours: The first argument was that minimum volumes would endan-
ger access to care for patients by reducing the geographic coverage of 
services:
In addition, the proposed bill suggests minimum volumes for hospitals. Yet 
the application of minimum volumes can exclude hospitals [from service 
provision] in an unjustified way, which would endanger access to services for 
patients. [DKG, Press release, 1 Feb 02]
A second line of argument was that minimum volumes were insuffi-
ciently supported by scientific evidence and were ‘unfair’ to low-volume 
hospitals that would produce good outcomes (Interview). Legislators had 
pre-empted the first line of argument by allowing state authorities to grant 
exemptions on a case-by-case basis on the grounds of geographic equity. 
However, the second argument – insufficient evidence – was more suc-
cessful in challenging the appropriateness of minimum volumes and 
obstructing their implementation. This position has been maintained to 
this day in a slightly modified version, with the hospital association argu-
ing that service volumes as surrogate parameter being less meaningful and 
therefore more likely to be unfair than indicators that measure quality 
directly (DKG 2014). While this is scientifically correct, it also raises the 
bar for regulation as it is not at all clear how other quality indicators would 
be operationalised to impact on hospitals’ practice of service provision.
A first list of complex surgical procedures was agreed by the Hospital 
Committee in 2003, comprising liver transplants, kidney transplants, com-
plex surgery of the oesophageal system and the pancreatic system, and 
stem cell transplantation. For these services, thresholds were set between 
5 and 20 per hospital per year (liver transplantation 10; kidney translation 
20; oesophageal surgery 5, pancreatic surgery 5, stem cell transplantation 
10–14) (MMV 2002).
Interviewees commented that these procedures had been considered as 
relatively uncontroversial, as their share in service delivery and potential 
financial impact on hospitals was small and volume thresholds low 
(Interview). They were also reflective of the services analysed in existing 
studies (Geraedts 2002; Rathmann and Windeler 2002). The limited 
selection of services and the low thresholds thus suggest compromise 
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between hospital and sickness fund associations on the lowest common 
denominator. In contrast, minimum volumes proposed by sickness funds 
(e.g. the Verband der Angestellten-Krankenkassen) had been much more 
ambitious, for example, for oesophageal and pancreatic surgery (both 10), 
coronary surgery (100), carotid surgery (20), percutaneous transluminal 
coronary angioplasty (150), breast cancer surgery (150) (Geraedts 2002).
In 2004, following the formation of the GBA, two further procedures 
were added to the list: total knee replacement and coronary surgery 
(BMGS 2004). However, no volumes were set at the time and coronary 
surgery – arguably a high volume service – would not be pursued any fur-
ther. More controversially, in 2005, a threshold of 50 cases per hospital 
and year was set for total knee replacements (BMGS 2005). Neonatal 
services for babies with very low birth weight were added by the GBA in 
2009 (GBA 2009). These two decisions involving services with high vol-
umes (knee replacement) and high costs (neonatal care) proved highly 
contested and were both subsequently challenged in court by hospitals.
At the time, two ‘evidence reports’  – one commissioned by sickness 
funds and authored by Rathmann and Windeler (2002) and the other 
commissioned by the Federal Chamber of Physicians and authored by 
Geraedts (2002) – appeared to have influenced the selection of services for 
minimum volumes. Both reports were able to identify procedures such as 
complex surgery of oesophageal tumours for which evidence of a robust 
volume-outcome relationship existed. However, as these studies were 
observational and relied on routine data, their authors took care to men-
tion that the evidence did not lend itself to suggesting volume thresholds. 
They also pointed out that studies did not identify the mechanisms, or 
factors, that would explain why higher volumes produced better outcomes. 
In other words, while these reviews established the problem and provided 
a rationale for action, they were unable to suggest specific solutions.
However, despite the known limitations of the evidence base, the 2003 
agreement stipulated that future minimum volumes should be based on 
scientific evidence. Specifically, it stated that decisions should be taken 
based on ‘epidemiological and empirical knowledge’ and applied in ‘a 
transparent and rule-based process’ (MMV 2002: 1). Not only should 
future minimum volumes require evidence of a causal relationship between 
volume and outcomes, they also required proof that improved outcomes 
were predominantly caused by higher volumes (‘im überwiegenden Teil’). 
Thus the 2003 agreement suggested that minimum volumes should only 
be set if volume was proven to be the decisive factor for variation in 
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 outcomes. This wording echoed similar terminology in the law (‘in beson-
derem Maβe’) but further raised the bar as to which types of evidence were 
regarded sufficient. However, evidence of volume being more influential 
than other factors was difficult to come by for practical reasons (i.e. such 
studies did not exist) and scientific reasons (i.e. volume is a proxy for 
other factors thus can never be decisive).
Unsurprisingly, this move towards evidence-based medicine in justify-
ing minimum volumes was celebrated by the hospital association:
Paragraph 3 of the agreement includes a procedural rule that stipulates that 
the setting of minimum volumes for certain services require an evidence- 
based process and scientific evaluation. [DKV, 4 Dec 03]
In 2004, having replaced the Hospital Committee, the GBA asked its 
newly created research institute, IQWiG, to examine the evidence of a 
volume-outcome relationship and to identify thresholds for total knee 
replacement (IQWiG 2005). Published in 2005, the IQWiG report noted 
that a volume-outcome relationship was plausible, but could not be proven 
in the absence of experimental studies (IQWiG 2005). In addition, the 
analysis of hospital data on volumes and outcomes for total knee replace-
ment (using the outcome measures ‘post-surgical mobility’ and ‘infection 
after surgery’) resulted in conflicting findings, with one indicator showing 
a decline in desired outcomes at higher volumes and the other showing 
steady improvement. Individually and jointly the analyses of these indica-
tors did not indicate that there is an ideal volume threshold. A later report 
by IQWiG relating to the treatment of very premature babies with very 
low birth weight also concluded that a causal relationship between volume 
and outcomes was likely, but could not be regarded as ultimately proven 
due to the absence of experimental studies (IQWiG 2008).
Since its inception the GBA has been committed to stringent evidence 
use, prompted by controversies over the reimbursement of pharmaceuti-
cals and medical procedures, often involving legal action from manufac-
turers. There has also been a drive to professionalise procedures with 
several documents specifying its by-laws and code of practice. There was a 
notable effort to apply similarly robust approaches to decisions on mini-
mum volumes, resulting in the commissioning of reviews and additional 
data analyses prepared by IQWiG.  In commissioning these studies, the 
GBA explicitly followed established best practice, including the publica-
tion of protocols and peer review. In compliance with its by-laws, the GBA 
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provided explicit rationales for its decisions, made this information pub-
licly available and gave due consideration to reports commissioned from 
its research institute (GBA 2008).
Yet despite this emphasis on procedural robustness, the GBA found 
itself in a position in which it was impossible to base minimum volume 
decisions on evidence alone. This happened because the scientific evidence 
in support of specific threshold was inconclusive. In addition, being a 
membership organisation, the GBA continued to be exposed to the parti-
san interests of its member organisations, in one instance rejecting a study 
brought in by the hospital association which aimed to demonstrate that a 
volume-outcome relationship was inexistent (GBA 2010). There was thus 
substantial tension between two procedural rules, those set out in by-laws 
which aim at ensuring transparency and due process, and those associated 
with the corporatist nature of the GBA and the practice of negotiating 
consensus between the organised interests in health care. In the end, deci-
sions about minimum volumes were taken by majority vote, which over-
ruled the resistance of the hospital association. Yet this did not end the 
controversy.
adJudIcatIon by tHe SocIal courtS
Following the introduction of minimum volumes for total knee replace-
ment at a level of 50 per hospital and year and of increasing existing vol-
umes for very premature babies from 14 to 30 (GBA 2013), several 
hospitals took legal action against sickness funds which had refused to pay 
for services delivered at lower numbers than required. Both cases led to a 
judicial review of the GBA decisions at state level (the Social Court of 
Berlin-Brandenburg, here referred to as ‘state court’), and, subsequently, 
at federal level (by the Federal Social Court, here the ‘federal court’).
Three questions were considered in the courts specifically: (1). Whether 
the GBA was entitled to set minimum volumes that are binding on hospi-
tals; (2). whether the selection of services to apply minimum volumes to 
was in compliance with the law (i.e. SGB 5), especially whether these ser-
vices were ‘planable’ (in the case of services for preterm babies) and 
whether there was sufficient evidence of a ‘particular’ relationship between 
volume and outcome; and (3). whether specific minimum volumes set had 
been sufficiently justified by the GBA, including by recourse to scientific 
evidence.
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On the first question, the state and federal courts upheld consistently 
that the GBA was entitled and mandated by parliament to set binding 
minimum volumes; however, the courts emphasised that, in compliance 
with German administrative law, the GBA had to explain and justify such 
decisions (BSG 2012a, b).
On the second question, the federal court ruled that services are legiti-
mately selected if they are ‘planable’ in the sense that they can be accessed 
without posing additional risks to patients, arising, for example, from longer 
journeys to (fewer) hospitals. In relation to care for very premature babies, 
the court argued, referencing national and international studies, that the 
benefits for mothers-to-be outweighed the risks associated with longer 
travel (BSG 2012a: para 43). The court thus rejected an interpretation of 
‘planable’ as ‘elective’ or ‘predictable’, as both terms would not consider the 
balance of risks and benefits to patients (BSG 2012a: para 30).
The courts also referred to research to clarify the meaning of the law 
with regard to the ‘particular’ causal relationship between volumes and 
outcomes required by law to justify specific minimum volumes. In 2011, 
the state court ruled that a causal relationship could only be regarded as 
‘particular’ if ‘controlled studies’ suggested a statistical relationship (LSG 
2011: para 87). The state court thus aligned the wording of the law with 
the concept of the ‘hierarchy of evidence’ used in evidence-based medi-
cine, which considers RCTs as the strongest research design to establish 
claims of causality.
This ruling was revised by the federal court in 2012 and confirmed in 
subsequent decisions in 2014 and 2015. The federal court argued that the 
law should not be interpreted as giving preference to particularly types of 
studies, especially since in the case of minimum volumes RCTs were nei-
ther practical nor ethical. Evidence from scientific studies would suffice if 
a causal relationship was ‘probable and plausible’ (BSG 2012b: para 31). 
However, such decisions would require additional support in the form of 
‘medical experience’ (medizinische Erfahrungssätze) (BSG 2012b: 39). 
Such medical experience is often used in court decisions by inviting expert 
witnesses (Sachverständige), although in this case the courts largely relied 
on written statements from the GBA in justification if its position.
The third question discussed by the courts was whether specific mini-
mum volumes had been sufficiently explained and justified by the 
GBA. The review of such justifications drew heavily on scientific evidence, 
although courts came to different conclusions about the level of justifica-
tion needed for minimum volumes to be considered legal. For the state 
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court in 2011, evidence was insufficient in the absence of experimental 
studies, which meant that the minimum volumes in question were unjusti-
fied (LSG 2011). Rejecting this ruling, the federal court argued – in line 
with its earlier reasoning – that minimum volumes were sufficiently justi-
fied if they were likely to improve outcomes, if the statistical association 
would be supported by ‘medical experience’ and if potential risks arising 
from minimum volumes (e.g. longer distances) would be outweighed by 
the potential benefits (BSG 2012a, 2014).
This weighing of risks and benefits led the federal court to come to dif-
ferent conclusions when considering specific minimum volumes. It argued 
that minimum volumes of 14 cases of very preterm babies per year were 
justified noting that 14 cases (roughly one per month) were sufficient to 
require the presence of a specialist team in a hospital. The existence of 
such a team would make quality improvements plausible. In a similar vein, 
it argued that 50 total knee replacements (roughly one per week on aver-
age) would be sufficient to require the hospital to employ a specialist team 
(BSG 2012a, 2014).
Using the same rationale, the federal court rejected minimum volumes 
of 30 per year for very preterm babies on the grounds that the higher 
threshold would increase the risks to those babies by excluding hospitals 
with lower volumes (but potentially providing good quality services) with-
out necessarily increasing the benefits (BSG 2012b: para 60–61). It spe-
cifically cited four studies in support of this suggestion, one of which had 
been included in a systematic review (i.e. by IQWiG) and another one had 
been rejected by the GBA in an earlier version and was co-funded by the 
hospital association (GBA 2010; Kutschmann et al. 2012). While these 
studies made valid points about the limited ability of minimum volumes to 
separate high from low performing hospitals entirely accurately, the ruling 
gave prominence to a few selected studies while disregarding all the others 
included in previous scientific reviews.
In conclusion, the analysis of court decisions suggests that scientific 
evidence was of relevance to the legal adjudication on minimum volumes 
to establish whether specific minimum volumes set by the GBA were suf-
ficiently justified in the eyes of the law. However, the decision itself was 
not based on evidence but on principles of plausibility and proportionality 
established in legal practice, which were then supported by research. Key 
to establishing conformity with the law was that the setting of minimum 
volumes was demonstrably proven to have been deliberated, with consid-
eration given to the available evidence, and that a justification was pro-
vided that could be reviewed in court.
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dIScuSSIon and concluSIon
This chapter has examined the development of minimum volume policy as 
a case study of health policy making in Germany. It specifically analysed 
the policy process and the way in which policy decisions were supported 
by evidence. It has argued that evidence use was mostly strategic: corpo-
ratist actors such as the hospital association and sickness funds commis-
sioned research to support their aims; the hospital association consistently 
promoted evidence use (specifically the ‘highest’ level of evidence such as 
RCTs, which for minimum volumes does not exist) as a cornerstone of 
decisions on specific minimum volumes; it also brought in its own, i.e. co- 
funded, studies to underline its position that minimum volumes do not 
make a meaningful contribution to quality assurance.
The formation of the GBA and IQWiG in 2004 has changed the rules 
of the argumentative game, with new procedures developed for, and 
applied to, decision-making and scientific evidence use. Decision-making 
had previously been dominated by the consensual arrangements character-
istic of corporatism. Consensual arrangements have been maintained in 
the GBA to some extent, however, decisions are eventually taken by 
majority vote, which means that resistance by providers can be overcome 
provided there is a majority. Decision-making procedures have become 
more rule-based, for example as they relate to commissioning evidence 
reviews from the IQWIG and considering its findings. This suggests that 
scientific evidence has become a substantial aspect of the GBA’s approach 
to legitimising its decisions in relation to minimum volumes. This chimes 
with findings from Boswell (2008), as well as Bijker et al. (2009), which 
describe the transfer of scientific authority to decision-making bodies 
helping them to legitimise their actions. Similar observations have been 
made in relation to decisions involving HTA where the legislator has 
recently tightened the framework for decisions for inpatient services pre-
venting the GBA to exclude services in the absence of evidence. New hos-
pital services have to be proven to be either less effective than existing 
treatments or harmful, thus setting a high bar to evidentiary support for 
decisions about service exclusions (Olberg et al. 2014).
Still, in relation to minimum volumes the analysis also echoes findings 
that emphasise the negotiated nature of decisions (Etgeton 2009), sug-
gesting that policy actors who are constituent members of the GBA engage 
in strategic uses of evidence to support their claims and promote their 
interests. Corporatist structures have changed and become more pluralist, 
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adversarial and less consensus oriented. While some have argued that the 
GBA is particularly well placed for taking unpopular decisions in contested 
policy fields such as service exclusions from the public benefits package 
(Gerlinger 2010), the present state of affairs suggests that such decisions 
often end up in court. Courts then weigh the scientific evidence provided 
in support of a decision to establish whether the GBA has provided suffi-
cient justification, although cognisant (perhaps increasingly so) of the lim-
its of such evidence. This analysis suggests however that substantive 
disagreements between different organised interests do not disappear by 
evoking the authority of scientific evidence. Evidence use as ‘technocratic 
fix’ is unlikely to solve the legitimacy problems of organisations charged 
with unpopular decisions (Syrett 2003). Decisions that directly affect the 
interests of policy actors, perhaps especially so if these have financial impli-
cations and impact on notions of professional autonomy, are likely to 
remain contested and have a fair chance to require legal adjudication. The 
GBA is routinely taken to court by pharmaceutical producers (and some-
times patients) contesting decisions to exclude medicinal products from 
public reimbursement, which is a well-trodden (though not necessarily 
successful) avenue given that access to legal review is easy in the German 
legal system. In this case here, smaller hospitals are particularly likely to be 
affected by minimum volumes and while the hospital association opposed 
the policy almost throughout (although there are signs of partial accep-
tance following repeated confirmation by the judiciary (DKG 2014)) hos-
pitals affected by the policy have found their interests directly at stake and 
have sought legal redress individually.
The policy process analysed here arguably does not tell the full story of 
minimum volumes, as it focuses on three specific stages of decision- making 
while largely ignoring the dynamics of agenda-setting prior to the parlia-
mentary debate, and the actual impact of minimum volumes in practice. 
There is now clear evidence that minimum volume regulation is widely 
ignored by hospitals and sickness funds are incapable of retrieving funding 
from hospitals if services turn out to have been delivered in volumes below 
the threshold (de Cruppé et al. 2014; Peschke et al. 2014).
Court decisions also have tended to directly affect how the GBA went 
about making decisions, with some noting that the first court cases led to 
more attention given to future evidentiary support for decisions. It also 
led to the GBA ceasing to introduce further minimum volumes. Meanwhile, 
sickness funds have asked parliament to change the wording of the law to 
reduce the requirement on evidentiary support for minimum volumes 
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(Leber 2014). In December 2015, a new law (the Act to Reform the 
Structures of Hospital Provision, KHSG) removed the phrase ‘in beson-
derem Maβe’ (i.e. the particular relationship of volume and outcome) 
from the SGB 5 to make specific minimum volumes more defensible in 
court and introduce a process that would make it easier for sickness funds 
to withhold funding from hospitals for services under the threshold. 
Whether this will increase the number of minimum volumes introduced 
by the GBA in future and, indeed, further changes the balance between 
payers and providers in the still corporatist system of health policy making 
in Germany remains to be seen.
The analysis above has shown that various forms of strategic evidence 
use dominate the example of minimum volume policy in Germany. While 
it is clear that strategic use of evidence does not entirely preclude notions 
of ‘evidence-based policy’ – as evidence can also have a substantive impact 
on decisions  – this analysis suggests that expectations of ‘instrumental’ 
evidence use are likely to be disappointed. Changes in corporatist decision- 
making, namely the formation of the GBA, have brought about new 
opportunities for evidence use, necessitated by the GBA’s need to legiti-
mise its decisions, including in court. But this has not reduced the poten-
tial for contestation or has fully established the idea of instrumental (i.e. 
objective) evidence use.
These findings hint at the contextual nature of evidence use in policy- 
making, which is shaped by the specific institutional arrangements of 
health care governance and the wider political system that influence the 
motivation of policy actors and organisations to use evidence to legitimise 
decisions. While the case of minimum volumes has shown that evidentiary 
support is necessary for such GBA decisions, evidence was not the only, or 
indeed most relevant, source of legitimacy, as legitimation is also derived 
from parliamentary law-making, corporatist governance and legal adjudi-
cation by the judiciary.
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CHAPTER 7
Electronic Cigarettes Regulation in the UK: 
A Case Study in Evidence Informed Policy 
Making
Benjamin Hawkins
IntroductIon
Electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) are hand-held, battery-operated devices, 
in which liquid nicotine is vapourised and inhaled by the user. E-cigarettes 
vary greatly in form and appearance, with some products (known as ‘ciga-
likes’) closely resembling conventional cigarettes in shape and appearance. 
Larger, refillable devices (known as ‘eGos’ or ‘mods’) bear little visual simi-
larity to tobacco products (Zhu et al. 2014; Grana et al. 2014a). The latter 
offer the possibility for users to vary rates of nicotine delivery through 
adjustable settings, customisation and the concentration of nicotine solu-
tion (‘e-liquid’) used. Globally, transnational tobacco corporations (TTCs) 
have aggressively entered the sector through a series of mergers and acqui-
sitions (Manning 2013; Richtel 2013; McNeill and Munafò 2013; Tobacco 
Tactics 2014a) and the once highly disparate e-cigarette market is rapidly 
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consolidating around a small number of producers, linked to TTCs 
(Smithers 2014; Thesing 2014).
Studies indicate that use of e-cigarettes doubled in Europe and North 
America between 2008 and 2012 (Grana et al. 2014a). The rapid expan-
sion in the use and marketing of these products raised a number of regula-
tory issues including their classification (as consumer products or medical 
devices), and thus the ways in which they can be sold and marketed, and 
restrictions on their purchase (age limits and outlet types) and use (in 
public places) (World Health Organization 2014). As the popularity and 
promotion of e-cigarettes grew, national governments and the European 
Union (EU) sought to put in place effective rules governing their sale, use 
and marketing, which balance the potential benefits of e-cigarettes (pri-
marily for existing smokers who may use them as quit aids) against the 
need to protect consumers and the wider public’s health.
Policy decisions such as how to regulate e-cigarettes require responsible 
agencies to evaluate the likely impact and potential risks of novel products, 
through engagement with the relevant bodies of evidence. In the case of 
e-cigarettes, this process was complicated by the limited evidence base on the 
health effects of e-cigarettes in real world conditions or their patterns of use 
and the significant divisions which have emerged within the tobacco control 
and public health communities regarding e-cigarettes (cf. Etter 2013; 
Chapman 2013; Chapman et  al. 2017; McNeill et  al. 2015a; McKee and 
Capewell 2015a). Those in favour on e-cigarettes emphasise their potential 
usefulness as smoking cessations tools, and emphasise that e- cigarettes offer a 
market oriented and demand led solution to smoking. Consequently they 
support non–interventionist regulatory frameworks which facilitate the devel-
opment of the product category and their appeal to smokers. Against this, 
those concerned about the potentially negative externalities of e-cigarettes for 
population level health have advocated policy makers adopt the precautionary 
principle and more robust controls on the sale, marketing and use of 
e-cigarettes. This schism has seen two separate letters sent to WHO Director-
General, Margaret Chan, setting out the potential benefits and dangers of 
e-cigarettes respectively, and advocating very different regulatory approaches 
to the products (Abrams et al. 2014; Aktan et al. 2014; Gartner and Malone 
2014). In the UK, a key market for the e-cigarette category and the policy 
debate on their regulation, the division between public health advocates in 
favour of or opposed to e-cigarettes came to the fore following publication of 
a Public Health England Report (McNeill et al. 2015a, b) endorsing the posi-
tive health effects of e-cigarettes and subsequent criticisms from other public 
health actors (McKee and Capewell 2015a, b; Lancet 2015).
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It is widely accepted that a highly unified advocacy and NGO network, 
coalescing around a shared policy agenda, has played a key role in deliver-
ing advances in tobacco control in recent decades (Gneiting 2015; Wipfli 
2015). E-cigarettes can thus be seen as a disruptive force in the field of 
tobacco policy, problematizing accepted norms of evidence use in decision 
making and dividing the expert community to which the government had 
previously been able to turn for clear, coherent guidance in this area.
The issue of e-cigarettes thus offers a highly pertinent case through 
which to study the process of evidence-use in policy making. Furthermore, 
the UK is a particularly useful context in which to examine evidence use in 
e-cigarette debates for four main reasons. First, the UK has a long- standing, 
and deeply embedded, culture of evidence use in policy making dating back 
at least to the New Labour Government (Parsons 2002), which has seen 
norms of evidence use institutionalised in bodies such as the National 
Institute of Health and Care Excellence (NICE). Second, the idea that 
health policy should be informed by research evidence is widely accepted, 
both within policy making circles and amongst the wider public (Cairney 
and Studlar 2014; Smith 2013). This is reflected in the strong rhetorical 
commitment to the goal of ‘evidence-based’ policy amongst both decision-
makers and policy advocates in relation to e-cigarettes. Third, the UK has 
a strong record on tobacco control and some of the most advanced tobacco 
control policies in the world (ASH 2007). As elsewhere, this was achieved 
to a significant extent by the successful advocacy of a well organised and 
unified public health community, which has been divided by the issue of 
e-cigarettes. Finally, the UK has been the site of some of the most vehe-
ment policy debates on e-cigarettes globally and some of the most bitter 
disagreements over the nature of the policy challenge posed by e-cigarettes 
and the guidance offered by the existing research evidence.
E-cIgarEttE rEgulatIon In thE uK
In EU member-states, many aspects of e-cigarette regulation are decided 
collectively at the European level. The 2014 Tobacco Products Directive 
(TPD) which governs the sale and marketing of e-cigarettes in the UK, 
takes a dual approach in which devices meeting certain criteria (such as the 
concentration of nicotine solution they contain) may be sold as tobacco 
products under the auspices of the Directive, whilst others must be 
licenced as medical devices by the designated national authorities, such as 
the UK Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). 
This classification determines how their sale, use and marketing are 
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r egulated, with only medical devices able to make health claims. National 
governments remain responsible for other areas of e-cigarette policy with-
out cross border effects including minimum purchase ages for e-cigarettes 
and rules relating to their use in public places. Public Health England have 
played a prominent role in discussions about the regulation of e-cigarettes 
(Bauld et al. 2014; Dockrell et al. 2013; McNeill et al. 2015a), including 
the issue of public use which, following the implementation of the TPD 
has emerged as a key point of contention between actors (Chapman et al. 
2017; Bauld et al. 2016).
IssuE FramIng and EvIdEncE InFormEd PolIcy
As is argued throughout the current volume, recent contributions to the 
study of evidence-informed policy making problematise both our under-
standing of research evidence and evidence use in the policy process, rec-
ognising that that there can be multiple bodies of evidence of relevance to 
a given policy issue, where multiple (and perhaps mutually exclusive) con-
cerns and policy priorities are at stake in the context of finite governmental 
resources available to address them. The issue of policy framing is, there-
fore, key to the analysis of the development of e-cigarette policy debates 
and the role of evidence within these (Van Hulst and Yanow 2016; Koon 
et al. 2016). The way policy controversies are framed – the specific under-
standing of what the issue at stake is – will lead different, relevant bodies 
of evidence to be foregrounded in debates. Equally, frame sponsors – pol-
icy advocates promoting particular understanding of policy issues – pursue 
particular policy agendas and will point to different bodies of evidence as 
an argumentative too to support their position (Majone 1993).
Disagreements over what the issue is cannot be decided by recourse to 
evidence, since interlocutors will not agree on what the ‘right’ issue fram-
ing (and thus the relevant body of evidence) is. However, policy actors 
often misapprehend that they are engaged, not in debates about the facts 
of the issue, but in a debate about what this issue itself is; how it is defined 
and which account of that issue prevails (Stone 1989; Bacchi 2009). The 
process of issue framing and agenda setting is highly political and involves 
conflicts between competing values, priorities and ideologies in the con-
text of finite resources. In some cases, the competing values at stake in 
policy debates may be mutually exclusive and come into direct conflict 
(e.g. concerns over freedoms and civil liberties versus security). At other 
times, governments may have to decide to prioritise certain issues and 
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outcomes over others, and this may be the result of successful discursive 
strategies by frame sponsors including the provision of evidence to sup-
port their claims.
Crucially, policy actors are often unable to see that they and their oppo-
nents are talking about fundamentally different things – or understand the 
policy problem to be something fundamentally different – even where they 
address what seems to be the ‘same’ issue through the ‘same’ vocabulary. 
As Charles Taylor (1971) comments, arguments over common meanings 
are often the basis of the most vehement political disputes. Making explicit 
and recognising the particular perspectives from which we see certain 
issues – our own biases and preferences that dictate what the issue is for 
us – has been identified as an essential step in overcoming protracted politi-
cal controversies in a process of ‘frame reflection’ (Rein and Schön 1994).
Whilst intractable policy disputes of this kind cannot be resolved by 
recourse to the ‘facts’ of the matter or the relevant evidence base; they are 
nevertheless involve decisions, which must be taken in light of the evi-
dence (Hawkins and Parkhurst 2016). That is to say relevant research 
evidence is one component feeding into in a complex process of policy 
decision making. Evidence of the effects of policy problems will inform 
the prioritisation of issues, but cannot decide this in isolation from other 
values and contextual variables. Once a policy problem has been identified 
as a priority requiring a policy response, evidence will inform decisions 
about how to address an issue in the most (cost) effective way, but evi-
dence alone cannot determine what course of action governments should 
take. Recognising both the political nature of decisions and the value of 
evidence to inform policy decisions (e.g. to ensure the efficacy and effec-
tiveness and value for money of competing policy options) requires a more 
nuanced account of evidence which appreciates the role evidence can and 
cannot play in the identification and resolution of policy issues.
thE uK E-cIgarEttE PolIcy dEbatE
These insights are of great relevance to the current UK e-cigarette debate 
in which policy actors often appear to be talking at cross purposes with 
each other. Whilst the basis of disagreements between policy actors appear 
to be routed in conflicts over evidence, the source of these disagreements 
lies in differing interpretations of the policy problem and the objectives of 
regulatory responses. Within the UK e-cigarette debate, actors have 
coalesced around what can be termed the ‘harm-reduction’ and ‘ population 
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health’ positons. By definition, the positions set out here and many actors 
will not fall squarely within either ‘camp’. However, they are useful heu-
ristics for discussing the different ways in which the issue is conceptualised 
and the nature of the controversy which has emerged.
The former consists of people actively involved in research and practise 
in the field of smoking cessations who prioritise the harm reduction poten-
tial of e-cigarettes for current smokers unwilling or unable to quit tobacco 
smoking. The logic of their position is that smokers may be able to transi-
tion away from smoking through e-cigarettes, reducing health harms 
experienced. The latter consist of people working in the broader areas of 
tobacco control and public health who prioritise concerns about the 
potentially negative population level effects of e-cigarettes and its poten-
tial to undermine current tobacco control policies. In addition, they ques-
tion their efficacy as quit aids and assert the needs for a precautionary 
approach. Actors in both camps strongly assert the need for evidence 
based policy making, citing evidence which supports their position (cf. 
McNeill et al. 2015b; McKee and Capewell 2015a). The quality and pol-
icy implications of new studies which appear are highly contested.
The debates within the public health community are not conducted in 
isolation. There are other prominent participants in these regulatory 
debates whose concerns and interests overlap and contrast with those of 
the public health voices at different times in the debate. In particular, 
there is a prominent and apparently well organised e-cigarette user or 
‘vaper’ movement which has engaged in policy debates to represent their 
preferences and interests as consumers. The transnational tobacco indus-
try, which has aggressively entered the UK and global e-cigarette markets, 
has also sought to represent its interests in the debates. This is a source of 
great controversy given the well documented history of tobacco industry 
involvement both in the subversion of science and policy and in the co-
opting of researchers and medical practitioners to confer legitimacy on its 
interventions (Brandt 2012). The presence of the tobacco industry in the 
debate, and the implications of this for tobacco control, is arguable the 
greatest source of controversy between different camps in the debate. The 
remainder of the chapter examines how these fundamentally different 
issue framings have led to significant disputes between policy actors in 
these camps and a range of topics relating to e-cigarette regulation: the 
potential health benefits of e-cigarettes; their classification as medical, 
tobacco or consumer devices; and the ways in which they should be mar-
keted and smokers and non-smokers.
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thE PotEntIal hEalth bEnEFIts oF E-cIgarEttEs
Policy debates on e-cigarettes turn on their potential health benefits. 
However, the way in which this is defined varies between camps. The 
debate on e-cigarettes has focused principally on the individual level health 
effects of e-cigarette use, and their harm reduction potential smoking for 
existing smokers (McNeill and Munafò 2013; Polosa et al. 2013; Cahn 
and Siegel 2011; Wagener et al. 2012; Riker et al. 2012). Whilst some 
argue, and cite evidence, that e-cigarettes are a less toxic alternative for 
smokers (Etter 2013; Wagener et al. 2012; McNeill and Munafò 2013; 
Polosa et al. 2013; Hajek et al. 2014), others have urged caution given the 
current uncertainty about their safety, usage patterns and their impact on 
existing tobacco control policies (Wagener et al. 2012; Taleb and Maziak 
2013; Maziak 2014; Chapman 2014a). However, the health implications 
of long term vaping are uncertain, and it will require longitudinal studies 
of real world usage to establish its effects (Grana et al. 2014a).
The harm reduction potential of e-cigarettes turns on their ability to 
attract and retain smokers, who abandon cigarettes entirely, given that even 
radically reduced rates of smoking carry significant harms (Schane et  al. 
2010). To the extent that reduction in smoking through dual use with 
e-cigarettes this a precursor to quit attempts, this may also contribute to 
public health (Cheong et al. 2007). However, where dual use is continued 
and reduces quit attempts – through the false perception of reduced harm 
from decreased smoking or through the added convenience of being ability 
to ‘vape’ in smoke free environments – e-cigarette use may increase, not 
reduce, harm (Chapman 2014b). This in turn requires accurate assess-
ments of usage patterns. Some limited evidence exists that e-cigarettes can 
aid smoking cessation. Whilst Brown et al. (2014) found them to be 60% 
more effective than nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) in quit attempts, 
Bullen et al. (2013) found e-cigarettes to be as effective as NRT. Further 
studies examine rates of e-cigarettes use (Evans and Hoffman 2014; Etter 
and Bullen 2014; Bullen et  al. 2010, 2013), including amongst certain 
sub-groups including young people (Durmowicz 2014; Grana et al. 2014a; 
Maziak 2014) and those with mental health issues (Cummins et al. 2014).
Concerns have also arisen that e-cigarettes may act as a gateway to smok-
ing, or entice ex-smokers to return to nicotine use (Zeller and Hatsukami 
2009; Fairchild et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2014; Dutra and Glantz 2014; Grana 
et al. 2013; Maziak 2014). Whether the attractiveness of vaping (and, as 
will be discussed below, its marketing) to non-smokers is a cause for con-
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cern depends on the assessment of its harmfulness, as well as moral debates 
about the desirability of marketing a relatively unharmful, yet highly addic-
tive, product such as nicotine to those who do not currently use it.
Those concerned with harm reduction have focussed on the relative 
toxicity of the e-cigarette vapour in comparison with tobacco smoke, both 
for consumers of these products and bystanders (Cahn and Siegel 2011; 
Goniewicz et  al. 2013; Cheng 2014; Orr 2014; Callahan-Lyon 2014; 
Etter et al. 2011). Recent studies have also begun to address issues such as 
the availability of e-cigarettes (Rose et al. 2014), exposure to marketing 
(Huang et al. 2014; De Andrade and Hastings 2013a; Grana et al. 2014b) 
and the effects of that marketing on different groups (Emery et al. 2014; 
Pepper et al. 2014).
Others, meanwhile, have paid attention to the potential sociological 
effects of e-cigarettes through the renormalisation of smoking, and the 
circumvention of existing tobacco control measures, including advertising 
blackouts and clean air legislation (for exceptions see De Andrade and 
Hastings 2013a; Fairchild et al. 2014; Maziak 2014; Taleb and Maziak 
2013; Zeller and Hatsukami 2009; Henningfield and Zaatari 2010). The 
similarity in appearance of many e-cigarettes and conventional cigarettes, 
as well as their packaging (Tobacco Tactics 2014b), may be used as a way 
for cigarette companies to circumvent cigarette advertising bans. 
Consequently, current debates appear to prioritise the issue of harm reduc-
tion for current smokers over measures designed to prevent the smoking 
uptake by future generations (Maziak 2014).
classIFyIng E-cIgarEttEs
Where e-cigarettes are legal products available for sale and consumption 
(e.g. in the UK), regulatory debates have focussed on whether e-cigarettes 
should be classified as medical devices, consumer goods or tobacco prod-
ucts. Public health advocates have argued in favour of their regulation as 
medical products, citing the precautionary principle and the absence of 
studies about their long term health effects. This approach, it is  contended, 
is necessary in order to guarantee their safety and provide a framework for 
regulating marketing activities. Those favouring a harm reduction 
approach, meanwhile, have favoured a light-touch regulatory approach, 
seeing accessibility of products and the ease of transition to vaping as 
being key drivers of reduced smoking rates (Snowden 2013). Toxicity 
studies cited in the previous section are cited to support the framing of 
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e-cigarettes as a safer alternative and the underline the importance of facili-
tating the transition of smokers to vaping. Proposals to regulate e- cigarettes 
as medical devices, it is claimed, both mischaracterise the product and 
preclude forms of marketing that would attract smokers to migrate to 
e-cigarettes (Gornall 2012; British American Tobacco 2013; Snowden 
2013; Devlin 2012).
E-cigarettes are seen by their proponents as a ‘market-led’ solution to 
the smoking issue which must be differentiated form medicalised NRT, 
like gum or patches (Devlin 2012; Cahn and Siegel 2011; EC Forum Ltd. 
2013). From this perspective, e-cigarettes are consumer products, aimed 
at those wishing to use nicotine recreationally without exposure to ciga-
rette smoke (Snowden 2013). In part, this reflects a desire articulated by 
vociferous e-cigarette user groups in the debate to be seen not as sick 
people requiring treatment to recover from smoking, but as consumers 
choosing safer forms of nicotine consumption.
marKEtIng
In keeping with the differing visions of e-cigarettes as medical devices and 
consumer products, there are widely differing views on the forms of mar-
keting which should be permitted for e-cigarettes. For those who see 
e-cigarettes as a potentially beneficial, market led phenomenon, attraction 
to these products through branding and promotion are an essential mech-
anism for reducing smoking by enticing smokers on to a safer alternative 
nicotine delivery mechanisms. On the other hand, concerns arise about 
the attractiveness of e-cigarette marketing for non-smokers and the wider 
public health effects of the promotion of vaping as a social practise.
E-cigarettes are now widely advertised and promoted online and in 
national media (Bauld et  al. 2014; De Andrade and Hastings 2013b; 
Tobacco Tactics 2014b). Marketing materials often promote the harm 
reduction potential of their products for existing smokers (Richardson 
et al. 2014; De Andrade and Hastings 2013a). Citing the lower recorded 
level of toxins in e-cigarette vapour versus tobacco smoke (Goniewicz 
et al. 2013; Schripp et al. 2013), manufacturers claim they cause no long 
term harm to users, or to the air quality around them (Snowden 2013; 
Henningfield and Zaatari 2010; Hodgekiss 2013).
Critics have argued that e-cigarette manufacturers have made use of 
marketing techniques reminiscent of the tobacco industry, including 
celebrity endorsement and product placement in films and music videos 
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(Tobacco Tactics 2014b; De Andrade and Hastings 2013a). The prolifera-
tion of e-cigarette marketing via social media (Fallin et al. 2012; Grana 
et  al. 2011), the introduction of flavoured products and claims that 
e- cigarettes are ‘healthier’ and environmentally friendly (Yamin et  al. 
2010; Fallin et  al. 2012) have raised concerns they may be especially 
attractive to young consumers. Recent attempts to repackage and rebrand 
e-cigarettes, as “vapesticks” or brightly coloured “hookah pens,” may be 
also appeal to youth (Richtel 2014). However, existing studies suggest 
levels of youth e-cigarette use remain low (McNeill et al. 2014).
dIscussIon and conclusIon
In the UK, significant divisions have opened up between policy actors 
highlighting the potentially positive and negative health effects of e- cigarette 
use and citing evidence which supports their positions. This issue has 
become particularly divisive within a public health community which had 
previously collaborated effectively on a consensual policy agenda.
A defining characteristic of this debate is the extent to which the lines 
of contestation are defined in terms of evidence and a strong normative 
commitment by actors on all sides to the goal of evidence based policy 
making. Policy actors on all sides point to evidence supporting their posi-
tion and express frustration at the failure of others to follow the apparently 
self-evident policy prescriptions which follow from this. The apparent fail-
ure of their interlocutors to accept the facts presented and their policy 
consequences has led to accusations of bad faith and conflicts of interest to 
explain what is otherwise incomprehensible intransigence.
The analysis above compares the different positions articulated on spe-
cific aspects of the e-cigarette debate by policy actors and the evidence 
cited to support these. The two broad camps identified within the public 
health community are necessarily simplified interpretations of what is a 
more complex and nuanced array of different views but the division identi-
fied between the ‘harm reduction’ and ‘public health’ positions serves to 
demonstrate that different, at times mutually exclusive, positions on an 
issue such as e-cigarette policy can be support by relevant bodies of evi-
dence. This is particularly the case with such novel products for which the 
research literature related to key policy issue is necessarily limited. It is 
erroneous, however, to assume that the current impasse can be overcome 
simply through the production of more evidence. In some instances, such 
as the long term health effects of e-cigarette use, consensus may emerge 
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(as with the health effects of smoking) which deligitimises or marginalises 
certain policy positions. However, evidence alone will not be sufficient to 
resolve what are political and value driven controversies.
Instead, what is needed to overcome the current divisions within public 
health, and with this a more coherent approach to developing effective 
and appropriate public policy, is a more explicit recognition of the political 
nature of the policy process and the possibility that multiple, competing 
framings of policy objects exist through a process of ‘frame reflection’ 
(Rein and Schön 1994). This may seem intuitive to social scientists, par-
ticularly those working in the realm of interpretative policy analysis. 
However, it is far more challenging for many public health actors whose 
training in the natural sciences perhaps does not equip them to recognise 
the existence of multiple competing narratives (and evidence bases) as a 
precursor to the process of frame reflection needed to overcome disputes. 
The natural science work on the assumptions of a single, universal ‘truth’, 
epistemologically accessible through the application of the correct meth-
odology to the relevant data. The idea that there can be multiple interpre-
tations of the same policy issue, multiple bodies of relevant evidence 
depending on those interpretations may run counter to their professional 
identities and their scholarly training. It may lead them to be oblivious to, 
or reject, the idea that there are multiple, competing ‘truths’ or problem 
definitions as a dangerous compromise or subversion of the scientific 
enterprise. However, this process of reflexivity about one’s own position 
and assumptions which underpins processes of frame reflection, which will 
be essential in attempting to detoxify current debates and open up a space 
for engagement between actors at different ends of the debate.
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IntroductIon
This chapter brings together insights of parallel efforts to map out the 
structures and bodies providing evidence to inform health policy in the six 
GRIP-Health case study countries covered in this volume of work. More 
specifically, it reflects on the roles of Ministries of Health in each country, 
and the systems of evidence advice that provide policy relevant evidence to 
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these Ministries. This chapter describes how Ministries of Health have 
been mandated to act as stewards of populations’ health according to the 
World Health Organization. We argue that this mandate extends to them 
having (at least partial) responsibility for ensuring relevant evidence and 
information informs health policy decisions. The chapter then discusses 
the need to consider evidence advisory systems serving Ministry needs, 
particularly considering whether or how such systems work to provide 
relevant and salient information in a timely manner to key decision points 
in the policy making process. Insights from our six cases are presented to 
illustrate the structural and practical differences which exist between evi-
dence advisory systems and how, at certain times, key health decisions may 
in fact lie outside ministerial authority. These divergent experiences high-
light a range of analytical challenges when considering the provision of 
evidence to inform health decisions from an institutional perspective. The 
following chapter continues the discussion with country case studies and 
comparative reflections on the use of evidence within government bodies 
outside Ministries of Health – particularly in the legislature and judiciary.
MInIstrIes as stewards of HealtH  
and HealtH evIdence
A key debate in global health over the last two decades has concerned the 
role of the state in the health sector and in health systems governance 
(WHO 2000, p. 119; Saltman and Ferroussier-Davis 2000, p. 732; Reich 
2002; Alvarez-Rosete 2008). This has grown in part from a renewed focus 
on the importance of health systems for improving population health, 
while simultaneously acknowledging the increasing diversity of decision- 
making forums and agencies involved in healthcare provision and imple-
mentation (Durán et  al. 2011; Hafner and Shiffman 2012). (Dodgson 
et al. 2002) These changes have led to a shift in the vocabulary used by 
scholars. The term ‘governance’ began to replace ‘government’ within 
political science discourse since the 1990s, reflecting the decentred posi-
tion of central government in public policy in many countries (Rhodes 
1996, 1997; Kooiman 2000; Pierre 2000; Rosenau 1995; Stoker 1998).1 
These changes have occurred in parallel with the growing number of calls 
to ensure that health services, and wider health sector, planning is informed 
1 For overviews of this shift in terminology and focus, see: (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; 
Richards and Smith 2002; Piere and Peters 2000; Davies and Keating 2000; Kjaer 2011, 
2004).
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by the rigorous use of evidence, with a growing body of literature that has 
engaged with strategies to improve the uptake or use of evidence (c.f. van 
Kammen et al. 2006; LaRocca et al. 2012; Lavis et al. 2010). Yet in the 
changing health sector landscape, questions arise about whose role or 
responsibility it is to ensure health policy is informed by evidence.
Recent decades have also seen widespread debate about the capacity of 
the state to deliver policy outcomes and its right to intervene in the lives of 
the citizens it governs (Richards and Smith 2002; Bell and Hindmoor 
2009). This shifting conceptualization of government as governance has 
also occurred in the arena of health (Dodgson et al. 2002; Kickbusch 2002; 
Lewis et  al. 2006). Thus questions have been raised about the locus of 
political power in contemporary societies and whether the state enjoys the 
same degree of control and power over health systems and policy as in the 
past. (Bell and Hindmoor 2009; Bevir 2010; Rhodes 1997) In contempo-
rary health systems, the number of old and new actors and institutions has 
multiplied, the boundaries between the public and private sectors have 
become more blurred, and central authorities’ control over a much more 
complex policy process may now be challenged (Lewis et al. 2006; Alvarez-
Rosete 2007; Saltman et al. 2011). The inherent complexity this implies 
means that such systems can only be governed through processes of steer-
ing, coordination and goal-setting for the range of different stakeholders 
involved and by developing a wide range of tools and strategies to this end.
The World Health Organization (WHO) introduced and championed 
the concept of stewardship of health systems as an essential government 
function in the year 2000 World Health Report (hereafter WHR 2000), 
which was devoted to the understanding, functioning and performance 
health systems. The report took a broad view of health systems as including: 
“all the organizations, institutions and resources that are devoted to pro-
ducing health actions. [Continuing:] A health action is defined as any effort, 
whether in personal health care, public health services or through inter-
sectoral initiatives, whose primary purpose is to improve health (p. xi)”.
The WHR 2000 is widely held up by the health community as a key 
document championing and reinvigorating the focus on health systems, 
with ministries of health being seen as health system stewards. Many subse-
quent WHO reports and policies have aimed at strengthening systems as 
well as the institutional mechanisms for governing them (WHO 2003, 
2007, 2008). Similarly, WHO regional offices have had the intertwined 
topics of health systems development and state governance roles at the heart 
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of their discussions (WHOROE 2008; Kickbusch and Gleicher 2012) – also 
see (McQueen et al. 2012).
The terms governance and stewardship have often been used as syn-
onyms by those working in the health field, yet stewardship implies a par-
ticular mandate, and ultimate responsibility, for population health that is 
reflected when the WHO states:
The ultimate responsibility for the overall performance of a country’s health 
system lies with government, which in turn should involve all sectors of 
society in its stewardship […] The health of the people is always a national 
priority: government responsibility for it is continuous and permanent. 
Ministries of health must therefore take on a large part of the stewardship of 
health systems. (WHO 2000, p. xiv)
According to the WHR 2000, such responsibility is exercised over three 
distinct dimensions of stewardship (p. 122):
• Formulating health policy – defining the vision and direction;
• Exerting influence – approaches to regulation;
• Collecting and using intelligence.
Whilst the first two components indicate a responsibility to oversee 
health policy and the conduct of health actors, the third dimension – ‘col-
lecting and using intelligence’ – captures many of the common ideas about 
the use of policy relevant information to inform health decisions.
InstItutIonal systeMs of evIdence advIse  
for HealtH PolIcy
Ministries of Health may thus be seen as having a mandate over decisions 
affecting the health of the people, as well as over the use of evidence and 
information to guide those decisions. However, effective utilisation of evi-
dence requires a conduit through which it can reach relevant decision- 
makers at times when such information can be useful. Thus applying wider 
‘governance’ concepts to the question of evidence use, it becomes clear 
that Ministries will not necessarily take it upon themselves to gather and 
analyse all policy relevant evidence (although some of them may try to). 
Rather, they can serve as the stewards of health evidence by overseeing and 
maintaining the institutional arrangements in place which serve to provide 
policy-relevant evidence.
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Ministries can rely on a more or less formalised network of bodies and 
groups to serve as the providers of policy-relevant evidence (Nutley et al. 
2007; Parkhurst 2017) – networks we refer to as ‘evidence advisory sys-
tems’, which can be seen to reflect a specific form of the broader concept 
of ‘policy advisory systems’ within the public policy literature. According 
to Hustedt and Veit (2017), “The concept of policy advisory systems 
focuses on the country-specific organization and institutionalization of 
policy advice. It refers to an interlocking set of actors with a unique con-
figuration in each sector and jurisdiction, who provide information, 
knowledge, and recommendations for actions to policy-makers” (p. 42).
One of the first authors to explicitly discuss policy advisory bodies from 
an institutional perspective was John Halligan (1995) who explored the 
location of the body providing advice (within the public service, internal 
to the government, or external) and reflected on the level of government 
control each might entail. Halligan notes that there is no consensus as to 
the ‘best’ structure for policy advice, but highlights some of the different 
potential issues that might be raised by differing systems, including the 
level of independence of the advisory bodies or the level of public consul-
tation involved. He proposes three principles that might be seen as central 
to a good advisory system, however: the provision of multiple sources of 
advice; the flexibility to be able to choose a mix of advisors and processes 
appropriate to a particular issue; and an explicit concern with the effective-
ness of advice.
More recently, scholars have questioned whether Halligan’s focus on 
location of advice is necessarily the best factor to consider when judging 
policy advisory systems. Craft and Howlett (2012), for instance, argue 
that this focus may ignore a number of other key concerns to those study-
ing advisory systems, including the content of the policy advice itself, 
which can have important implications for the kinds of decisions advice 
that is being provided. Other scholars have started to investigate policy 
advisory systems in greater depth, but according to Hustedt and Veit 
(2017), much of this work has focussed on western democracies, looking 
at questions such as the externalisation of advice or politicisation of advice, 
with a large number of other policy-relevant questions remaining unad-
dressed. In the health sector, Koon and colleagues (Koon et al. 2013) have 
more specifically discussed the importance of ‘embeddedness’ of health 
policy and systems research to inform health policy decisions; with 
 embeddedness reflecting the centrality and networked links these forms of 
research have in various government systems.
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However, the explicit normative goal of Ministries of Health to serve in 
a stewardship role to improve population health provides a useful lens by 
which to analyse evidence advisory systems. Indeed, while high level legis-
latures and political bodies may see their ultimate goals continually being 
debated or changed as political priorities shift, Ministries of Health typi-
cally have a fairly commonly agreed set of goals that can be used to reflect 
on how evidence advisory systems in place work to serve those needs or 
achieve health sector goals.
Indeed, stakeholders calling for increased or improved uses of evidence 
in health policy typically make such calls on the basis of a set of (stated or 
unstated) assumptions. First, the goals of health policy to improve popula-
tion health – primarily though reducing morbidity and mortality, extend-
ing life expectancy, or decreasing health inequalities – are taken as given by 
many public health advocates. Furthermore, the particular emphasis on 
scientific evidence is based on an underlying assumption that more rigor-
ous and systematic uses of evidence are likely to lead to greater effective-
ness and efficiency than piecemeal or scientifically flawed uses of evidence 
(Chalmers 2003; Chalmers et  al. 2002; Parkhurst 2017). Yet efficiency 
gains of this nature further require that policy-relevant evidence is pro-
duced and reaches the appropriate decision making body in a timely man-
ner in order to be usable. These criteria provide us with a lens through 
which to evaluate the structures, functions and effectiveness of evidence 
advisory bodies serving Ministries of Health.
HealtH decIsIons and needs
The public policy literature recognises that the term ‘policy’ can refer to a 
range of concepts, from projects and programmes, to sector-specific plans, 
to broad statements of intent (Hogwood and Gunn 1984). Policy is also 
rarely the responsibility of a single body; rather, policy decisions affecting 
health take place at difference levels of governance (i.e. sub-national, 
national and supra-national) across a range of state and non-state decision 
making forums. As such, the most relevant forms of evidence will vary 
across policy issues and decision types of policy-making location.
However, there are some types of decisions common to many coun-
tries’ health sectors for which research evidence is often held as critical, 
and over which Ministries of Health typically are seen to have authority. 
This allows a basic typology of decision types to provide a starting point to 
explore how evidence advisory systems work to provide policy-relevant 
evidence. For example:
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• Public health and health promotion: Decisions of this kind are usu-
ally done at a high level as they affect large segments of the popula-
tion. A broad range of evidence will thus be relevant to such decisions, 
including epidemiological, economic, social attitude, and other data 
which speak to relevant policy concerns.
• Health sector planning and priority setting: These decisions are con-
cerned with setting national goals and priority setting across the sec-
tor. They can also involve allocation of resources between local 
health concerns. Relevant evidence forms can thus include popula-
tion health data, resource health technology appraisals/assessments 
(HTA), or health services research.
• Health systems and services management: In addition to new policy 
decisions and priority setting, Ministries of Health also typically 
make ongoing decisions related to the management and functioning 
of the health system. Relevant evidence can include routine data col-
lected from facilities or surveys, operations research, implementation 
research, or other programmatic evidence.
• Programmatic decision making: What many authors refer to as health 
policy decisions fall within the remit of specialised agencies, such as 
programmes dedicated to individual conditions (cancer, HIV/AIDS, 
malaria, etc.). In particular these decisions can involve the choice of 
interventions to pursue, often with a fixed budget to allocate. 
Decisions of this nature can require evidence both about efficacy or 
cost effectiveness of available options, but equally can be informed 
by locally generated data (e.g. routine data from surveillance or facil-
ity information).
Even within these broad categories, decision making for health can 
take place at different levels within government hierarchies, with author-
ity for decisions, and entry points for evidence, resting in national level 
bodies and sub-national bodies. In different country settings the various 
decision types listed above might be addressed at any level or may cut 
across more than one. Moreover, they may be shaped by supra-national 
policy regimes (such as those of the European Union). Movements 
towards de- centralisation might also lead to the shifting of decision-
making from national levels to lower levels. Such realities, however, allow 
consideration of whether systems of evidentiary advice are well aligned 
with the decision authority structures in a given setting. There can also 
be important considerations on the ways that national evidence systems 
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link to influential non-state decision makers (e.g. development partners 
in low and middle income settings, or corporatist bodies with authority 
in health decision making fora).
country case studIes
In each case study country, members of the GRIP-Health research pro-
gramme attempted to map out the key health policy decision making bod-
ies, and the sources of evidence in the country that inform health decisions. 
These mappings allowed reflection on how the evidence advisory system 
in each country might work, or face challenges, in aligning sources of 
policy relevant evidence with the policy needs in each setting. The sub- 
sections below summarise some of the key findings from each case. This is 
then followed by a discussion of cross cutting issues and themes seen from 
multiple settings.
Ghana
In Ghana, the Ministry of Health (MoH) provides overall policy direction 
for all stakeholders and players in the health sector, and approves health 
decisions related to specific health system issues, including health system 
strengthening and, at times, programme or disease specific interventions. 
The Ghana Health Service (GHS) is an autonomous Executive Agency of 
the MoH which has been delegated the responsibility to manage and oper-
ate all public health facilities (except for three teaching hospitals); while 
the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) is also the primary body 
which decides on the package of services available to many citizens.
Ghana has established some formal internal bodies to provide evidence 
to these agencies. Within the GHS, the Policy, Planning, Monitoring and 
Evaluation division and the Research & Development division are both 
tasked with evidence generation. The GHS also hosts the Centre for 
Health Information Management which includes the District Health 
Information Management System, through which routine health data 
(administrative, demographic and clinical) is provided from local facilities 
to districts and upwards to central health management levels. In the MoH 
there is also a Research, Statistics and Information Management 
Directorate and a MoH-based Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation 
division as well which are responsible for generating evidence and advising 
the MoH.  The GHS also directs three regional research centres that 
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 conduct health services and systems research within their designated areas 
to guide national decision making.
In these ways, Ghana appears to have a well-aligned bureaucracy pro-
viding relevant research and evidence to key decision making bodies. 
However we did identify some challenges and further needs as well. First, 
as a lower-middle income country, there were some expected capacity 
limitations in terms of volume of research and population of experts to 
provide relevant evidence. Furthermore, while the NHIA is tasked with 
choosing the services covered by the National Health Insurance Scheme, 
the GHS decides the NHIS charges at each facility. Interviews and partici-
patory observations at the annual business meeting with international 
partners in November 2015, identified a latent rivalry between the two 
government agencies due to conflicting interests in generating and using 
evidence to inform decisions as purchaser (NHIA) and provider (GHS) of 
health services.
At the time of research, there was not any formalised or fully agreed 
system of Health Technology Appraisal (HTA) in place to guide decisions 
on health services provided across the health sector, although there was 
some movement towards using HTA to inform individual decisions. 
Funding for many health programmes is also reliant on international 
donors (so called ‘development partners’), which was said to lead to verti-
cal programming independent of any evidence of local priorities or need. 
International donors were also said to use their own systems and bodies of 
evidence at times.
Reliance on development partners, who can retain decision making 
authority in some ways, can thus pose challenges to rationalising evidence 
use and ensuring local stewardship of evidence advisory systems. On the 
one hand, donors obviously provide finance for health services, and will no 
doubt at times be undertaking evaluations of programmes that can generate 
policy relevant evidence. Yet, such systems are external to national struc-
tures, and thus risk establishing parallel systems of evidence advisory out-
side those under the control of, and at the service of, national authorities.
Finally, it was identified that the Ghanaian Parliament had a remit to 
make decisions around health financing nationally and other health 
related legislation through the Parliament select committee on health. 
However, local interviewees noted limited influence of this committee 
due to financial constraints prohibiting its ability to gather information or 
undertake inquiries as needed. Also, the involvement of local MPs into 
the two annual business meetings with development partners is limited, 
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with consequent inability to obtain relevant information on future health 
interventions and leverage their positions at the moment of approving the 
government budget.
Colombia
Colombia is the second middle income case study country, included yet its 
differences with Ghana illustrate just how context-specific health policy-
making can be. Since the inception of the Colombian health system in 
1993, highly politicised disagreements have been sustained on issues such 
as the financing of the system (insurance versus taxation based); the 
involvement of the private sector; and whether limits can or should be 
placed on the right to health care. Policy debates almost exclusively focus 
on macro/systemic health sector reforms, to the exclusion of many other 
health policy issues.
As an insurance based health system, the Ministry of Health and Social 
Protection (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social, MSPS) primarily steers 
health care by setting the mandatory basic service package (the Plan 
Obligatorio de Salud [POS]) and regulating the system; although it does 
not have a direct managerial input on health care facilities. However, roles 
and authority over these functions have also changed or been assigned (or 
reassigned) between the Ministry and other bodies in recent years. For 
instance from 2007 a Regulatory Commission for Health was set up to 
update the package of health services provided in Colombia, but in 2012 
it was abolished and the Ministry re-assumed this role (Castro 2014).
The health policy decision making process in Colombia also involves a 
range of different institutions across the branches of government as well as 
non-state actors (e.g. civil society organisations, health insurers, service 
providers, academia and professional organisations). The governance of 
the health system is thus extremely fragmented, reflecting the complexity 
of the health system itself (Bernal et al. 2012; Yamin and Parra-Vera 2010). 
Furthermore, the judiciary plays a particularly important role in health 
policymaking in Colombia (as discussed in more depth in Chap. 5) as it 
often serves as the means by which the public challenges insurers on what 
should be included in the package of services.
The Ministry does have a series of organizations ascribed to it with 
responsibilities for evidence provision through their mandate to advise on 
decisions in health, including: the Instituto Nacional de Salud (INS) (the 
National Health Institute); the Instituto de Evaluación de Tecnologíca en 
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Salud (IETS) (Institute of Health Technology Assessment); and the 
Instituto Nacional de Vigilancia de Medicinas y Alimentos (INVIMA) 
(National Institute for the Vigilance of Medicines and Food). Yet there is 
no unique central hub of evidence generation in the Ministry; instead, 
each unit and directorate within the Ministry appears to be responsible for 
its own areas of expertise; and these national advisory bodies may thus 
have limited influence given the fragmented governance of decision mak-
ing, providing advice to some decision points but not necessarily others.
Overall, some of the biggest challenges to the use of evidence for health 
policy thus includes the fragmentation of decision making, the politicisa-
tion over fundamental elements of health care provision (diverting time 
and attention away from more specific health service and systems plan-
ning) and the lack of central authority vested in the Ministry of Health and 
Social Protection. In combination, these factors limit how much evidence 
advisory bodies can influence health policy decisions in ‘rational-technical’ 
ways often expected by public health advocates.
Cambodia
Cambodia was selected as one of our low income setting cases at the time 
of research, although today it is classified as ‘lower-middle income’ in 
World Bank rankings. Despite recent economic growth, it still has limited 
state provision of health services. Estimates vary, but survey data suggest 
two-thirds of health spending is financed by consumer out-of-pocket pay-
ments ([Cambodia] National Institute of Statistics Directorate for Health 
2015), with national demographic and health surveys suggesting only 
one-fifth of treatments carried out by the public sector.
The MoH has the mandate to monitor the country’s health status, 
advise central government on health policies and legislation, formulate 
strategies and develop programmes to address the country’s health prob-
lems, and implement, monitor and evaluate all health programmes and 
activities in the country in collaboration with other sectors and agencies. 
There are also numerous national programmes, centres and institutions 
important to the Cambodian health system, many of which are issue spe-
cific in their remit. These include the National Maternal and Child Health 
Centre (NMCH), the National Centre for HIV/AIDS, Dermatology and 
STD (NCHADS) and the National Institute of Public Health (NIPH). 
These technical health departments and national centres sit within the 
MoH structure, and can initiate specific health policies or guidelines 
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(Jones and Camboida Economic Associate Centre for Policy Studies 
2013). The Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF) was noted to be 
one of the most important other decision making bodies in Cambodia 
affecting health, however, as it is responsible for financing the health sys-
tem, and particularly important for health policy decisions with budgetary 
implications in the country. International development partners (donors) 
are also highly influential in the Cambodian health sector as over half of 
the public budget is funded by aid (approximately 52% of the health bud-
get, as estimated in 2011 (World Bank 2011)). Local respondents further 
noted that research topics are heavily driven by external funders, rather 
than assessments of health policy priorities by local bodies.
Whilst there appears to be a demand for evidence and research in health 
policy-making in Cambodia, including language used within Ministry 
documents of a need for ‘evidence based’ approaches, this demand does 
not appear to be deeply embedded in MoH systems and structures. A 
considerable amount of research is produced in the sector in the form of 
reviews and assessments for specific projects or programmes. This work is 
often conducted by commissioned consultancies, and has been described 
elsewhere by Jones (2013) to be of variable quality. Jones further notes 
concern over the supply of policy-relevant data in the country (Jones and 
Camboida Economic Associate Centre for Policy Studies 2013). Some 
information sources (or documents collecting data) are institutionalised, 
however. For example, the annual operational plan (AOP) process and the 
health management information system (HMIS); although private consul-
tations and treatments (accounting for about 70% of care) are not cap-
tured in the HMIS. Indeed, the Ministry itself has highlighted the need to 
improve the reliability and policy relevance of the system (Cambodia 
Ministry of Health 2008). Furthermore it was reported that the Ministry 
had no way to monitor or gather data from most private providers of 
health services, despite this capturing a majority of treatment in the coun-
try. The domestic research community is also relatively weak in regard to 
health, particularly due to limited funding and the low strategic  importance 
accorded to research by political actors (Jones and Camboida Economic 
Associate Centre for Policy Studies 2013).
In terms of technical bodies, the National Institute for Public Health 
(NIPH) is one of the most notable within the Cambodian system. It is a 
semi-autonomous institute under the MoH tasked to undertake research, 
knowledge translation, and training – although it has reportedly largely 
focused on training, as no budget has been provided for research activities. 
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Given these resource constraints, including limited staffing capacity, the 
NIPH is not currently considered a strong player in the domestic research 
community. However, it does appear to have a clear mandate and institu-
tional position to serve an evidence advisory role.
In terms of donor-funded evidence use, research projects are often 
focussed on programme evaluation. They have often been critiqued for 
lacking coordination, resulting in duplications of efforts and inefficient use 
of resources, and lacking integration in terms of data collection and analy-
sis (Jones and Camboida Economic Associate Centre for Policy Studies 
2013). There are some efforts to coordinate data and evidence to inform 
national level strategic planning, however. In particular, the drafting of the 
Health Strategic Plan, the mid-term review process of the Plan, as well as 
annual performance reviews are supported by consultation mechanisms in 
which data are presented and discussed. Most notable is the Technical 
Working Group for Health, chaired by the Minster of Health, which brings 
together government and development partners to present and discuss 
evidence to inform this high level of sector planning and review.
The evidence advisory system for health policy-making in Cambodia 
thus appears to suffer from limited capacity and a vertical programme ori-
entation  – often driven by sources of funds from outside actors (e.g. 
donors). There is a lack of strategy in the handling of the evidence and 
knowledge base for the health sector, and management and decision- 
making based on research evidence and analysis is limited in both health 
policy-making and service delivery. However, policy makers are aware of 
the need to develop a research agenda for the sector (expressed in inter-
views and seen in MoH documents identifying needed improvements), 
and some MoH working groups have increasingly been giving attention to 
this issue. There are also existing institutional bodies that could serve 
more central or relevant roles in evidence generation or synthesis in the 
future, with greater capacity and integration into planning processes.
Ethiopia
Ethiopia served as our second low income case. The country is officially a 
federation, and the constitution establishes dual jurisdiction over public 
health between the Federal and the Regional governments. However, the 
Federal Ministry of Health has control over the national health policy, 
formulating the national strategic plan for the health sector. Since 1991, 
Ethiopia has made improvements to health care delivery and set the basic 
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foundations of a health system, improvements that are recognized by 
some as a success story of health system reform (Downie 2016). In this 
process, the role of health research has been seen to be critical; conse-
quently, Ethiopia has at times made explicit commitments to improving 
the use of evidence in health (c.f. Ethiopian Academy of Science 2013).
Given the limited resources in country, there have been expected ongo-
ing challenges in terms of low research-related technical and human capac-
ity and an absence of strong research priority-setting mechanisms. Yet these 
limitations seem not to have undermined the capacity of the Federal 
Ministry of Health (FMoH) to make decisions in health and enforce com-
mitments with development partners (Downie 2016). Instead, the govern-
ment of Ethiopia appears to have maintained a strong central controlling 
function over the decisions which have been made. Health policymaking in 
Ethiopia appears heavily focussed on centralised planning, and particularly 
draws on routine data sources to inform decisions. Data gathering and anal-
ysis are concentrated in two main national agencies, the Central Statistical 
Agency and the recently reorganised Ethiopian Public Health Institute. 
Data on health facilities are collected at the community level, then reported 
to the district (woreda), regional and national levels. The FMoH then uses 
data to produce indicators that are passed back to lower levels to elaborate 
local health plans (Ethiopia Federal Ministry of Health 2014).
The bureaucratic structures in Ethiopia thus appear to be well aligned 
for this collection and review of local data for planning. The Policy and 
Planning Directorate within the FMoH hosts the Health Management 
Information System (HMIS), for instance, which is a key component of 
the system. According to national documents, the HMIS is also used to 
identify funding gaps and priorities in order to inform the need for donor 
assistance (Ethiopia Federal Ministry of Health 2014).
Generation and review of other forms of evidence to inform planning 
decisions, however, do show limitations. For example, the Ethiopia Public 
Health Institute serves as a semi-autonomous institution under the 
FMOH and is the technical arm of the FMOH.  Its main tasks are to 
undertake research on priority health and nutrition problems and on pub-
lic health emergencies management. Yet the capacity of this body was said 
to be limited, leading to fairly piecemeal production of policy relevant 
evidence. For example, a representative from the Technology Transfer and 
Research Translation Directorate of EHPI noted that there were very few 
staff to undertake activities, and only a few policy briefs had been pro-
duced to inform decision making at that time.
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It is therefore generally indicated that evidence production and use in 
Ethiopia are still limited, mainly due to insufficient human capacity in 
generating evidence and in the relatively young establishment of the cul-
ture of evidence- informed policy-making (African Health Observatory 
2014). Consolidating and publishing existing evidence for policy-making 
and decision-making has thus been described as limited and unsystematic 
(Gaym 2008). Yet this stands in contrast to the seemingly well established 
and centrally controlled system of planning around routine data sources in 
the country.
England
England represents the first of our high income case study settings. The 
country is well known for its tax funded and state provided National 
Health Service (NHS). Elements of evidence use within the English sys-
tem are also often held up as exemplars of evidence informed policy. In 
particular, the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) – 
a non-departmental public body that provides clinical guidelines and 
health technology appraisals for the NHS – has been held up as a role 
model both domestically and internationally. Within England, it has served 
as the inspiration for a set of ‘what works’ centres that aim to emulate the 
health approach to synthesising evidence of interventions to inform poli-
cymaking (UK Government 2013). Globally it has been a template for 
health technology assessment bodies in other countries (Including 
Colombia as noted above, and described by Castro (2014) elsewhere).
The Department (Ministry) of Health has overall responsibility for the 
NHS, public health and social care, within a legislative framework set by 
Parliament. The Department is supported by 26 agencies and public bod-
ies. Of these, 15 are referred to as ‘arm’s-length bodies’, with different 
degrees of independence from government. The remaining bodies are 
advisory non-departmental public bodies, whose role is to assist the 
Department in “evaluating, investigating and supporting policy” and pro-
viding independent scientific expertise (Boyle 2011). The Department is 
also supported by two executive agencies: the Medicines and Healthcare 
products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), responsible for regulating medi-
cines, medical devices and blood components for transfusion, and Public 
Health England (PHE), developing public health and health promotion 
policy. Finally, NICE is a non-departmental body that provides national 
guidance and advice for health, public health and social care practitioners, 
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as well as quality standards for the provision and the commissioning of 
these services. This includes the appraisal of new medical technologies 
using principles of cost-effectiveness (NICE 2017). NICE therefore plays 
a key role in defining the package of services available to patients in the 
NHS.
In general, scientific evidence plays a pivotal role in the governance of 
the NHS. There is a substantial volume of health systems, health services 
and health policy research produced in the UK (in addition to clinical 
research and basic sciences) which has led some authors to describe a cul-
ture of evidence use in which the NHS aims to become, a “consistent, 
evidence-based whole (Shergold and Grant 2008, p. 7)” with substantial 
‘absorptive capacity’ for publicly and privately-funded health research 
(Hanney et al. 2010).
The evidence advisory system, however, combines multiple elements. 
In Parliament, select committees play a key role in holding the govern-
ment to account for its decisions, policies, and reforms; and they mostly 
do so in relation to health policy through an assessment of the available 
evidence base. The Department of Health, however, has a history of com-
missioning research on behalf of the NHS, PHE and others, and of col-
laborating with the various government research bodies that fund health 
related research. The National Institute of Health Research (NIHR) was 
created in 2006, and coordinates research efforts to inform the health 
system. Finally, England is a leading market for think tanks, including in 
the health sector. However it has been argued that little is known about 
how such think tanks prioritize topics, fund their research (and the meth-
odologies employed), or influence health policy-making; with calls for 
greater research into their roles and biases in health policy-making (Shaw 
et al. 2014). Despite this, overall the English system has widely been seen 
as a strong example of a coordinated evidence advisory system that 
attempts to institutionalise evidence use in health policy and health system 
governance.
Germany
Germany represents our final case study country and second high income 
setting, but one that looks very different from England in its health system 
structure and broader governance approach. One of the most relevant 
features, perhaps, is how much health decision making takes place outside 
the remit of the Ministry of Health. Germany is a federal parliamentary 
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republic comprised of 16 states (Länder). The Basic Law (Grundgesetz) 
provides for the separation of powers between the Bund (federal state) and 
the Länder and sets out their respective rights and responsibilities. The 
Basic Law also sets out the general principles that shape health system 
governance, including a commitment to ‘corporatism’  – which broadly 
involves governance through power sharing with major interest groups. 
Responsibilities for health system governance are thus shared by federal, 
states and municipalities, as well as the corporatist self-administration.
Parliamentary decision-making is prepared by, and largely happens in, 
committees. For health policy, two standing committees are most relevant: 
the Health Committee (Gesundheitsausschuss) and the Conciliation 
Committee (Vermittlungsausschuss). Health care legislation, including 
major health care reform, is usually initiated by the federal minister of 
health. The main responsibility of the Federal Ministry of Health is to 
maintain, secure and advance an effective statutory health system 
([Germany] Federal Ministry of Health 2015). The Federal Ministry of 
Health has several ways of steering health and health care policy: develop-
ing legislation, decrees and administrative directives; supervising the pro-
vision of tasks that have been delegated to the self-administration; and 
co-ordinating stakeholders in health system governance in other ways, for 
example, through organising initiatives, establishing committees or pro-
moting other forms of collaborative work.
However, in line with the Basic Law, a large number of decision- making 
and regulatory tasks have been delegated to the organisations of the self- 
administration. At federal level, key corporatist actors are the top organisa-
tions of sickness funds (Spitzenverband der deutschen Krankenkassen), 
representing public payers, the German Hospital Association (Deutsche 
Krankenhausgesellschaft) and the federal association of office-based doc-
tors and dentists who deliver services funded by social health insurance 
(Kassenärztliche Bundesvereinigung). Within this self-administration, the 
Federal Joint Committee (GBA) is the highest decision-making body at 
federal level, composed of these federal associations.
The Federal Ministry of Health is advised by a number of permanent or 
temporary expert committees. Permanent committees are the Advisory 
Council on the Assessment of Developments in the Health Care System 
and the Joint Scientific Council of the Agencies and Institutes, subordi-
nate to the Ministry. Both committees largely consist of scientific experts. 
The Federal Ministry of Health also has administrative oversight of a num-
ber of federal agencies and research institutes, but research commissioned 
directly by the Ministry is limited.
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In contrast, the use of scientific evidence is central for the GBA. Scientific 
evidence plays a key role in many, but not all, decisions of the GBA and 
practices of using evidence are embedded in the rules of procedures set 
out in the GBA’s by-laws. Two research institutes support the work of the 
GBA: The Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care (IQWiG), 
established in 2004, and the Institute for Quality Assurance and 
Transparency in Health Care (IQTIG), which became operational in 
2016. IQWiG, for instance, is mandated to provide health technology 
assessments and reviews of scientific evidence in relation to the efficacy of 
pharmaceuticals, diagnostics and medical treatment, evidence-based clini-
cal guidelines and patient information.
However, given its broad remit and the diversity of its regulatory tasks, 
scientific evidence will be used in different ways for different types of deci-
sions by the GBA. This will depend on the nature of the issue, the types, 
quality and quantity of studies available, the availability of (international) 
standards of evidence use (e.g. clinical guidelines, health technology 
assessment), and the degree to which the issue affects stakeholder inter-
ests. As a result, decisions concerning the funding of health technologies, 
such as pharmaceuticals, diagnostics and medical treatments are typically 
robustly supported by evidence, while decisions concerning distributional 
issues such as the geographical coverage of physicians in the ambulatory 
sector (i.e. capacity planning) show fewer traces of scientific analysis and 
are more likely to be the product of negotiation between the interest 
groups represented on the committee. However, in contrast to NICE in 
England, decisions concerning the package of service do not utilise evi-
dence of cost-effectiveness as a criterion for funding decisions.
Many other organisations of the self-administration, especially at the 
federal level (e.g. the Sickness Funds, or Federal Association of Physicians), 
have developed their own research capacity and/or are supported by their 
own research institutes. These take a variety of organisational and legal 
forms, and some may be more independent from the organisation com-
missioning the research than others.
Overall, Germany has deeply rooted systems of democratic account-
ability, but the decentralised nature of the state limits the stewardship role 
of the federal government, including the Federal Ministry of Health 
(BMG), to influence health policy and health service governance. As 
health system governance is spread across a number of state and non-state 
actors, there is no single mechanism of decision-making and therefore no 
single entry point for scientific research. Consequently, there are multiple 
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conduits for scientific evidence to enter the policy process, be it in parlia-
ment, federal government, the self-administration and its member organ-
isations, and the legal system; with a large number of research institutes, 
scientific advisory bodies, expert committees and other mechanisms pro-
viding scientific advice. However, there are few formal rules that require 
decision-making to be informed by scientific evidence, with explicit proce-
dures for evidence use in decisions taken by the GBA on inclusions to or 
exclusions from the statutory benefits package being an exception rather 
than a norm.
dIscussIon: Issues and cHallenges
The six countries included in the GRIP-Health programme of work rep-
resent a wide range of health policy contexts – ranging from low to high 
income, covering four continents, and having widely divergent historical 
and political experiences and socioeconomic profiles. However, in all cases 
there are core health systems decisions that need to be made, and struc-
tures in support of providing evidence to inform such decisions. In all 
cases (with the possible exception of Germany), Ministries of health were 
found to be central to these forms of decisions; although we also identified 
situations where decision authority lies outside the Ministry.
From an institutional perspective, we have particularly focussed on the 
evidence advisory systems that inform key health policy decisions in each 
country setting. Each country is of course unique in the historical devel-
opment of its health systems and associated bureaucracy. As such, we 
would not expect evidence advisory systems to necessarily look the same 
across these contexts. Rather, they will have been established, by default or 
design, within pre-existing administrative structures  – products of their 
specific history which shapes the potential directions and features of any 
systems being developed. The ultimate goals of improving health and 
health decision making, however, can be where we look for similarities and 
comparisons. In particular, it can be assumed that, for evidence advisory 
systems to function effectively, they must be able to provide robust and 
high quality syntheses of different forms of evidence, relevant to the spe-
cific policy issue at hand, to the appropriate decision makers or bodies 
responsible for policy decisions which can use them in a timely manner to 
inform relevant health decisions. We can thus reflect, in a comparative 
perspective across case study countries, on the alignment of these systems 
with the decision making needs of the health sector – and of Ministries of 
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Health in particular – given these ministries mandate as stewards of popu-
lation health, and a recognised need for these bodies to use information to 
inform decisions.
Decisions on Packages of Services
One theme we can see arising in multiple countries is the central concern 
across case study countries with the package of health care services to pro-
vide to the public – either through state provided health facilities, or within 
packages of services included in state-regulated insurance programmes. 
Comparing our case studies illustrates some particular issues with the insti-
tutional arrangements in place to supply evidence to inform these decisions. 
It was in our middle income cases (Colombia and Ghana) where the chal-
lenges in the systems to inform such decisions were most visible. Indeed, in 
the lower income settings studied (Ethiopia and Cambodia), local stake-
holders did not raise these decisions as primary concerns in interviews – 
potentially due to the inability to provide comprehensive packages of care 
in the first place. When needs are well beyond resources available, and funds 
for services are highly dependent on both donors and individuals’ out of 
pocket expenditures, there may be little perceived need to have an evidence 
base on which to judge inclusion or exclusion of a formal package of ser-
vices. Alternatively, in our high income settings (England and Germany), 
there were already well established formal systems informing these deci-
sions, albeit very different in structure. There are also notable differences in 
the type of evidence included in such decisions between both countries, 
with NICE in England basing its recommendations on cost effectiveness, a 
criterion which is absent from the German regulatory approach.
In our middle income settings, decisions about the package of health 
services were indeed being made, but without a fully established structure 
to provide evidence to inform such decisions. In Ghana, the National 
Health Insurance Agency (NHIA) has had to decide what to include in its 
service package, yet a national framework for health technology assessment 
(HTA) has not yet been implemented. This is despite the fact that the 
country supported the HTA resolution at the 67th World Health Assembly 
(2014) requiring all countries to work towards Universal Health Coverage 
using HTA as a tool for priority setting. At the time of our fieldwork, the 
country was only piloting HTA as a tool to guide prioritisation decisions 
within the NHIA. So steps are being made, but the evidence advisory sys-
tems needed for particular decisions may not yet be fully formed.
J. PARKHURST ET AL.
 175
In Colombia there has indeed been a recent attempt to establish a for-
mal Health Technology Assessment body. The local body (IETS) was 
largely modelled on NICE in England, with key personnel from NICE 
involved in the establishment and governance of the body, but its institu-
tional placement and level of influence differs considerably from the 
English body. IETS was not set up with a formal government mandate to 
make decisions for service provision in Colombia, and thus is merely advi-
sory. The insurance based system in Colombia is also very different to the 
English National Health Service, and there appears to be no strong agree-
ment on the appropriateness of using HTA metrics (like cost- effectiveness) 
to make decisions about services in this setting. As Chap. 9 further notes, 
many decisions on health service provision end up being resolved by the 
court system rather than the government.
Use of Routine Data to Guide Decisions
A second theme that arose in our lower and middle income settings were 
issues around how systems work to provide routine data to guide health 
sector decision making. Interestingly, the robustness of the system to use 
such data was not simply a reflection of the income level of the country. 
Indeed, it was Ethiopia that appeared to have a particularly strong empha-
sis on such data, building systems to use it for health sector planning. In 
contrast, capacity issues over data use were raised in Cambodia, along with 
an identified challenge in gathering data from private health providers 
who represent the majority of service provision in the country.
Ghana presented another case to look at how well systems of routine 
data align with decision structures in the country. As detailed in more 
depth in Chap. 4, Ghana has had investment and capacity building in its 
routine data system. However, that chapter further explored how such 
data can end up being used in an institutionalised decision making process 
that has strong donor influence, with international bodies playing a large 
role in the annual processes in which routine data are used to construct 
national indicators that inform the health sector plan. The analysis 
explored how this can result in a parallel system of evidence use and plan-
ning that was outside the normal health sector administrative hierarchy. 
Ethiopia, on the other hand, appeared to more strongly centrally control 
its planning activities, including resisting donor influence as reported in 
our case study.
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In Germany and England, there is substantial infrastructure to collect 
routine data across both health systems, supported by a number of bodies 
created for this purpose. For a long time, data collection in England has 
benefited from an integrated approach applied to the NHS as a whole, 
with Hospital Episode Statistics being a prime example for a comprehen-
sive and systematic approach to data collection across all hospitals in 
England since 1987. In Germany, such systematic data collection tends to 
be a more recent development, as national approaches to data collection 
have typically been afflicted by concerns around the privacy of personal 
data. In recent years, however, efforts have been made to improve the col-
lection of routine data, for example, through the creation of the IQTiG, 
which is mandated with the collection of data on the quality of care across 
the health system.
Health-Issue Specific Decisions
In addition to deciding which health services to provide within national 
service packages, and the use of data to inform sector-wide planning, a 
third key area for evidence use in health policymaking is captured within 
the process of decision making within health-specific programmes. Indeed, 
a great deal of literature on the topic of evidence-informed policymaking 
in the health sector refers to how pieces of evidence can inform health 
issue specific decisions – such as choices between possible interventions. 
For example, we can see literature concerned with improving evidence use 
for malaria (Woelk et al. 2009), for HIV (Auerbach 2008), or for mental 
health decisions (Weisz et al. 2005), amongst others.
Our findings show that the institutional structures to serve these needs 
can be varied. Some countries will have ministerial departments that under-
take research that links to other departments with specific health remits. 
Yet in most cases, evidence to inform decisions on health topics comes 
from outside Ministries of Health. This can come in the form of explicitly 
commissioned research dictated by, or initiated by ministry actors; or alter-
natively provided by external actors – be they research bodies, think tanks, 
international development partners, etc. – who are approaching ministry 
officials and departments or providing evidence of one form or another.
The use of commissioning research as a strategy relies on having resources 
available to do so, but also on actors to value evidence sufficient to commit 
them for this purpose. In many ways, research commissioning by Ministry 
officials may be interpreted positively as it can ensure the policy relevance 
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of evidence generated. Yet heavy reliance on internal commissioning also 
risks narrowing the focus of evidence provision to those issues pre-identi-
fied or preferred by officials, potentially to the detriment of other options 
that have not been considered for any number of political reasons. Yet reli-
ance on outside groups presenting information is not without challenges as 
well. While a much larger number of groups may provide evidence from 
outside official bodies, there is a risk this process is dominated by particular 
well-networked or well-resourced organisations, which can also direct 
political attention using evidence to support a given case. In our aid-depen-
dent settings, as discussed in Chap. 10, there were concerns raised about 
how donor influence shapes the evidence that is created and provided to 
governments at times.
Arm’s Length Public Health Advisory Bodies
Despite the vast differences between country settings, an institutional 
arrangement seen in multiple countries was the establishment of officially 
mandated advisory bodies that sit at ‘arm’s length’ to the Ministry of 
Health. In three cases, this was explicitly a body tasked with providing 
advice in relation to public health: the Ethiopia Public Health Institute, 
the Cambodian National Institute of Public Health, and Public Health 
England were all mentioned as playing such roles to inform policy and 
practice while being placed outside of the Ministry system.
In these three cases of arm’s length public health bodies, we found that 
they all have clear mandates to provide evidence to the decision process 
with appropriate linkages to do so, and in some cases their placement 
appeared to work well to ensure the independence of evidence advice while 
still remaining relevant to local needs (this was not explicitly investigated, 
though, in all cases). The main issue identified, however, related to capac-
ity – with the Ethiopian and Cambodian examples showing serious limita-
tions. In Cambodia, financial constraints were highlighted as a particular 
challenge. So, for example, the ability to raise salary costs by undertaking 
work for non-state actors was noted as a key challenge preventing the 
National Institute of Public Health from achieving greater potential to 
inform and advise the government for policymaking. In Ethiopia, the 
Public Health Institute also faced resource challenges, but these were pre-
sented as related to human capacity. Thus even though a directorate existed 
to provide policy briefs to government, only a handful were produced at 
the time of the fieldwork due to the limited number of staff available.
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conclusIons
This chapter began by discussing the stewardship function of ministries of 
health, which provides them with a mandate for improving population 
health, but further can be seen to provide a mandate to shape the evidence 
advisory systems in place to inform health policy. However, when looking 
across a range of countries, with differing contextual features, we see a 
number of ways that such evidence advisory systems may function (or not) 
to meet the needs of health policy making. We can further identify key 
issues related to the ability of Ministries to serve in this stewardship role in 
relation to policy-relevant evidence.
In terms of authority over health policymaking itself, Ministries of 
Health are responsible for many key health decisions in our case study 
countries. Yet there are several instances where the institutional arrange-
ments in place shift key decisions outside of direct Ministerial authority. 
This is perhaps most evident in Germany where the corporatist approach 
to governance means that actors representing the self-administration pos-
sess a good deal of authority to make decisions. As such, ministerial infor-
mation sources in Germany may work in parallel with evidence systems 
informing the corporatist system. In Colombia, on the other hand, the 
Constitutional Court makes fundamental decisions on availability and 
provision of health services and treatments, with clear implications for 
evidence use given the highly technical nature of these decisions (see 
Chaps. 5 and 6). The judicializiation of health policy decisions in this way, 
takes not only decision making but also evidence advisory roles outside 
the control or jurisdiction of the ministry of health in that setting (Hawkins 
and Alvarez Rosete 2017).
Similarly, in settings in which health policy decisions were made within 
the legislative branch (e.g. at parliamentary level), Ministries of Health 
would not necessarily be involved in structuring the systems of evidence 
advice. Public health and health promotion decisions affecting whole pop-
ulations might at times be decided at parliamentary level – for example in 
the UK or in Ghana. Yet there appears to be minimal involvement of min-
istries of health in shaping or informing the evidence advisory systems that 
serve the legislatures in these cases. Again, they appear to be constructed 
in parallel to ministry systems, or outside ministerial jurisdiction. Donor 
influence and control of health decisions in aid-dependent settings could 
lead to further cases where ministries did not have direct control over sys-
tems of evidence provision (explored more in Chap. 10).
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We thus find important limitations to the idea that Ministries of Health 
can serve as comprehensive stewards of systems of health evidence advice, 
as their ability to do so will be strongly shaped by their authority and con-
trol over particular health decision types. That said, we maintain that 
Ministries of Health, in all case country settings, have significant roles and 
responsibilities for health decisions even in cases where certain key health 
topics are addressed in other forums or at different levels of governance. 
We conclude that there is a clear need for both financial and human 
resource capacity to ensure well-functioning evidence advisory systems 
serve the needs of decision makers. That said, capacity was not the only 
issue identified, nor were lower resources always an insurmountable chal-
lenge. Ethiopia’s strength in use and control of routine data sources for 
planning stands out in comparison to Cambodia, which is ranks as having 
a marginally higher national income (World Bank 2017), but which has 
struggled to establish robust data management systems. Ghana has 
invested in its data system, but the institutional systems in place can dictate 
how data were subsequently used to inform health sector planning; with 
findings showing that routine data could end up informing planning sys-
tems greatly influenced by external donors (see Chap. 4). Even in higher 
income settings, we identified issues beyond those of capacity. England 
and Germany demonstrate a high level of scientific expertise and evidence 
advisory capacity, but they rely on differing mixes of systems, agencies, 
and bodies. The generation or synthesis of evidence through  commissioned 
research, or through the convening of advisory groups on an ad- hoc basis, 
may reflect a positive step to ensure evidence is policy relevant, but may 
also lead to evidence only being provided when it is politically expedient 
or for issues which are already on the political agendas.
Comparing countries of varying income levels illustrates that the realm 
of government bodies (some at arm’s length, others not) appears much 
more crowded in England and Germany than in our other case study 
countries. This may not be surprising, however, as it is possible that as 
institutional structures evolve over time, there will be increasing numbers 
of organisations, a greater division of work, and potential for higher levels 
of specialisation. While outside the scope of analysis here, there could be 
future work investigating questions around this in more depth – poten-
tially considering levels of capacity and resource; the prominence given to 
evidence to inform decision; and the time and stability required to estab-
lish types of infrastructure arrangements.
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While the World Health Organization has indeed identified Ministries 
of Health as the stewards of their population’s health, decision making 
that shapes health outcomes may be located in a number of forums, with 
only some key decisions taken in Ministries of Health. However, Ministries 
of Health remain central to health policy decisions in all settings. We have 
argued here that understanding when and why policy-relevant evidence 
serves the needs of health decisions requires an explicitly institutional lens 
that can consider the structural arrangements and links between sources 
and providers of evidence and the relevant decision making points. 
Evidence can improve health decisions and outcomes, but only if it is pro-
vided in a comprehensive and timely manner to inform key decisions. 
Ultimately it will be the underlying structures and links of the evidence 
advisory systems in each country that dictate when, how, and how well 
this takes place.
references
[Cambodia] National Institute of Statistics Directorate for Health. 2015. 
Cambodia demographic and health survey 2014. Phnom Penh: Cambodia 
National Institute of Statistics Directorate for Health and ICF International.
[Germany] Federal Ministry of Health. 2015. Bundestministerum für Gesundheit. 
http://www.bmg.bund.de/. Accessed 5/2/2015.
African Health Observatory. 2014. Ethiopia health system: Health information, 
research, evidence and knowledge. http://www.aho.afro.who.int/profiles_
information/index.php/Ethiopia:Health_information,_research,_evidence_ 
and_knowledge. Accessed Sept 2016.
Alvarez-Rosete, Auturo. 2007. Modernising policy making. In Health policy and 
politics, ed. A. Hann, 41–57. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Alvarez-Rosete, Arturo. 2008. The role of the state in public health. In 
International encyclopedia of public health, ed. Kris Heggenhougen, 211–218. 
Oxford: Academic Press.
Auerbach, Judy. 2008. Confronting the ‘evidence’ in evidence-based HIV preven-
tion: Summary report. San Francisco: San Francisco AIDS Foundation.
Bell, Stephen, and Andrew Hindmoor. 2009. Rethinking governance: The central-
ity of the state in modern society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bernal, Oscar, Juan Camilo Forero, and Ian Forde. 2012. Colombia’s response to 
crisis. BMJ 344: 25.
Bevir, Mark. 2010. Democratic governance. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Boyle, Seán. 2011. United Kingdom (England) health system review. London: 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
J. PARKHURST ET AL.
 181
Cambodia Ministry of Health. 2008. Health strategic plan 2008–2015. Accontability, 
efficiency, quality, equity. Phnom Penh: Cambodia Ministry of Health.
Castro, Hector. 2014. Assessing the feasibility of conducting and using health 
technology assessment in Colombia. The case of severe haemophilia. Doctor of 
Public Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
Chalmers, Iain. 2003. Trying to do more good than harm in policy and practice: 
The role of rigorous, transparent, up-to-date evaluations. The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 589 (1): 22–40.
Chalmers, Iain, Larry V. Hedges, and Harris Cooper. 2002. A brief history of 
research synthesis. Evaluation & the Health Professions 25 (1): 12–37. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0163278702025001003.
Craft, Jonathan, and Michael Howlett. 2012. Policy formulation, governance 
shifts and policy influence: Location and content in policy advisory systems. 
Journal of Public Policy 32 (2): 79–98.
Davies, Glyn, and Michael Keating, eds. 2000. The future of governance. St 
Leonards: Allen & Unwin.
Dodgson, Richard, Kelley Lee, Nick Drager, and World Health Organization. 
2002. Global health governance: A conceptual review. London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and World Health Organization.
Downie, Richard. 2016. Sustaining improvements to public health in Ethiopia. 
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Durán, Antonio, Joseph Kutzin, José M.  Martin-Moreno, and Phyllida Travis. 
2011. Understanding health systems: Scope, functions and objectives. In 
Health systems: Health, wealth, society and wellbeing. Maidenhead, Open 
University Press and McGraw-Hill, ed. Joseph Figueras and Martin McKee, 
19–36. Maidenhead: Open University Press.
Ethiopia Federal Ministry of Health. 2014. Ethiopia’s fifth national health accounts, 
2010/2011. Addis Ababa: Federal Ministry of Health.
Ethiopian Academy of Science. 2013. Report on mapping the health Reserach land-
scape in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa: Ethiopian Academy of Science.
Gaym, Asheber. 2008. Health research in Ethiopia—Past, present and suggestions 
on the way forward. Ethiopian Medical Journal 46 (3): 287–308.
Hafner, Tamara, and Jeremy Shiffman. 2012. The emergence of global attention 
to health systems strengthening. Health Policy and Planning 28 (1): 41–50.
Halligan, John. 1995. Policy advice and the public service. In Governance in a 
changing environment, ed. Guy Peters and Donald J.  Savoie, 138–172. 
Montreal: Canadian Centre for Management Development.
Hanney, Stephen, Shyama Kuruvilla, Bryony Soper, and Nicholas Mays. 2010. 
Who needs what from a national health research system: Lessons from reforms 
to the English Department of Health’s R&D system. Health Research Policy 
and Systems 8 (1): 11.
 MINISTRIES OF HEALTH AND THE STEWARDSHIP OF HEALTH EVIDENCE 
182 
Hawkins, Benjamin, and Arturo Alvarez Rosete. 2017. Judicialization and health 
policy in Colombia: The implications for evidence-informed policymaking. 
Policy Studies Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12230.
Hogwood, Brian W., and Lewis A. Gunn. 1984. Policy analysis for the real world. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hustedt, Thurid, and Sylvia Veit. 2017. Policy advisory systems: Change dynamics 
and sources of variation. Policy Sciences 50 (1): 41–46.
Jones, Harry, and Camboida Economic Associate Centre for Policy Studies. 2013. 
Building political ownership and technical eadership: Decision-making, political 
economy and knowledge use in the health sector in Cambodia. London: Overseas 
Development Institute.
Kickbusch, Ilona, and David Gleicher. 2012. Governance for health in the 21st cen-
tury: World Health Organization, Regional Office for Europe.
Kickbusch, Ilona. 2002. Perspectives on health governance in the 21st century. In 
Marhall Marinker and Martin Mckee (eds) Health targets in Europe: Policy, 
progress and promise, 218. London: BMJ Books.
Kjaer, Anne Mette. 2004. Governance: Key concepts. Cambridge: Polity Press.
———. 2011. Rhodes’ contribution to governance theory: Praise, criticism and 
the future governance debate. Public Administration 89 (1): 101–113.
Kooiman, Jan. 2000. Societal governance: Levels, modes and orders of social- 
political interaction. In Debating governance: Authority, steering and democ-
racy, ed. Jon Pierre, 138–167. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Koon, Adam D., Krishna D.  Rao, Nhan T.  Tran, and Abdul Ghaffar. 2013. 
Embedding health policy and systems research into decision-making processes 
in low-and middle-income countries. BMC Health Research Policy and Systems 
11 (1): 30.
LaRocca, Rebecca, Jennifer Yost, Maureen Dobbins, Donna Ciliska, and Michelle 
Butt. 2012. The effectiveness of knowledge translation strategies used in public 
health: A systematic review. BMC Public Health 12 (1): 751.
Lavis, John N., G. Emmanuel Guindon, David Cameron, Boungnong Boupha, 
Masoumeh Dejman, Eric J. Osei, and Ritu Sadana. 2010. Bridging the gaps 
between research, policy and practice in low- and middle-income countries: A 
survey of researchers. CMAJ. https://doi.org/10.1503/cmaj.081164.
Lewis, Richard, Arturo Alvarez-Rosete, and Nicholas Mays. 2006. How to regulate 
health care in England? An international perspective: King’s Fund.
McQueen, David, Matthias Wismar, Vivian Lin, Catherine M. Jones, and Maggie 
Davies, eds. 2012. Intersectoral governance for health in all policies. Structures, 
actions and experiences. Malta: World Health Organization on behalf of the 
European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies.
NICE. 2017. NICE Charter. National Institute for Health and Care Excellence. 
https://www.nice.org.uk/media/default/about/who-we-are/nice_charter.pdf
J. PARKHURST ET AL.
 183
Nutley, Sandra M., Isabel Walter, and Huw T.O. Davies. 2007. Using evidence: 
How research can inform public services. Bristol: The Policy Press.
Parkhurst, Justin. 2017. The politics of evidence: From evidence based policy to the 
good governance of evidence. Abingdon: Routledge.
Piere, Jan, and B. Guy Peters. 2000. Governance, politics and the state. Basingstoke: 
Macmillian.
Pierre, Jon. 2000. Debating governance: Authority, steering and democracy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Reich, Michael R. 2002. Reshaping the state from above, from within, from 
below: Implications for public health. Social Science & Medicine 54 (11): 
1669–1675.
Rhodes, Roderick Arthur William. 1996. The new governance: Governing with-
out government. Political studies 44 (4): 652–667.
Rhodes, Rod A.W. 1997. Understanding governance: Policy networks, governance, 
reflexivity and accountability. Philadelphia: Open University Press.
Richards, David, and Martin J. Smith. 2002. Governance and public policy in the 
UK. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rosenau, James N. 1995. Governance in the twenty-first century. Global 
Governance 1 (1): 13–43.
Saltman, Richard B., and Odile Ferroussier-Davis. 2000. The concept of steward-
ship in health policy. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 78 (6): 
732–739.
Saltman, Richard B., Antonio Durán, and Hans F.W. Dubois. 2011. Governing 
public hospitals. Reform strategies and the movement towards institutional auton-
omy. Copenhagen: European Observatory on Health Systems and Policy, 
WHO Regional Office for Europe.
Shaw, Sara E., Jill Russell, Trisha Greenhalgh, and Maja Korica. 2014. Thinking 
about think tanks in health care: A call for a new research agenda. Sociology of 
Health & Illness 36 (3): 447–461.
Shergold, Miriam, and Jonathan Grant. 2008. Freedom and need: The evolution 
of public strategy for biomedical and health research in England. Health 
Research Policy and Systems 6 (1): 2.
Stoker, Gerry. 1998. Governance as theory: Five propositions. International Social 
Science Journal 50 (155): 17–28.
UK Government. 2013. What works: Evidence centres for social policy. London: UK 
Cabinet Office.
van Kammen, Jessika, Don de Savigny, and Nelson Sewankambo. 2006. Using 
knowledge brokering to promote evidence-based policy-making: The need for 
support structures. Bulletin of the World Health Organization 84: 608–612.
Weisz, John R., Irwin N. Sandler, Joseph A. Durlak, and Barry S. Anton. 2005. 
Promoting and protecting youth mental health through evidence-based pre-
vention and treatment. American Psychologist 60 (6): 628.
 MINISTRIES OF HEALTH AND THE STEWARDSHIP OF HEALTH EVIDENCE 
184 
WHO. 2000. The world health report 2000  – Health systems: Improving perfor-
mance. Geneva: World Health Organization.
———. 2003. The world health report 2003. Shaping the future. Geneva: World 
Health Organization.
———. 2007. Everybody’s business. Strengthening health systems to improve health 
outcomes. WHO’s framework for action. Geneva: World Health Organization.
———. 2008. Primary care. Now more than ever. Geneva: World Health 
Organization.
WHOROE. 2008. Tallinn charter on health systems, health and wealth. Copenhagen: 
WHO Regional Office for Europe.
Woelk, Godfrey, Karen Daniels, Julie Cliff, Simon Lewin, Esperança Sevene, 
Benedita Fernandes, Alda Mariano, Sheillah Matinhure, Andrew D. Oxman, 
and John N.  Lavis. 2009. Translating research into policy: Lessons learned 
from eclampsia treatment and malaria control in three southern African coun-
tries. Health Research Policy and Systems 7 (31): 1–14.
World Bank. 2011. Cambodia – More efficient government spending for strong and 
inclusive growth: Integrated fiduciary assessment and public expenditure review 
(IFPER). Phnom Penh: The World Bank.
———. 2017. World development indicators database. http://databank.worldbank.
org/data/download/GNIPC.pdf
Yamin, Alicia Ely, and Oscar Parra-Vera. 2010. Judicial protection of the right to 
health in Colombia: From social demands to individual claims to public debates. 
Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 33: 431.
Open Access   This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the per-
mitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
J. PARKHURST ET AL.
185© The Author(s) 2018
J. Parkhurst et al. (eds.), Evidence Use in Health Policy Making, 
International Series on Public Policy, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93467-9_9
CHAPTER 9
Evidence Use and the Institutions 
of the State: The Role of Parliament 
and the Judiciary
Stefanie Ettelt
IntroductIon
Most analyses of the role of scientific evidence in health policy see health 
system governance as predominantly the responsibility of the Government, 
with the Ministry of Health being its main representative. The World 
Health Organization (WHO), for example, emphasised the steering role 
of ministries in improving health and health system performance (Travis 
et al. 2002). Yet what is sometimes overlooked is that ministries operate in 
context, with other state institutions interacting and shaping its role. The 
Ministry of Health may be the main actor responsible for health within the 
executive, but it operates within a larger institutional context, i.e. the 
‘political system’. This definition by Scott and Mcloughlin emphasises the 
interaction of formal and informal institutions that shape the plethora of 
political processes, roles and responsibilities that together form the state:
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Political systems are the formal and informal political processes by which 
decisions are made concerning the use, production and distribution of 
resources in any given society. Formal political institutions can determine 
the process for electing leaders; the roles and responsibilities of the executive 
and legislature; the organisation of political representation (through politi-
cal parties); and the accountability and oversight of the state. Informal and 
customary political systems, norms and rules can operate within or alongside 
these formal political institutions. (Scott and Mcloughlin 2014: n.p.)
This chapter examines the role of two of the institutions of the state 
that influence health policymaking and health system governance in addi-
tion to government. With health policy we mean all national or sub- 
national policies that have an intentional bearing on population health and 
health care provision; health system governance refers to the steering of 
the health system with all its components. These definitions overlap, as 
they should, but as not all health policies relate to health system gover-
nance and not all governance decisions may be considered policies.
The chapter concentrates on the legislature and the judiciary, which are 
typically anchored in constitutional law (the United Kingdom is the exam-
ple in which constitutional rules are in existence but are “unwritten”). 
Therefore, this chapter will examine the role of (1) parliaments in making 
legislation and scrutinising the actions of government, and (2) the legal 
system, forming the judiciary and its role in arbitrating conflicts between 
policy actors and in scrutinising the compatibility of decisions by govern-
ment and parliament with existing law.
Understanding the role of the legislative and judiciary is important to 
contextualise the role of health ministries analysed in earlier chapters and 
their approach to making use of research evidence to inform decisions. 
The chapter takes the observation as a starting point that other bodies of 
‘the state’ are often involved in the policy process and should therefore be 
considered relevant when we analyse the role of scientific evidence in 
health policymaking. Yet the constellation of these bodies varies between 
countries as they reflect differences in political systems, which translates 
into significant differences in how health policymaking and health system 
governance are influenced by them.
The chapter does not attempt to cover all bodies of the state relevant to 
health policy or all aspects of each country’s political system. Instead, it 
aims to provide a broad overview by extracting relevant examples from the 
case studies of the GRIP-Health project and reflect on similarities and 
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differences between them. There are few empirical studies of how evi-
dence from research is incorporated in decision making processes within 
parliaments and courts (two of them included in this book), or if there are 
any, they are dispersed between different academic disciplines and not fully 
explored from the perspective of evidence-based policy-making. This 
chapter wants to highlight this gap by drawing attention to the relevance 
of legislators and courts in using evidence to exercise their mandate. It 
primarily does so by exploring the use of evidence in relation to their func-
tion of holding government to account, which has the benefit of allowing 
us to reflect on the checks and balances on governmental power and the 
limits of its decision- making relating to health policy.
InstItutIons of the state and theIr role In usIng 
evIdence for health PolIcy-MakIng
It is sometimes assumed that health policymaking largely takes place in 
central government, with ministries of health being the only state actors. 
Indeed, the WHO, highlighting the need for stewardship in health system 
governance, largely called on ministries of health to become responsible 
‘stewards’ in driving health policy development and system reform (Travis 
et al. 2002). There are multiple critiques of this assumption, for example, 
with regard to countries in which responsibility for health are shared 
between different levels of government (Ettelt et al. 2010). This exists in 
many forms, for example in federalist countries in which responsibility for 
health policy is shared by different levels of government (Banting and 
Corbett 2001). But even among countries that are not federalist in the 
sense that they consist of a federation of states with separate state govern-
ments and parliaments, there is much variation with regard to the distribu-
tion of responsibility for health and the health system (Saltman et  al. 
2007). The United Kingdom with its four countries – England, Scotland, 
Wales and the Northern Ireland – is a case in point, as each country has its 
own health department and National Health Service, with only a few 
functions (e.g. emergency response) being centralised.
In addition, in many countries the decision-making power for health 
policymaking is also diffused among the institutions of the state, especially 
parliament and the judiciary. This particularly emphasises the role of 
national law, both in terms of making and in interpreting legislation, in 
health policy-making and system governance. The countries selected for 
this study cover different political regime types (ranging from democratic 
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to non-democratic) and different constitutional structures (e.g. unitary vs. 
federal states; degree of executive control) (Ettelt et al. 2016). The com-
parison of political systems of the six countries selected for this study high-
lights three important differences:
• First, in some countries, the health policy and system governance 
function is highly centralised with the ministry of health being the 
main, and sometimes only player, with parliament and the judiciary 
being less influential. Ethiopia, Cambodia and Ghana broadly fall 
into this category for reasons that include both constitutional separa-
tion of power and practices of collaborative deliberation. In Ghana, 
for instance, in theory, parliament should approve the sectoral bud-
gets for any financial year and coordinate its decision with the 
Ministry of Health responsible for the internal evaluation of the per-
formance of the health system and its policies. Yet coordination does 
not happen in practice; while both processes tend to happen simulta-
neously, there is little overlap of the personnel involved in each and 
hence the coordination between both processes is limited. In 
Germany, in contrast, health system governance is almost entirely 
devolved to corporatist actors operating within a legal framework 
developed by the Federal Parliament, with the Federal Ministry of 
Health being only responsible for a relatively narrowly defined set of 
policy decisions and accountability functions (Ettelt et al. 2010).
• The second difference relates to the role of parliament in making 
health policy decisions and in scrutinising government actions in rela-
tion to policy development and health system governance. While par-
liament has some role in health policymaking in most countries, by 
way of debating, developing and eventually passing legislation, there 
are substantial differences in the extent to which parliament uses its 
powers to scrutinize government policy both ex ante and ex post, and 
the extent this scrutiny involves questioning the type of knowledge 
used to inform its decisions including scientific evidence.
• A third difference relates to the role of the judiciary in health policy and 
health system governance. Colombia and Germany stand out among 
the selected countries in this respect as in both countries the judiciary 
has a strong role in challenging the decisions of government and other 
health policy actors (e.g. the corporatist self-administration). The right 
to challenge these decisions in the courts is inscribed in constitutional 
law, which define both the balance of power within the state and the 
scope for action by citizens and others (e.g. provider organisations, 
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insurers, corporatist actors) to defend their rights in case of violation. In 
other countries, in contrast, the judiciary is more restrained in interven-
ing in government decisions either because of customary authority 
given to the government (in England) or because the judiciary is 
not sufficiently independent from those ruling in government (in 
Cambodia).
In the following two sections the role of the legislature and the judi-
ciary and  their potential for evidence use will be investigated in more 
detail, starting with the role of parliaments.
legIslatures: the role of ParlIaMents
Given their constitutional role, parliaments should have a major influence 
on evidence use in health system governance and health policies. However, 
whether this happens in practice is an empirical question and this question 
has not yet been much researched.
In principle, there are (at least) two roles for parliament that can create 
opportunities for evidence use. The first role is to develop legislation and 
to set the legislative framework for health system governance. This includes 
initiating major health care reform (e.g. setting up the current system of 
health care financing in Colombia), but can also involve a broad spectrum 
of legislation that applies to any aspect of health care financing and deliv-
ery, health promotion, and preventative and public health measures (as 
discussed e.g. in the chapter on Ghana). Such decisions would warrant 
good information, hence there is a potential role for research evidence to 
influence these processes (constituting some form of ‘instrumental’ use).
The second role is for parliament to hold government to account for its 
decisions and actions. This can include both the use of scientific studies as a 
means to exercise accountability (e.g. evaluation of government policies or 
analyses of health system monitoring data) and the requirement of govern-
ment and its constituent parts to demonstrate that decisions are well founded, 
which may include considerations of supporting evidence from research.
The analysis of the countries selected in this book suggests that there is 
great variation in the role of parliament in using, and enforcing, evidence 
use in health policymaking. Crucially, parliaments vary in their involve-
ment in health policymaking, but also in the extent to which they hold 
government to account. In some countries, as outlined above, health poli-
cymaking and health system governance are mostly the domain of the 
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executive with parliamentary involvement and oversight being limited or 
non-existent (Newman et al. 2013). In other countries, parliaments decide 
on a wide range of health policies and health system governance issues. As 
an example, Parliaments in England and Ghana both approve the budget 
allocation for health care. The Federal Parliament in Germany (composed 
of the Federal Assembly (Bundestag) and the Federal Council (Bundesrat)), 
in contrast, does not have authority over the budget, as this is held jointly 
by sickness funds as funds are collected through a social insurance system. 
Yet in Germany, the Federal Parliament plays a crucial role in setting, and 
monitoring, contribution rates to social health insurance thus influencing 
the ability of sickness funds to increase the budget significantly.
The analysis of the country case studies suggests that there is great 
variation as to the role of parliament in using, and enforcing, evidence use 
in health policymaking. Overall the verdict is not positive. In our study, 
examples of parliaments or parliamentarians engaging with research and 
opportunities for using evidence to come to better informed decisions 
were few and far between, particular with regard to informing legislative 
decisions. The analysis of minimum volumes policy in Germany (aimed at 
improving outcomes of complex interventions in hospitals) is a case in 
point. Parliament seemed not to have engaged with any evidence, despite 
the fact that the policy proposal was inspired by findings from health ser-
vices research. Yet the scientific evidence base for minimum volumes 
became a major cause of disagreement at later stages of the policy process, 
including in the courts. In Germany, both chambers of Parliament are 
supported by an in-house scientific service, but its role is largely invisible 
to the public (it briefly surfaced in a recent scandal where a minister had 
used the service to co-write his PhD (Blechschmidt et al. 2011)). A recent 
study on the role of research in the UK Parliament, conducted by research-
ers of the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, concluded that 
almost all Members of Parliament and their staff participating in the sur-
vey (83 out of a total of 85) found research evidence useful for their work. 
However, most respondents applied a wide definition of what they meant 
by ‘research’ and ‘evidence’, including scientific research as well as other 
forms of research and knowledge (Kenny et al. 2017).
Countries also vary in whether health policy is mostly made through 
legislation, like in Germany and Colombia, or whether decisions relating to 
health policy and health system governance are mostly made through gov-
ernment decree and secondary legislation. Colombia’s bicameral Parliament 
(the Congress) plays a substantial role in health system  governance as most 
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aspects of health policy are based on primary legislation (although there is 
also the possibility of a presidential decree). When the current system of 
health care financing was created through ‘Law 100’ in 1993 it was 
expected that much of the detailed principles that are required for its full 
implementation would be developed by subsequent legislatures. However, 
this has proven to be a slow process with the Congress having difficulties in 
forming sustainable majorities to make substantial decisions over a longer 
period of time as required for the implementation of Law 100.
Weyrauch et al. (2016) note that political parties can play a prominent 
role in channelling scientific evidence to inform legislation. However, in 
Colombia, to stay with the example, Parliament has a reputation for being 
fragmented and its members tend not to vote along party lines. Political 
parties are deemed weak and “lack[ing] the coherence and stability needed 
to effectively make policy” (Pachón and Johnson 2016: 73). This ten-
dency to fragmentation in consequence allows the Government to exercise 
power over Parliament and orchestrate legislative action. Pachon and 
Johnson (2016) note that bills brought forward by the Government have 
a much higher chance to be turned into legislation than bills promoted by 
members of parliament, suggesting that the Government has substantial 
influence over the legislative process, for example by influencing the selec-
tion of chairs and rapporteurs on parliamentary committees.
In our case study on Colombia, Alvarez-Rosete and Hawkins (in this 
book) demonstrate that legislation is often justified by reference to scien-
tific evidence and it is possible that committees engage with studies relat-
ing to relevant topics. However, it is difficult to see what incentives 
members of parliament might have to use evidence or scrutinise the 
Government’s use of evidence. Dargent (2015) also noted that, in 
Colombia, Ministry of Health officials hold most technical expertise and 
have often play a pivotal role in informing the development of health leg-
islation, again tipping the balance in favour of government.
One condition for parliaments to exercise their function to oversee gov-
ernments is that the legislature has a degree of independence from the 
executive. Arguably, this is inherently difficult in parliamentary systems in 
which the executive is formed by majority holders elected into parliament. 
However, the question is whether parliament is sufficiently separate from 
government so that members of parliament see it as their collective respon-
sibility to hold their government to account. If this is not the case, for 
example where both government and parliament are dominated by the 
same group of people (as in Cambodia), it is unlikely that parliament is in 
a position to review and challenge government actions.
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Parliaments can also be limited in their capacity to scrutinise proposals 
from the executive, which produces the vast amount of legislative initia-
tives. In Ghana, the Select Committee on Health can initiate inquiries on 
health policy matters to hold the Government to account, but its efforts 
are constrained by its limited budgetary and professional capacity.
Lindberg (2010) notes that Parliamentary scrutiny of government pol-
icy in Ghana was high in the years 1997–2000 (the second presidential 
term of Jerry John Rawlings in the Fourth Republic), with subsequent 
parliaments being less active in challenging government action. The prob-
lem Lindberg diagnoses is that members of parliament are themselves not 
held to account by their constituents for their role in scrutinising govern-
ment, but are rewarded, and kept in post, for their ability to secure 
resources for local projects and investments. Access to such resources is 
controlled by the Government which therefore can reward (or penalise) 
members of parliament for their support (or the lack of it) for government 
decisions. Mechanisms such as questions to the Government from the 
floor are possible, but they are more likely to be used to inquire about 
progress in the implementation of local projects than about policies rele-
vant to the populace as a whole (Lindberg 2010). With the accountability 
function being ineffective, the ability of parliament – while democratically 
elected and thriving in this respect – to scrutinise government is weak. 
This weakness is compounded by a lack of resources and capacity of par-
liamentary services.
The importance of accountability mechanisms for evidence use is also 
highlighted by the role of the Parliament (composed of the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords) in the UK. The UK Parliament passes 
primary legislation relating to health, which provides the framework for 
the National Health Service (NHS), public health and other health-related 
policies. It also scrutinises health policy that the Government develops and 
implements via secondary legislation through its Department of Health. A 
number of mechanisms are available for this purpose, including parliamen-
tary debates, and questions put to ministers, the department and posed 
directly to the Prime Minister. Evidence from research may play a part in 
these mechanisms (Kenny et al. 2017), yet its use is highly variable, topic 
dependent and often superseded by debates about the worthiness of policy 
goals in the first place. The debate about the controversial 2012 health 
care reform is a case in point, in which Members of Parliament challenged 
the intention of the Government to privatise the NHS much more force-
fully than they demanded the existence of any studies in support of the 
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proposal for large-scale restructuring and the strengthening of provider 
competition (Timmins 2012). The Government was criticised for not 
using evidence, but this critique came from actors outside the legislature, 
such as policy think tanks (IoG 2012).
Both the House of Commons and the House of Lords are supported in 
their work by research and library services, however, the extent to which 
these information services are used and are seen as relevant by members is 
highly variable. In contrast, scientific evidence is often central in the work 
of the Health Select Committee. In the 2015–17 Parliamentary term, the 
Committee conducted 24 inquiries on topics as wide ranging as the state of 
the NHS finances, the Government’s actions on suicide prevention, the 
effects of Brexit on health and social care services, and the state of public 
health after the restructuring of the sector in 2013. The Committee invites 
public sector and civil society organisations to make submissions for a topic, 
which are often bolstered by substantial references to studies. It also invites 
a broad range of experts, including researchers, to give evidence before the 
committee. After deliberating the evidence from all sources (scientific or 
not), the committee publishes its verdict in a report available from its web-
site (e.g. HoC 2016). However, the extent to which UK Select Committees 
are able to hold the Government to account is debated. King and Crewe 
(2013: 355), in their book “The blunders of our Governments”, argue that 
such committees “seldom seek to delve deeply into the origins of policies 
as distinct from their merits and generally fight shy of addressing issues that 
already are, or might become, issues of partisan controversy”.
the JudIcIary: the role of courts
The judiciary – often referred to as the third power of the state – applies 
and interprets the law of a country in the name of the state. Countries vary 
in whether the judiciary can have a role in developing legislation, either 
through commenting, or even approving, proposed bills or through set-
ting precedence that informs future decisions of courts.
This function is represented, for example, by the Constitutional Court 
in Colombia, which has authority, as per the Colombian constitution, to 
review legislation passed by the Congress if the bill affects constitutional 
rights (Hernández Álvarez 2013). The Constitutional Court can also 
decide to step in if it finds that legislative and executive bodies have failed 
to act. This has created a dynamic in which political actors tend to defer to 
the Court for resolution on contested issues that they are unable to resolve 
by other means.
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The judiciary can also have a role in holding the government and parlia-
ment to account, for example through the mechanisms of constitutional 
complaint or judicial review. In Germany, the Federal Government and 
Parliament tend to consult senior judges at the German Constitutional 
Court on policies that affect constitutional rights to avoid a retrospective 
“complaint of unconstitutionality” (Verfassungsklage) that can result in 
legislation being revoked and returned to legislators (Landfried 1994). 
There is no suggestion that courts are particularly interested or indeed 
equipped to advise other state bodies about matters of scientific evidence, 
as advice will be focused on aspects of legality and couched in legal terms 
only. However, depending on the issue in question it is possible that stud-
ies play a role in legal argumentation in case of review (as demonstrated in 
the chapter on minimum volumes in this book).
However, it is not a given that courts are in a position to challenge 
governments as this (as with parliament) requires a good degree of inde-
pendence between the executive and the judiciary. Courts can also arbi-
trate in conflicts between individuals and organisations, often using a 
broad spectrum of law that has a bearing on health and health policy (e.g. 
medical law; social law; criminal law, administrative law). In some coun-
tries, courts play a prominent role in arbitrating access to care decisions, 
especially those that provide a constitutional right to health or health care 
(e.g. Colombia, Germany). These decisions typically cut across litigation 
on behalf of individuals (i.e. patients, members of sickness funds) and the 
politico-administrative system mandated with making decisions about col-
lective health service coverage (for example through bodies such as the 
National Institute For Health and Care Excellence (NICE) in England or 
the Institute for Health Technology Assessment (IETS) in Colombia).
Such litigation is widespread in Colombia, where a constitutional right 
to health provides the legal basis for patients to challenge decisions by 
insurers if these deny funding treatments. Between 1999 and 2014 over 
1.3 million right-to-health cases were brought to the Constitutional Court 
(Defensoría del Pueblo 2015). Such court cases draw on the legal instru-
ment of ‘tutelas’ which are “informal and expedite injunctions that allow 
citizens to seek judicial protection when their basic rights are threatened 
by the state or by a third party” (Lamprea 2014: 133). The court  therefore 
has the power to reverse a decision made by insurers, both public and 
private, as well as decisions made by IETS, even if these decisions have 
been based on rigorous health technology assessment. This is problematic, 
as the right to health is interpreted in a way that allows individuals to have 
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access to (government-funded) treatment even if this treatment is proven 
to be ineffective or excessively costly.
Pharmaceutical companies have latched on this opportunity and have 
made a business model of providing legal support to patients to gain addi-
tional funding. However, while the behaviour of the court has been 
decried as inappropriately interventionist, it has also been argued that this 
is the only route that patients can take to challenge the decisions of insur-
ers. The argument is that the Ministry of Health has been unable to effec-
tively regulate and police the behaviour of insurers and the price setting of 
pharmaceutical companies that both could help to ease pressure on courts. 
Lamprea (2014: 158) therefore suggests that the Constitutional Court in 
Colombia acts like the proverbial “canary in the coal mine that signals 
deeper institutional dysfunctions within Colombia’s health sector”.
Courts in Germany have a prominent role in access to treatment deci-
sions, but in contrast to Colombia most cases are dealt with by Social 
Courts (i.e. a system of courts concerned with social security matters) 
rather than the Federal Constitutional Court. In 2005, the Constitutional 
Court laid down rules for applying the constitutional ‘right to life’ included 
in the German Basic Law (which expands to a right to health care). This 
decision provides the basis for the decisions of all courts to which these 
rules apply, forcing sickness funds to reimburse treatment, including in 
cases in which evidence of effectiveness was absent or highly questionable 
(Ettelt  in press). However, compared with Colombia, the caseload in 
Germany is relatively modest, with less than 400 cases between 2005 and 
the end of 2015 (RUB 2016).
In contrast, courts play a much more limited role in treatment decisions 
in England, where no constitutional right to health exists. Since the incep-
tion of NICE, there have been less than a handful of cases in which NHS 
patients sought legal redress against decisions by NICE to withhold (or, 
more precisely, not mandate local NHS organisations to provide) treat-
ment in the NHS. Littlejohns et al. (2012) noted that there is only a nar-
rowly defined set of reasons that patients can employ to take NICE, or any 
Government agency, to court. These reasons are that NICE has exceeded 
its mandate (defined by Parliament and the Secretary of State for Health), 
that the institute acted unfairly or that the decision cannot be ‘reasonably’ 
justified, all of which can be refuted by reference to mandate and proce-
dure, which can include reference to appropriate use to scientific evidence 
(also Syrett 2010).
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However, more recently, there were a number of cases of patients who 
took NHS England (the central governance body overseeing the NHS) to 
court for rejecting applications for treatment funding. In May 2016, the 
High Court ordered NHS England to provide a teenager with narcolepsy 
with the requested drug at least for three months, in spite of NHS England 
not considering the drug as sufficiently cost-effective (HSJ 2016). The 
court ruled that the case met the criteria of “exceptionality” and judged 
that the reasoning of NHS England was “unsupportable”. Yet such legal 
challenges to treatment decisions of NHS governing bodies that are effec-
tively government agencies are considered unusual and undesirable, as it is 
argued that courts should not become involved in decisions about resource 
allocation. Such decisions should be made by government and related 
administrative bodies (Ford and Tracy 2016).
In interviews, conducted in Cambodia, Ghana and Ethiopia the judiciary 
was not mentioned as an institutional actor that impacts on health policy or 
health system governance decisions. This may be a reflection of our inter-
view strategy but it also resonates with our observation of the unstable or 
emerging role of the judiciary in these countries and/or a lack of judicial 
independence that does not allow courts to challenge the  government. 
Cambodia, for example, only begun (re-)building its judicial system after 
democratisation in 1993 following several decades with no legal system in 
place. However, the judiciary is institutionally weak and dominated by the 
interests of the ruling elite which also dominate the executive and legislature 
(Dressel 2014; McCarthy and Un 2015). There is therefore no mechanism 
through which the judiciary could hold the government to account (with 
the trial against former Khmer Rouge leaders being a potential exception) 
and courts are unlikely to be involved in health policy decisions.
the InstItutIons of the state Matter for the study 
of evIdence use In health PolIcy 
and health systeM governance
This chapter has discussed a number of examples from our programme of 
work that illustrate how the design and functioning of state institutions can 
shape the accountability mechanism between the government, parliament 
and the judiciary and the different places in which decision-making in rela-
tion to health policy and health system making can happen at the national 
level. While ministries of health are the pivotal (if not only) actors in health 
policymaking, their role is highly dependent on the institutional configura-
tion of the state.
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Our country case studies showed a variety of such constellations, par-
ticularly focusing on parliament (legislature) and courts (judiciary), their 
role in scrutinising government policy and their involvement in decision 
making relating to health policy. While there are few studies specifically 
examining the role of evidence use in decisions in parliaments or the judi-
ciary this chapter wants to shine a spotlight on the fact that these institu-
tions often have a role in health policymaking and health system governance 
which should not be overlooked.
The chapter hints at a number of tensions between decision-making struc-
tures and demands for better use of research evidence in policy-making. 
Parliament provides a key mechanism for holding government to account, 
however, this is not a given and in many situations this is not sufficiently 
exercised. There are many reasons why parliaments can find it difficult to 
hold governments to account, although these are likely to vary greatly. It 
also can be argued that attention of parliament for government activities, in 
health or elsewhere, is likely to be sporadic and incomplete, and depended 
on the interests, qualification and attention span of their members. However, 
in countries in which the parliament (often through committees) uses evi-
dence and demands evidence use from the government, this can provide a 
powerful stimulus for better evidence use throughout the sector.
There are only a few examples of courts being involved in health policy 
decisions within the scope of this book. Examples of court involvement in 
access to treatment decisions in Germany and Colombia show that the rela-
tionship can be complicated with courts likely to give preference to constitu-
tional principles that emphasise individual rights over concerns about 
effectiveness or affordability. However, different judicial practices in different 
countries have brought about a variety of approaches that may or may not 
include an assessment of evidence from studies. Courts can also have a place 
in reviewing Government policies through mechanisms such as judicial review 
or ‘constitutional challenge’, although the effect of evidence use is unclear.
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CHAPTER 10
Evidence and Policy in Aid-Dependent 
Settings
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IntroductIon
As has been noted in earlier chapters of this book, comparative institu-
tional analyses can be particularly difficult when national contexts differ 
widely. As such, identifying common features in the political or institu-
tional contexts across different settings can be important. One highly rel-
evant contextual feature that is shared across a range of lower income 
settings is the presence, and potential influence, of international donor 
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agencies (or ‘aid’ agencies) that provide funding and assistance to recipi-
ent governments (often classified as ‘Official Development Assistance’ or 
ODA). Of course, there are a wide variety of aid modalities and relation-
ships with these agencies in recipient country settings. International 
donors can be bilateral or multilateral in their orientation (i.e.  representing 
specific governments or collections of countries); they may be private phil-
anthropic (e.g. foundations like the Rockefeller Foundation or Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation); or issue-specific aid mechanisms (e.g. the 
Global Fund to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria; or Gavi  – the 
Vaccine Alliance).
In many parts of the world, aid provision and donor relationships have 
been seen to have historical strategic and political origins (Van Belle 2004). 
Lancaster (2008), for instance, argues that most aid – particularly from the 
US – originated out of cold war diplomacy. While McDougall (2011) argues 
that Australia’s aid programme has aimed to improve security in the pacific 
region. Yet while each country’s arrangements, and historical engagement, 
with donors will have its own unique features, for comparative analyses it can 
be a useful starting point to consider shared experiences involved when out-
side agencies provide financial support for social policies and public services 
in recipient countries. The role of donors in the use of evidence to inform 
health policy was thus identified as a theme in three of the GRIP-Health 
programme case study countries, Cambodia, Ethiopia, and Ghana, where 
levels of donor assistance (in terms of net Official Development Assistance) 
were, respectively, 5.1%, 6.5%, and 3.0% of gross national income, at the time 
of our research (according to 2014 World Bank estimates (World Bank)).
Concerns have been raised, particularly in the international develop-
ment literature, about the influence that donors may have over domestic 
policy agendas, policy decisions, and governance arrangements through 
the aid relationship. Development scholars have often taken a critical 
stance towards conditionality attached to aid and policy-based lending, in 
part for its imposition on the sovereignty of recipient countries to make 
their own policy choices (c.f. Koeberle 2003; Mosley et al. 1995). In the 
health sector, for instance, Okuonzi and Macrae (1995) ask the funda-
mental question of ‘whose policy is it anyway?’ to challenge the influence 
donors had over priority setting in health in Uganda. Outside the specific 
confines of health, Chabal (1992) has argued that:
Aid has become an integral part of state policy that is the state takes aid into 
account when devising and implementing policies. Insofar as it is account-
able, then, the state must in part be accountable to outside constituencies 
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(donors). Accountability here means that the state meets the conditions 
under which aid is delivered. Because dependence (aid) is now so central to 
the survival and operation of African states, accountability to aid-donors is a 
priority even if it is at the expense of accountability to domestic constituen-
cies. (p. 243)
Conditionality was particularly strongly enforced during the structural 
adjustment reforms of the 1980s and 1990s, but more recently, there has 
been a retreat from direct conditions placed on aid.1 Yet concerns remain 
over the ways in which donor influence can undermine state sovereignty, 
alter political priorities, or impose new power relationships in less explicit, 
but equally important ways. Swedlund (2013), for instance, evaluates the 
shift from project based (so-called ‘vertical’) funding to budgetary sup-
port (often termed ‘horizontal’ funding) in Rwanda and Tanzania to 
assess if this approach has reduced donor policy influence. He finds that, 
contrary to popular opinion, donors were also using general budgetary 
support as a mechanism to shape local policy priorities.
In addition to concerns about influence over policy priorities and 
choices, some development scholars critique how the international com-
munity has fundamentally shaped the governing institutions of low-income 
countries. The historical legacy of colonialism has provided a starting 
point for some authors to consider how it provided the political, institu-
tional and administrative bases for the construction of the post-colonial 
state (c.f. Chazan et al. 1999; Mamdani 1997). It is also well known that 
international financial institutions and donors have played a major role in 
steering political and institutional development in some countries, explic-
itly linking the provision of foreign aid with political reform and constitu-
tional change (Stokke 2013). While approaches to international 
development have changed over the past two decades, with increasing 
emphasis on the importance of national governance and stewardship, 
there are still concerns over external influence on governance structures 
and systems. Harrison (2001) presents the idea of ‘post-conditionality’ as 
a situation in which donor-recipient relationships become more subtle 
than in past conditionality situations (in terms of direct coercion or explicit 
demands for policy decisions in return for aid). Instead, in systems of post- 
conditionality, influence is mediated through more informal yet pervasive 
1 With some notable exceptions, such as the US government’s so-called ‘global gag rule’ 
that refuses to provide aid funding to agencies that inform about abortion services in any 
way, which is repeatedly imposed or rescinded depending on whether a Republican or 
Democrat is elected as President (Crane and Dusenberry 2004).
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practices of administrative guidance, which often embed donor values or 
ideas into decision structures and reflect power imbalances in doing so. 
Harrison explains:
Donors do not just impose conditionalities; they also work in routinized 
fashion at the centre of policy-making. Donor-funded technical assistance 
introduces not new policies but new methodologies of policy design based 
on corporate plans, surveys, and closer budgeting and monitoring tech-
niques. (p. 671)
He further notes that this approach works to establish political relations 
which make the distinction between external and national level actors less 
useful as donors become involved within multiple forms and processes of 
decision making (p.  675). Such insights mirror arguments made by 
Chambers and Pettit (2004) who have described aid as a ‘complex system’ 
in which power relations are reinforced through “[o]rganisational norms 
and procedures, combined with personal behaviour, attitudes and beliefs 
(p. 137).”
Within the realm of global health and development, such arrange-
ments can place into potential conflict two sets of institutions – national 
institutions guided by Ministries of Health, serving local populations, 
and international global health institutions – each with their own differ-
ent accountability mechanisms or ultimate goals. Some examples of this 
have been seen elsewhere. Storeng and Béhague (2014), for instance, 
identified how particular quantitative indicators were embraced or uti-
lised by international maternal health advocates when these helped 
increase the global profile of their preferred health issue (so-called ‘evi-
dence based advocacy’). Béhague et al. (2009) further have explored how 
the dominant ideas of what an ‘evidence based’ policy response should be 
in maternal and neonatal care could impose global policy interests over 
domestic ones, pushing countries to generic interventions over tailored 
implementation strategies and serving to legitimate, rather than inform, 
key policy stakeholders.
Akin to this, Shiffman (2014) has described the advisory role of key 
global health actors and networks as an exercise in ‘epistemic power’ in the 
ways that it establishes the dominance of particular discourses, priorities 
and approaches in health policy agendas in low-income settings without 
necessarily raising questions about the legitimacy or accountability of 
these actors.
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These perspectives thus highlight the salient features of the aid- receiving 
context in which evidence is both generated and used to guide policy 
development. We can use these ideas to specifically investigate the institu-
tionalised organisational norms, procedures, behaviours, attitudes and 
beliefs (to use Chamvers and Pettit’s terms) that are established in each 
setting which shape the utilisation of evidence for health policy decision 
making.
EvIdEncE usE as a PowEr/KnowlEdgE nExus
Despite the existence of a well-established body of both empirical and 
conceptual work exploring how donors influence structures, processes, 
and outcomes of policy decision making, these insights are rarely incorpo-
rated in debates about, and recommendations to support, the use of evi-
dence in the health sector. Many global actors use an overtly technical 
language when referring to the use of evidence, at times mirroring ideas of 
the public health community: presenting evidence as a technical tool that 
is principally discussed in terms of how it improves the efficiency or effec-
tiveness of programmatic planning and implementation (c.f. WHO 2004; 
Yamey and Volmink 2014); and donor funds have increasingly been chan-
nelled to programmes aiming to ‘improve’ evidence use principally based 
on technical arguments (c.f. iDSI undated; UKAid 2014; ODI 2013).
Seeing the role of evidence as simply technical, however, stands in con-
trast to critical scholars who have explored the decidedly political nature of 
evidence utilisation (in both public health and other policy realms). 
Stewart and Smith (2015) for example have recently discussed how par-
ticular ‘evidence tools’ – including systematic reviews, impact assessments 
or economic decision-support tools (such as cost-effectiveness analyses) – 
serve political functions in addition to the provision of technical guidance, 
“primarily in their symbolic value as markers of good decision making”(p. 
415). This includes conveying credibility to external audiences as well as 
providing clear and quantifiable answers to policy questions. Through 
interviews with public health policy stakeholders, Stewart and Smith found 
that these tools reflected a high degree of what Weiss (1979) has described 
as the ‘symbolic’ use of research – providing signals of what might be con-
sidered important, rather than necessarily functioning in the ‘problem 
solving’ or ‘engineering’ roles that many tools are often described as 
representing.
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Ferlie and McGivern (2013) similarly described the field of evidence- 
based medicine in the UK as a ‘power/knowledge nexus’ to explore the 
political implications of promotion of particular ways to utilise evidence to 
inform health decisions. In a separate paper, Ferlie and colleagues explain:
power resides in mundane day to day practices, dominant languages, obedi-
ent and reformed subjects and taken for granted rationalities. Such power is 
seen in neutral rather than critical neo Marxist terms: it can constitute a 
capacity to govern (Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips, 2006; Townley, 1998) 
without crude force, domination or exploitation. (Ferlie et al. 2012, p. 340)
In line with the conceptual approach outlined in Chap. 1 of this volume, 
this chapter explores the application of health policy-relevant knowledge as 
an exercise of power, pulling out insights from three country cases  – 
Cambodia, Ghana, and Ethiopia – to explore the use of evidence to inform 
health policy. Our analysis discusses a set of key themes seen in the mecha-
nisms through which donors may influence policy and politics through 
evidence utilisation, exploring the political and governance implications 
seen arising from international donors’ promotion or utilisation of particu-
lar tools and strategies of evidence application to influence health policy.
comParatIvE analysIs
The remainder of this chapter attempts to draw out themes about how 
donor activities or power relationships can have implications for the use of 
evidence in health policymaking based on our three country investigations 
undertaken in aid-dependent settings. Each of these countries is also rep-
resented in separate chapters of this book, which provide further informa-
tion and lines of analysis. So, for example, Chap. 2 presents a comparison 
of evidence use in Cambodia for three different health policy issues: 
tobacco control, HIV/AIDS, and performance-based financing including 
the Government Midwifery Incentive Scheme. The chapter finds that the 
use of evidence for differing policy issues was best explained by mapping 
out how the various health policy issues differed in terms of the outcomes 
of concern to key stakeholders; but also by exploring the structurally 
established positions of influence that stakeholders had, and the logics 
held by influential stakeholders over which evidence was held to be rele-
vant to any given outcome. Further work arising from our Cambodia 
research (published elsewhere) looked more broadly at the routes through 
which donors could have influence over the health policymaking process 
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(analysed through a comparison of Cambodia and Pakistan). That work 
found that donors could exert influence at each stage of the policy process: 
priority setting, policy formulation, and policy implementation, monitor-
ing and evaluation. The analysis found that direct funding to preferred 
policy issues was the most common means of donor influence, but other 
means of influence arose from control over technical knowledge as well as 
more indirect influence – such as through financing particular research or 
evaluations (thus constructing evidence that could be seen as policy rele-
vant), or through recipient country concerns over maintain a good reputa-
tion to avoid impacts on non-health areas of concern (e.g. tourism or 
trade) (Khan et al. 2018).
Influence over institutions and norms by donors can also be seen in the 
case study from Ghana presented in Chap. 4, which particularly draws out 
the ways that donors could influence the collection of routine data and 
indicators to inform annual performance reviews and subsequent sectoral 
plans. Chapter 3, which presents findings from our Ethiopian case study, 
looked more specifically at the issue of nutrition policy, and found that the 
international community’s framing of nutrition problems and policy 
responses could be important factors in helping to explain how evidence 
was utilised within policymaking processes for that specific issue.
As discussed above, it is important to consider the underlying structural 
governing dynamics in aid-recipient areas to understand donor influence, 
including the organisational norms, procedures, or beliefs held that shap-
ing the generation and utilisation of evidence. Through the three case 
studies in countries reliant on donor support to the health sector, we have 
thus been able to reflect on multiple ways that donor influence can mani-
fest itself within the structures and processes of evidence use for health 
policymaking. In this section we draw out three themes that point to par-
ticular mechanisms though which donor organisations influence the policy 
process: through the creation of policy-relevant evidence; through the 
utilisation of evidence for specific policy processes; and through the con-
struction of systems and routines that shape how evidence informs policy 
within health policymaking more broadly.
The Generation or Creation of Policy Relevant Evidence
Health sector planning typically requires assessments of the health status 
and health care needs of a population as well as knowledge about what is 
feasible or achievable based on different intervention strategies  (Abel- Smith 
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1994; Green 2007). For each of these, however, there may be more or less 
robust bodies of evidence available to provide information about health 
care needs and intervention possibilities. As social epidemiologist Nancy 
Krieger (1992) has stated, “If you don’t ask, you don’t know, and if you 
don’t know, you can’t act (p. 412).” In this way, decisions about which 
data to collect, the identification of a research agenda and the choice of 
research topics can be seen to be inherently political as it shapes the topics 
that enter the agenda, and thus which pathways of policy action can be 
followed (see also: Parkhurst 2016, 2017).
In Cambodia, it was reported that the research agenda and the avail-
ability of routine data from the national health information system are 
driven by external funding, often focused on high profile diseases (such as 
malaria or HIV/AIDS), and this could result in the neglect of other 
important health concerns (with issues like hepatitis, road traffic accidents, 
or dengue fever mentioned). One interviewee further explained that men-
tal health was another key priority in Cambodia, given the historical legacy 
of the genocide perpetuated in the 1970s; yet research and policy atten-
tion to mental health were said to be lacking due to dependence on donor 
agendas (see (Khan et al. 2018) for more details). Similarly, a recent litera-
ture review found that few research reports on non-communicable dis-
eases in Cambodia have been published, despite these accounting for the 
highest morbidity and mortality rates in the country (Goyet et al. 2015).
In Ethiopia, the influence of donors was said to arise through their 
funding to local universities conducting research – through which local 
evidence would then be generated for health topics of interest to donors 
(with nutrition given as an example). Paralleling a respondent in Cambodia, 
an Ethiopian interviewee stated that donor research interests might focus 
on diseases with a high profile on the global health agenda (such as HIV 
or TB) without work on lesser known areas which might be important 
from a national perspective, leading to these topics being overlooked when 
it comes to the drafting of health policies. Research conducted by devel-
opment partners or NGOs was also seen to be valued by decision makers 
more highly than that generated solely by Ethiopian scholars, viewing 
international partners as experts and potentially excluding local sources of 
evidence, and thus local voices, from having influence on policymaking.
Cambodian interviewers noted other ways that donors might influence 
the creation of policy relevant evidence. First, donors were seen as influ-
encing which areas of health information systems were strengthened  – 
thus building capacity to collect and generate routine data for selected 
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areas of health which they prioritised, such as malaria or HIV. Second, 
donor choice in financing of programme evaluations would again affect 
which evidence is created in ways that could shape where future policy 
attention could lie.
Evidence Use Within the Policy Process
A second theme we explore in our case studies focusses on the use of evi-
dence within different health policymaking processes, to consider the roles 
or influence of donor agencies within these more specific policy decision 
situations. One of the most well established (yet often critiqued) mecha-
nisms of donor influence in low-income settings is in the direct funding of 
particular programmes and shaping of national priorities (Buse and 
Harmer 2007; Ooms et al. 2008; Sridhar and Tamashiro 2009). While 
there have been shifts away from such so-called vertical programming, it 
still does occur in many cases, with large numbers of global bodies direct-
ing money to specific health issues. Such arrangements can subsequently 
have direct impacts on evidence use, however, as those issues which 
received funding for programmatic use could have increased attention to, 
or application of, particular forms of evidence.
For example, in Cambodia, we investigated three health (system) topics 
that have recently received policy attention. Of these, it was HIV/AIDS – 
in comparison to tobacco control or financial performance incentives to 
health workers – that respondents typically described as having the most 
robust system to draw on high-quality scientific evidence to guide pro-
grammatic decisions; including epidemiological modelling, cost- 
effectiveness data, and scaling up from pilot programme evaluations. A 
reason given for this, however, was the interest and support of donors to 
HIV/AIDS in the country. This included provision of financial and human 
capacity resources to the bodies planning HIV activities, such as the 
National Centre for HIV/AIDS, Dermatology and STDs.
It may not be surprising that donor interest in HIV enabled a system of 
evidence use judged by local actors to be better than in other health deci-
sions. Cambodia has limited human resources for the generation and anal-
ysis of policy-relevant evidence. In the other two cases explored in Chap. 
2, powerful national interests were seen as dominating the framing of the 
policy question, which subsequently affected which pieces of evidence 
were held to be relevant or applied. With the case of tobacco policy, it was 
industry and national revenue interests that influenced which evidence 
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could be brought to bear; while the Prime Minister’s office’s direct inter-
est in maternal mortality was seen to shape how a midwifery incentive 
scheme was conceptualised and how it subsequently used evidence. In the 
case of HIV/AIDS policy in Cambodia, some saw this as presenting a 
positive development given the limited or piecemeal application of evi-
dence to inform decisions for other health issues. But there are still chal-
lenges in the fact that it might only be a sub-set of issues for which there 
is a robust enough body of evidence generated, reviewed, or applied to 
justify international interest and funding.
Furthermore, while it was financing of interventions, and of research 
on priority topics, that affected evidence use for the agenda-setting stage, 
donors were also seen to have influence on the policy formulation stage in 
Cambodia. At this stage, influence was seen to derive from donor profi-
ciency in analysing data and using research outputs to inform policies and 
plans, or in filling knowledge gaps that might exist – either by commis-
sioning additional research or using their own expertise.
Another example of how international actors may have political influ-
ence within specific health policy issues can be seen in Ethiopia. Chapter 3 
presents a case study of nutrition planning, exploring how the conceptual 
framing of nutrition by the global community had implications for how 
particular evidence could inform policy development. For instance it was 
explained that international stakeholders and processes, including a 2008 
Lancet special series on maternal and child undernutrition, led to a com-
mon understanding of a need to address nutrition through a multi- sectoral 
approach. Yet the implications of this were that particular forms of evi-
dence resonated with particular institutionalised logics of appropriateness 
and were not appropriate for the logics of others, thus hampering efforts 
to achieve multisectoral policy to address nutrition.
So, for example, it was reported that the Ministry of Agriculture pursued 
a logic dictated by concern over farm outputs, while the Finance Ministry 
considered monetary data to justify action from an economic development 
perspective  – in contrast to the typical public health indicators (such as 
under-five mortality or obesity rates) that are institutionally understood and 
used to raise malnutrition awareness and priority in global health circles.
The mention of the Lancet’s 2008 undernutrition series by our inter-
viewees reflects Shiffman’s (2014) recent description of epistemic and 
normative power in global health. Shiffman specifically identifies the 
Lancet as “one of the most powerful actors in global health (p. 298),” in 
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the ways it has worked to set the global agenda and construct ideas of 
what should be done in health. Our research described in Chap. 3 illus-
trates this in practice, showing how a special series of that journal worked 
to shape the conceptual understanding of malnutrition, with subsequent 
implications for which evidence was drawn upon and how to shape policy 
development.
Systems and Routines of Evidence Utilisation
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, Harrison’s (2001) analysis of 
‘post-conditionality’ identified how donor influence has shifted to routin-
ised processes of policy design. While Harrison focusses on Uganda and 
Tanzania, he points to a set of other African countries that might fit this 
description (including Ghana). And from a new institutional perspective 
(c.f. Lowndes 2010; Peters 2005), routinisation would be reflected in the 
structures, processes, and norms that shape the use of evidence to inform 
health policy.
For example, the analysis of Ghana presented in Chap. 4 principally 
focusses on an institutional process and system for data utilisation to 
inform health policy and planning  – specifically exploring how routine 
local data and locally relevant research evidence are utilised to populate a 
set of ‘indicators’ that are then used to evaluate health sector achievement 
and inform annual formal sector strategic planning meetings. Using rou-
tine data to inform annual planning cycles is of course not an unusual idea, 
yet it was the specific role of donors in defining indicators, and influencing 
how they were used to assess national policies, that served as mechanisms 
by which donors could collectively shape the development of national 
policy. In particular, it was an annual ‘health summit’ event during which 
indicators were developed and populated with data to judge policy suc-
cess, and steer policy directions for the future.
This example echoes forms of influence described by Whitfield (2007) 
who explains:
Donors exhibit powerful influence over policy not only through condition-
ality, but also through policy dialogue arenas. Donors have created a pleth-
ora of arenas for what they call ‘policy dialogue’ with government, as well as 
for coordinating their operations, sharing information and experience, 
 discussing policies, and identifying opportunities to engage government on 
policy reforms. (p. 145)
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Such policy dialogues can be particularly fertile environments for the 
introduction of ‘evidence’ when conceptualised in a technical problem 
solving manner, with the form, location, and arrangements around such 
dialogues having implications for power and influence within the local 
settings.
In Cambodia, however, there were also examples of structured pro-
cesses and routinised norms that reflected donor influence on the broader 
institutional environment that shaped evidence use within health policy-
making for any number of policy decisions. In Cambodia, for instance, 
one respondent explained that technical reports were typically published 
in English, creating an immediate barrier for some local stakeholders to 
engage with technical evidence. It was also reported that research was 
driven by funding rather than local demand, which could mean available 
research could be less relevant to the country. This shows some similarity 
to issues raised in Ethiopia where it was reported that internationally pro-
duced evidence is more respected than that produced internally by national 
institutions.
dIscussIon: InfluEncE and rEsIstancE ovEr multIPlE 
forms of EvIdEncE usE
The influence of donors in aid-recipient nations has long been a subject of 
interest to development scholars, yet rarely have these issues directly been 
analysed in relation to issues of evidence use within the policy process. Our 
comparative analysis identified a range of examples and themes through 
which donor influence could manifest itself in shaping the way evidence 
was generated or utilised to inform decisions, as well as in the ongoing 
systems or routines that can influence evidence use as well.
As noted in Chap. 1, Carol Weiss described multiple meanings of 
research utilisation in the 1970s (c.f. Weiss 1979)  – including rational 
‘problem solving’ uses of research, but also how research serves a ‘knowl-
edge driven’ role to identify problems in the first place, or to influence 
broader thinking about issues through a so-called ‘enlightenment’ mecha-
nism. The case studies explored in this chapter illustrate examples of evi-
dence and research use fitting each of these meanings. Influence over 
evidence generation, for example, could shape the knowledge construc-
tion process which serves to identify health problems for policy attention 
in the first place. The direct support to priority issues, on the other hand, 
allowed certain topics to have evidence used more robustly in a classic 
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problem solving modality. Influence over broader systems of data use, or 
routinised norms related to expertise and evidence utilisation, on the other 
hand, might alternatively reflect Weiss’ enlightenment ideas.
In these ways we can of course consider donor influence as an exercise 
of power. The historical concern of some authors over donor control of 
resources (i.e. funding) certainly was found to be a major influence on 
which issues received attention, which at times shaped which health issues 
were seen to have had robust or improved evidence utilisation processes as 
well. Yet power also could be seen as present in the expert knowledge and 
capacity in regards to evidence utilisation that international actors pos-
sessed, or were perceived as possessing – so called epistemic power linked 
to scientific expertise.
This said, our country cases also illustrated a number of ways that 
donor power and influence might be resisted – themes particularly dis-
cussed in Ghana and Ethiopia. At the time of the research, Ghana was the 
only one of our three aid-dependent settings classified as a lower-middle 
income country (today Cambodia also falls into this classification), but 
Ghana particularly stood out as having greater local capacity related to 
evidence generation and use than in Ethiopia or Cambodia. Multiple 
respondents in Ghana referred to significant research or evidence genera-
tive capacity in national bodies, including the Ghana Health Service 
(GHS) as well as universities. One interviewee stated that the country 
had a strong desire to be independent from donors in its desire to rely on 
local data for evaluations; and in another case a representative of a UN 
body stated that they choose research topics based on those requested by 
the government.
Notably, there are three well-regarded Health Research Centres within 
the Research and Development Division of the GHS, serving the north-
ern, middle, and southern regions of the country. According to national 
documents, these centres conduct research within their designated sub- 
region as per the needs and priorities of the GHS, this information is then 
used to guide national-level decision making and policy development 
(Ghana Health Service 2015). All centres are also said to have well estab-
lished health and demographic surveillance systems and collaborate with a 
number of international partners and funders (Ghana Health Service 
2015; Navrongo Health Research Centre 2016). In contrast, in Cambodia 
and Ethiopia, there were indications that donors had a strong say over 
which health topics were researched in the first place. Thus the generation 
of policy-relevant data could be seen to follow donor interests with 
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 subsequent implications for policy options. Ghana, however, with its 
higher capacity and better established research and bureaucratic bodies, 
appeared less susceptible to influence in this way.
Despite greater local capacity in Ghana, interviewees still mentioned 
donors could shape policy decisions – achieved through their allocation of 
resources to specific issues, through a national desire to appease donors so 
as to maintain budgets, or even through lobbying for preferred policies. 
One representative of the GHS interviewed noted that there still will be 
priority allocated to issues based on the power of stakeholders – providing 
an example of how breast cancer was addressed before cervical cancer in 
the country, as it affects wealthier individuals, despite representing a lower 
burden of disease in the country. Yet Ghana has been noted elsewhere for 
having established a muti-donor budget support mechanism and associ-
ated policy dialogue mechanism to improve coordination of aid and main-
tain national leadership of policymaking in the face of donor proliferation 
(Pallas et al. 2015). As such there appeared to be a tension between the 
capacity and strength of local decision making systems and the influence of 
donors at multiple points.
In Ethiopia, as noted, local capacity was acknowledged as weak for 
much health planning and decision making. Yet despite the fact that we 
identified influence over evidence creation and framing of issue responses 
by donors and international actors, Ethiopian policymaking and planning 
was understood to be strongly centrally controlled, which seemed to indi-
cate significant resistance to direct influence over decisions or priority set-
ting at times. Indeed, in a recent assessment of potential donor influence 
on policy in Ethiopia over two decades, Borchgrevink (2008) found par-
ticularly strong resistance to influence in the country. A key explanation 
the author gives is how:
the Ethiopian regime is independent-minded, proud, and unwilling to bow 
to the whims and wishes of donors and the international community in 
general. The [ruling coalition] has learnt self-reliance during a long guerrilla 
struggle, has a strong commitment to its own development model with a 
basis in Marxism-Leninism, and a perhaps healthy distrust of the reliability 
of donors. (p. 216)
This, in combination with a lack of donor coordination or consistency 
and the lack of significant threat to change the regime, are used by 
Borchgrevink to explain that “donors have been relatively powerless to 
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influence Ethiopian policies (p. 215).” Indeed, one representative of a UN 
agency stated that it was still the Ethiopian government who decides how 
to use the results of research programmes, for instance, even if research 
was supported externally. This difficulty to influence the government was 
also reflected in several of our interviews, where the strength of the gov-
ernment was seen to limit the influence donors could have – both on pol-
icy agendas, but also on the roles that evidence plays in planning.
Ultimately, insights from multiple countries illustrate balances between 
donor influence and national country resistance or control over policymak-
ing. Agendas could be directly shaped by donor funds, or more indirectly 
influenced through creation of policy-relevant evidence. Yet the extent and 
impact of each of these was contextually determined, influenced by govern-
ment capacity, systems, and control over aspects of decision making in the 
health sector. Strategic forms of resistance to influence would also reflect 
the idea of aid as a ‘game’ situation, explored in earlier work on aid condi-
tionality by Mosely et al. (1995) in which donors and recipients are con-
ceptualised as pursuing different goals, basing behaviour on the expected 
response of the other party and potential trade-offs as a result.
conclusIons
While the use of evidence to inform health policy has often been discussed 
in technical terms, critical policy scholars have noted how such conceptu-
alisations may mask or ignore important aspects of policymaking – includ-
ing how evidence promotion or utilisation risks depoliticising the policy 
process  – both by obscuring the fundamental value-based choices that 
policy makers must consider and trade off, as well as obscuring the gover-
nance implications that may arise from the different ways evidence may be 
used to steer or shape ultimate policy decisions. Exploring these concerns 
through the specific context of aid-dependent settings, however, adds new 
insights into how power dynamics can play out in multiple ways affecting 
not only specific policy decision making, but also through the underlying 
governing institutional structures that shape how evidence is created, 
selected, or interpreted to inform policy decisions.
In our comparative reflection presented above, the political-economy 
of aid and development has been shown to manifest itself through a num-
ber of more or less visible processes of evidence utilisation. Donor agen-
cies not only use evidence to essentially promote desired policy choices 
and agenda topics, but they similarly have influence over which policy- 
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relevant evidence bases are created in the first place by funding research, 
strengthening select routine data sources, or undertaking programmatic 
evaluations of desired interventions. They further have been shown to 
have influence over the ways that pieces of evidence are interpreted in 
decision making fora at times, illustrating the power dynamics within deci-
sions around which evidence is relevant for what policy and planning con-
siderations. Finally, donors at times work to construct institutionalised 
systems and processes, the continuing performance of which may work to 
prioritise particular problems, solutions, or power relationships within the 
health sector. In all these ways we can see the importance of critically 
investigating the power and governance implications of evidence promo-
tion and use, particularly in low and middle income settings which have 
historically had less research in these areas, yet which clearly show impor-
tant dynamics as well due to the political dynamics of the aid donor- 
recipient relationship.
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RetuRning to the Question: What Does it Mean 
to use eviDence in PolicyMaking?
As Chap. 1 of this volume noted, the growth in interest in the use of evi-
dence in policymaking has been remarkable in recent years. Nowhere has 
this been truer than in the area of health policy, given the close affiliation 
and historical associations with the evidence based medicine movement. 
There has been a proliferation of formal structures, bodies, processes and 
mechanisms within government and policy making designed to facilitate 
the use of evidence in decision making. Examples include new govern-
ment agencies mandated with evidence synthesis, the establishment of 
health technology appraisal bodies, or the creation of standalone bodies at 
arm’s length or independent from government, providing syntheses for 
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public policy information (such as the UK’s ‘what works centres’). 
Reflecting these developments, there has been a commensurate expansion 
in focus on the idea and practice of evidence use in policymaking amongst 
both scholars and practitioners. This is evident in the emergence, and 
increasing profile, of journals focussed specifically on evidence utilisation, 
such as Evidence & Policy or Implementation Science, and international 
events such as the Global Evidence Summit or the What Works Global 
Summit which are now held on a regular basis. The desire to engage with 
questions surrounding evidence use appears greater than ever.
Despite these important developments, the field of work looking at 
evidence use in policymaking appears to still be in its infancy, with scholars 
struggling to make sense of evidence use in real world settings. Policy 
scholars studying efforts made to achieve ‘uptake’ of research findings are 
often struck by the use of the language of ‘evidence-based policy’ in both 
academic and professional circles with little, if any, explicit definition of 
what counts as ‘evidence’ and what it means to have that evidence ‘taken 
up’ in policy decisions. At times, it seems easier to identify a policy com-
munity advocating for ‘evidence-based policymaking’, than to find clarity 
on what the term actually means. As discussed elsewhere (Parkhurst 2017), 
many champions of ‘evidence based policy making’ express explicit con-
cern with problematic ways that evidence is used. This includes criticisms 
that policy makers ignore relevant evidence in decision making, or engage 
in ‘cherry-picking’ or manipulation of evidence for strategic ends. Yet the 
identification of unscientific practices and problems of bias in some politi-
cal processes does not produce conceptual clarity about what real world 
practices of evidence use in policy making look like and, from a normative 
perspective, what they should look like.
Improving conceptual clarity requires a more nuanced understanding 
of the process of evidence production, the epistemological status of 
research outputs (i.e. the types of knowledge claims which are substanti-
ated by a given study or piece of evidence) and the process of evidence use. 
Reflecting this, many policy scholars interested in questions of evidence 
use have shifted from a discourse of ‘evidence based’ to ‘evidence informed’ 
policymaking reflecting the realisation that evidence is one influence on 
policy amongst many (including ideological orientation of governments 
and societies and the political priorities and consent over the direction of 
policy by the populations affected by decisions). Moreover, the shift in 
language reflects the realisation that, while evidence can guide decisions, 
or inform us about the likely consequences of policy choices, it cannot 
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guide what policy objectives governments ought to choose. This is particu-
larly the case where governments face often mutually exclusive choices 
between competing policy agendas promoted by multiple policy advocates 
in the contexts of finite resources.
Chapter 1 also noted that there have been many attempts to identify the 
multiple ways research or evidence might influence policy, with works by 
those such as Carol Weiss (1979, 1982, 1991), or Sandra Nutley, Huw 
Davies and colleagues (see Davies et al. 2000; Nutley et al. 2007, 2013) 
mapping out many of the most common ways that pieces of research or 
evidence appear to influence decisions. There is also no shortage of system-
atic reviews that have been conducted attempting to draw together empiri-
cal work on the subject, identifying barriers and facilitators to evidence use 
of one kind or another (c.f. Oliver et  al. 2014; Mitton et  al. 2007; 
Contandriopoulos et al. 2010; McCormack et al. 2013). However, there is 
still a gap in the literature relating to understanding the politics of evidence 
use, which warrants specific attention to be given to policy processes, the 
actors involved, the forms of contestation associated with policymaking, and 
the institutions that shape these processes and, by extension, evidence use.
A public policy perspective can integrate and move beyond initial typol-
ogies to understand the ways in which contextual factors shape evidence 
use in different policy environments. In particular, forms of political con-
testation around policy problems and their putative solutions, and institu-
tional structures – including political systems in which policy responses are 
formulated and decisions are taken – shape the use of evidence in health 
policymaking. In the following sections, we reflect on how the case studies 
presented in the current volume provide insights into these three areas and 
into understanding the processes of evidence informed policy making 
more generally. We conclude with a broader discussion about the possible 
trajectories of future research agendas on evidence use in policymaking.
instRuMental uses of eviDence
As has been identified previously (Smith 2013a; Russell et  al. 2008; 
Cairney 2016), the public health community’s language and thinking 
about evidence use often reflects Weiss’ mostly instrumental meanings of 
research utilisation (i.e. her ‘knowledge-driven’ or ‘problem-solving’ 
models (Weiss 1979)). Yet politics and political systems tend to result in 
policy processes that rarely resemble this rational-linear, instrumental 
model (c.f. Weiss 1979, 1991; Russell et al. 2008; Hammersley 2013).
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Our case studies illustrate that there can be particular institutional 
arrangements in place which make instrumental uses of evidence more 
likely; arrangements that are typically created for exactly this purpose. The 
concept of evidence advisory systems, explored in Chap. 8 in particular, 
points to ways that formalised infrastructures might be deployed to ensure 
that both a supply of policy relevant evidence is available (e.g. research 
being undertaken, data collected, or bodies of evidence summarised), and 
that there are mechanisms through which decision makers can use policy- 
relevant evidence to inform decision making. We saw such systems have 
important effects in high income countries, with the Federal Joint 
Committee (GBA) in Germany and Public Health England being specifi-
cally mandated to review the evidence on policies within their remit.
Yet we also saw structural arrangements in lower and middle income 
settings playing important roles in driving instrumental uses of evidence. 
In Colombia (see Chap. 5), the implementation of organisations such as 
IETS (modelled on the example of the English National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE), and tasked with providing health 
technology assessments similar to NICE) demonstrates the wider applica-
bility of this model and the potential for trans-national knowledge transfer 
of evidence advisory systems, often via key individuals promoting a par-
ticular approach. In Ghana (Chap. 4), we further saw how the established 
national systems of data collection in healthcare fed into regular annual 
meetings that used such data to inform the evaluations of the health sector 
and plan for the future. Yet the Ghanaian case also illustrates that these 
systems do not remove political considerations or contestation from the 
processes of evidence use. Indeed, that chapter shows that they can rou-
tinise structures with decidedly political implications; with that chapter 
exploring how donor influence within this system could be seen to chal-
lenge local accountability processes. In a similar vein, contestation of evi-
dence in case studies from Germany and England demonstrate that 
structures built to improve or rationalise evidence use cannot entirely pre-
vent research evidence becoming embroiled in political debate and/or 
being used strategically to strengthen one side of a debate. Ultimately, we 
would argue that instrumental use relies on people actively prioritising this 
type of evidence use, sharing a belief that drawing on findings from 
research improves the quality of the outcome of decisions. In this sense, 
institutional structures to support the use of research in policy can work to 
embed this belief and reflect a willingness to enhance, and invest in, an 
instrumental role for research in supporting policy decisions.
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Political contestation anD stRategic 
uses of eviDence
The existence of political contestation around the identification of policy 
problems and decisions on their proposed solutions, even within for-
malised advisory systems, underlines the fundamentally political nature of 
the policy process and the impossibility of stepping outside of politics even 
in the context of highly technical forms of decision making. Decisions 
about issues such as the prioritisation of different policy problems in the 
context of limited resources, or the way to address complex, multi- 
dimensional health issues which derive from multiple causal factors includ-
ing those which are hard to define, isolate, and measure (e.g. the social 
determinants of health), will draw on multiple bodies of evidence – often 
in different forms and adhering to different epistemological norms. 
Unavoidably, the decision making process confronts different values, 
norms and political ideologies, in addition to whatever evidence has been 
chosen in support of the decision. An example of this is illustrated in the 
case study in Ethiopia (Chap. 3), whereby the multi-sectoral planning 
required to address nutrition in that country meant that multiple interests 
were relevant to a decision, and there were differing views on which evi-
dence was therefore relevant or how to use it to inform decisions.
Yet we have also examined cases illustrating active disagreement 
between policy stakeholders about policy goals. This contestation could 
appear visibly, or it could be less explicit. In our aid-recipient nations, for 
instance, often the conflicts between the aims of international funding 
bodies and the agendas of national governments were not necessarily pub-
licly debated. Interviews provided insights into how donor funding for 
particular research topics, or support for the construction of particular 
pieces of research (such as programmatic evaluations), could shape the 
evidence base to set policy priorities. Similarly, the political dynamics 
through which evidence of certain topics was brought to political decision 
processes was seen in some places as a mechanism for donor influence; as 
was the influence that could result when donors shaped the processes 
through which evidence and data are brought to bear on policy decisions 
(see discussion in Chap. 10; also Khan et al. 2017).
We found overt and explicit contestation more visible in our middle 
and higher income settings (although the extent to which conflict plays 
out ‘behind the scene’ was not investigated per se). In Colombia (Chap. 
5), for instance, debates around national health system reform  demonstrated 
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the importance of different ideas about the relationship between the indi-
vidual and the state and the role of the state and private enterprises in 
funding and providing healthcare in the incremental process of reforming 
the country’s health system. Whilst evidence was called upon by all sides 
to support their positions, and was cited in draft legislation in support of 
proposals, it was unable to resolve conflicts between policy actors with 
deeply entrenched ideological positions.
In England (Chap. 7), we also saw how tobacco control debates around 
new nicotine delivery systems (e-cigarettes) have polarised the public 
health community and the strategic use of evidence to support the promo-
tion of very different framing of the policy problem facing government 
and the regulatory approach it should take in addressing this. Evidence is 
cited by policy actors and researchers on both sides of the debate. For 
example, those who see the harm reduction potential of e-cigarettes point 
to studies showing reduced levels of toxicity in e-cigarette vapour versus 
tobacco smoke, whilst those taking a tobacco control perspective high-
light the lack of epidemiological studies on their long term health effects. 
At this stage of the debate, with the need for significant additional research 
needed to remove uncertainty about the long-term health effects of 
e- cigarettes, recourse to evidence is unable to resolve conflicts between 
actors who view the issue in fundamentally different terms and from dif-
ferent professional perspectives.
The competitive nature of many policy environments can be seen to 
drive Weiss’ (1979) idea of ‘strategic’ uses of evidence. In such cases, evi-
dence is seen to be used as ‘ammunition’ to achieve pre-defined positions 
or policy goals – fundamentally to ‘win’ in the competitive process. Using 
evidence strategically may risk violating established principles of good sci-
entific practice, however. It is also not compatible with notions of ‘instru-
mental’ use, although this distinction can be difficult to uphold and might 
well be part of the contestation. For example, in England, the public 
health community for many years collaborated effectively to influence 
government policy on tobacco control, strategically utilising scientific evi-
dence to support their position. This was widely seen to be a legitimate use 
of evidence. Yet the tobacco industry also routinely engaged in strategic 
uses of evidence to support arguments in opposition to tobacco control 
measures, typically in ways judged to be biased by researchers and tobacco 
control advocates (c.f. Bero 2005; Lee et al. 2004; Ulucanlar et al. 2014).
Even rules-based health governance systems such as Germany’s are 
open to strategic evidence use under conditions of contestation. The case 
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study on minimum volume regulation (Chap. 6) demonstrated that while 
the Federal Joint Committee, the body mandated with setting minimum 
volumes, is required by law to appreciate the evidence in support of mini-
mum volumes, its constituting member organisations were pitted against 
each other, with the German Hospital Association being strongly opposed 
to such regulation and marshalling its own evidence in support of its posi-
tion. Evidence in this example was therefore used both instrumentally and 
strategically.
In our case studies, we found no indication that parliaments (explored 
in Chap. 9) were particularly prone to use evidence to inform decision (i.e. 
law) making. While this subject requires substantial additional research, 
this observation seems to suggest that in settings in which contestation is 
acted out openly and purposefully, the case for using evidence in an ‘objec-
tive’ or systematic way is harder to make. While there are structures in 
place in some countries to provide scientific advice to parliamentarians and 
committees, the emphasis of parliamentary process is on creating majori-
ties and these majorities are typically formed within the context of party 
politics (although these can play out very differently in different parlia-
mentary cultures as we have seen cross our case studies). There is a debate 
to be had about the extent to which parliaments should be better informed 
by evidence. It is certainly desirable for politicians to be literate in research 
use and for political parties to have their proposals questioned by recourse 
to evidence. Yet expecting parliament to operate in an ‘evidence based’ 
fashion seems to suggest an expectation that it is possible to reduce con-
testation in (i.e. depoliticise) political debate which is a contradiction in 
terms. In fact, this is more likely to happen in political systems that inten-
tionally stifle or suppress contestation than in those with established dem-
ocratic traditions.
the constRuction of issues anD iMPact  
on eviDence use
While there may be both subtle and overt forms of contestation around 
evidence-informed policy debates, the case studies contained in this vol-
ume also point to a larger overarching theme important in shaping the use 
of evidence in health policy making. In particular, a number of cases 
explored the fundamental importance of issue construction and issue 
framing within local contexts in determining when and how evidence is 
used in the policy process.
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It might be expected that certain features of health problems make 
issues more or less conducive to particular types of evidence use. Such 
thinking is evident in the health policy literature, with the concept of ‘issue 
characteristics’ used by some to help explain global health policy agenda 
setting or the success of global health networks (Shiffman 2007; Shiffman 
et  al. 2015). The importance of issue characteristics has also been pro-
posed in other policy areas, for example, to understand what is considered 
rational policymaking in areas like global warming (Oshitani 2013), or to 
explain different bargaining strategies adopted within the EU by member 
states (McKibben 2010).
Within the health sector, scholars have argued that certain characteris-
tics of policy issues might influence the ways in which evidence is used in 
decision making. For example, there is general recognition of cases where 
issues directly impact on private sector financial interests, which has led to 
strategic uses of evidence by corporate actors. Examples of this have been 
widely documented for the tobacco and alcohol industry for instance 
(Marmot 2004; Smith 2013b; Tong and Glantz 2007; McCambridge 
et al. 2014). We also see cases where policies are contested in terms of 
moral arguments about the appropriateness of certain behaviours, includ-
ing sexual activity and drug use and the appropriate forms of treatment 
and the extent of resources which should be directed to tackling these 
conditions. A clear example of this surrounds arguments in favour of and 
against harm reduction approaches to injecting drug users (c.f Keane 
2003; Rhodes et al. 2010; Buchanan et al. 2003), or debates about sexual 
health (c.f. Epstein 2006; Lyons 1999; Wald et al. 2001).
However, the concept of ‘issue characteristics’ deployed in much of the 
health policy literature is problematic, as it can assume an overly materialist 
and objectivist conception of the nature of social problems and underplays 
the extent to which policy problems are a result of inter-discursive processes 
of problem construction by policy actors. Moreover, it is possible that there 
will be multiple (sometime starkly conflicting) accounts of the ‘same’ policy 
issue within the same policy space. Similarly, we can find examples where 
seemingly technical issues, for which one might not expect contestation to 
arise around evidence use, could become problematized in unique ways, 
resulting in debates over evidence that might not be expected based on the 
nature of the policy decision (c.f. D’Souza and Parkhurst 2018).
Rather than health issues having inherent characteristics, it is, therefore, 
more appropriate to explore how different health issues are framed or 
constructed in particular ways in different settings, and to seek to understand 
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the consequences of this for evidence use. In some of our lower- income 
fieldwork countries we asked interviewees about whether particular issues 
were highly contested, including asking about sexual health or HIV spe-
cifically. However, we did not find any respondents identifying any strong 
contestation over these in relation to their (current) work. In a similar 
vein, our interviews in Ghana identified little contestation or challenge 
around evidence use and policy formulation for tobacco control in that 
country – potentially explained by the fact that the country is not a tobacco 
producer and has relatively low smoking rates. This serves as a reminder 
that just because an issue may be deeply polarised and highly contested in 
one setting, it does not mean that the issue is inherently polarising. Nor 
does it meant that evidence around the issue will be necessarily used stra-
tegically, as has been seen with both HIV and tobacco control elsewhere 
(c.f. Parkhurst 2013; Parkhurst et al. 2015; Smith 2013b; and in Chap. 7 
in this volume).
In Cambodia (Chap. 2), policy debates around HIV/AIDS was not 
found to be characterised by strong contestation along moral lines (accord-
ing to our interviewees working primarily in national public health roles). 
Rather, it was presented as an example where evidence was used well in the 
country by respondents. In this case, ‘good evidence use’ was seen to be 
reflected in how international donor communities reviewed and relied on 
epidemiological studies to guide the choice of interventions for HIV/AIDS 
locally – a use of evidence that more reflects Weiss’ instrumental modes.
Chapter 2 also illustrates just how fluid or dynamic the understanding of 
the concept of a ‘good use’ of evidence can be, and how this itself might be 
a construct of the specific context and policy needs. A second example 
mentioned by interviewees as exemplifying a good use of evidence was 
around a national programme providing financial incentives for health 
workers to encourage pregnant women to deliver in health facilities. When 
pressed further to explain why this was an exemplar, interviewees explained 
that there was ‘evidence’ of a problem of high maternal mortality, and a 
need to achieve progress towards the millennium development goal of 
reducing maternal mortality, and this intervention was clearly well targeted 
to achieve those goals. This conceptualisation of good evidence use for 
policy, however, is quite different from most conceptualisations in the 
global public health community. Instead, this judgement appears to have 
arisen from a broader idea that evidence can identify problems, and a pro-
active policy response to those problems (regardless of the efficacy of the 
intervention) would thus provide a good example of evidence use.
 CONCLUSION: REFLECTING ON STUDYING EVIDENCE USE… 
230 
Ultimately, our cases, and the broader literature on which they build, 
point to the ways in which evidence use in policymaking reflect the inter-
action between processes of issue framing and contestation. Thus, ideas 
about the appropriate or ‘good’ use of evidence use are not fixed or uni-
versal but vary between policy contexts and even between issues within the 
same context depending on the way in which a policy problem and their 
solutions are constructed and the institutional context in which policy 
decisions are taken.
aDDing institutional analysis
From the policy perspective adopted in this volume, political institutions 
are of central importance to help understand the use of research evidence 
in health policymaking. Chapter 1 noted that there was a sizable gap in the 
literature of work exploring the institutional arrangements that work to 
shape which evidence is used, when, by whom, and to what ends. The 
chapters in this volume draw out a number of ways that institutions play 
key roles in shaping policy processes and by extension evidence use for 
health policymaking, providing a second key area of insight in addition to 
the nature of political contestation and issue construction.
One way institutions can influence evidence utilisation is by shaping 
which policy actors are involved in the policy process, or have access to 
those directly involved, and thus whose positions are considered. This was 
clearly illustrated in the analysis of Ghana (Chap. 4), where the formal 
processes of data analysis for policy review routinised the important roles 
that international donors had in the policy process. The comparative eval-
uation of evidence advisory systems in Chap. 8 similarly illustrated cases 
where some key stakeholders might be structured into policy-relevant 
positions due to institutional arrangements. In Germany’s corporatist 
health governance system, non-state actors such as hospital or sickness 
fund associations, influence policy directly as they are legally mandated to 
be part of the top decision-making committee, while other actors have a 
minor or no role in decision making (e.g. patient organisations are con-
sulted but do not have voting rights). Finally, the comparative analysis 
presented in Chap. 9 explored how formal authority over particular health 
decisions could lie with legislatures or judiciaries in countries, with impor-
tant implications for how evidence would be considered and used as a 
result. Questions arise as to how these bodies are equipped when dealing 
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with scientific evidence and whether there are limits to what can be 
achieved in terms of faithfulness to the scientific production of such evi-
dence (Jasanoff and Nelkin 1981).
However, there can be less formal norms and practices that are institu-
tionalised within key policymaking structures which could have implica-
tions for evidence use. March and Olsen’s (2006) concept of institutional 
‘logics of appropriateness’ can be seen to capture the ways that expectations 
about evidence, and understandings around how policy-relevant evidence 
can be embedded within different decision making bodies. Chapter 3 drew 
explicitly on this concept in Ethiopia to explore how the expectations and 
norms of evidence use could differ between government sectors, with 
potential implications for how evidence may or may not be used to inform 
multi-sectoral planning on nutrition. Similarly, the judicialisation of certain 
health policy decisions in Colombia (Chap. 5), particularly in relation to 
the provision of medicines and treatments led to different conceptualisa-
tions around what evidence is relevant to inform decisions than was the 
case in policy deliberations within the legislative-executive nexus (for a 
more detailed account, see Hawkins and Alvarez Rosete 2017). In Germany, 
courts grappled with the concept of ‘hierarchies of evidence’ demanding 
randomised controlled trials to provide the evidence in support of certain 
minimum volumes, irrespective of the fact that these studies do not exist 
and are not feasible to be conducted, especially not in the context of 
German hospital care. In addition, judicial decisions are typically based on 
the correct application of legally and constitutionally enshrined rights to 
specific individuals, but courts may be ill equipped to take account of the 
wider social and economic consequences of the decision, such as the 
implications of the ruling in question for resource allocation elsewhere in 
the system or the overall financial sustainability of the health system 
(although there are significant differences in legal practice in this respect 
between countries).
Institutions thus influence the use of evidence in policymaking for 
health in multiple ways. First, institutional arrangements can provide 
direction to both thinking and action involving evidence use. For exam-
ple, the logics of appropriateness embedded within government institu-
tions around evidence may make it more likely for civil servants to engage 
with research and evidence in some policy fields (health) than in others 
(justice) and in some countries (UK) than in others. Yet as discussed 
above, power and contestation remain highly relevant in the framing and 
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problematisation of health issues, with important implications for evidence 
use. Second, institutions play a role in providing the venues in which such 
contestation and debate can take place. Institutional arrangements thus 
provide opportunities in terms of policy spaces where actors with access to 
these spaces can engage in issue construction and contestation processes. 
These processes may see stakeholders actively utilising pieces of evidence 
to problematize issues, but the resultant constructions will also establish 
frames of understanding that will have further implications for how differ-
ent pieces of evidence are judged relevant to policy debates. For example, 
contestation of e-cigarette policy that in England largely played out within 
the scientific community and  government public health bodies, in 
Germany led to legal challenge, so that the court system became the prin-
cipal arena for contestation. This consequently limited the policy options 
for e-cigarette regulation in Germany, with little acknowledgement of the 
limited knowledge and research available at the time on the effects of 
e-cigarettes.
Third, while providing arenas for contestation and issue construction, 
institutional arrangements also serve to establish limits, with only certain 
actors having access to these spaces, or with the strength of norms and 
rules providing boundaries on how policy actors might shape and frame 
evidence to inform policy decisions. For example, Chap. 9 explored the 
roles of the judiciary and legislature and how these can play important 
roles in health policymaking and thus evidence use. As would be expected, 
those institutional arrangements regularly see contestation and debate, 
but they also shape and limit which types of actors and which types of 
arguments are made in relation to evidence use.
RefRaMing eviDence BaseD Policy Making 
foR the PuBlic health sectoR
Health sector actors regularly speak of the need to use evidence to achieve 
their goal of improving individual and population health. However, as has 
been discussed, what evidence use actually means can take a variety of 
forms and means different things in different contexts. Thus there is a 
need for more explicit reflection on what sorts of evidence use might best 
serve health sector goals, as well as recognition of the ways that public 
health actors’ conceptualisations of evidence use may be insufficient given 
the realities of the policy process.
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The health sciences are in many ways deterministic, in as much as clinical 
medicine and epidemiology build on investigations of the natural world and 
physical bodies, and often seek to identify direct cause-effect relationships 
affecting human morbidity and mortality. Many key actors in the health 
sector have thus been trained in disciplines that look to control for context 
when considering interventions in order to be able to say ‘what works’ to 
reduce illness and improve health. From this perspective, it may seem logi-
cal or self-evident that strategies to increase evidence use will translate into 
more effective policies and interventions. Yet this fails to appreciate the 
existence of multiple relevant bodies of evidence and multiple ways in which 
that evidence may feed into complex policy decisions, in which health policy 
debates cannot be separated from the wider political context.
The fact that evidence use has many meanings is not a new insight, of 
course. However, this volume moves beyond a mapping of possible uses, 
to explore how different forms of evidence and evidence use arise and play 
out in relation to different issues and in different policy contexts. The case 
studies presented here illustrate how evidence use is shaped by various 
aspects of the policy, the institutional context in which policy decision are 
taken and the active agency of policy actors which will seek to frame per-
ceptions of policy problems and their solutions in different ways, which 
impact in turn on the ways in which different bodies of evidence feed into 
the policy decisions.
A key message for health policy actors is to take on board the insights 
from policy analysis presented in this volume and appreciate the contex-
tual nature of evidence informed policy making and the dependence of 
policy debates on issue and policy framing. This would move debates in 
this area beyond the identification of politics as a barrier to evidence use, 
to identify political contestation as a necessary and unavoidable character-
istic of the policy process, which provides the context in which evidence 
use occurs. As we cannot move beyond, or step outside of politics, as some 
would hope, we must develop a more nuanced understanding of how evi-
dence use occurs in the context of political contestation.
For those concerned with the use of evidence to achieve health improve-
ments, this perspective can help to develop strategies which facilitate forms 
of evidence use that serve to identify the most efficient and effective  solutions 
to accepted policy problems. It can also, however, serve as a means of facili-
tating the resolution of protracted policy conflicts. Indeed, a more wide-
spread appreciation of the contested and political nature of policy making, 
and the existence of multiple framings of policy debates, amongst policy 
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actors could potentially lead to more constructive forms of engagement in 
areas of vehement political contestation (such as the current debates about 
e-cigarettes in the UK); rather than seeing opposing sides of debates both 
selecting pieces of evidence on which to claim an ‘evidence based’ position 
(while simultaneously ignoring or dismissing their opponents claims over 
evidence). Understanding that different accounts of policy evidence result 
from different assessments of policy concerns and policy framings, may be 
one way to address the political polarisation over issues and increase the 
chances that competing actors seek effective policy solutions in good faith.
futuRe ReseaRch agenDas
The current volume identifies a number of potential directions for future 
research which build on the insights presented here. While the GRIP- 
health programme, from which this volume emerged, attempted to sam-
ple a range of countries with differing levels of economic development and 
with differing forms of constitutional and institutional arrangements, the 
scope of analysis and comparison between cases was limited by the time 
and data available within an ambitious multi-country study. More focussed 
work should thus be undertaken to explore the different elements of evi-
dence informed policy making that our chapters identify in greater depth, 
with significant scope for further comparative, politically informed studies 
of evidence use in low, middle, and high income settings.
For example, while Chap. 10 draws out lessons from aid-recipient set-
tings, there are many further investigations that could be explored along 
these lines, including to investigate the governance implications of many 
new donor supported efforts to build systems of evidence use in low- 
income settings. Even when not reliant on donor support, we are also 
seeing the development of new domestic administrative arrangements in 
relation to evidence use occurring in many low and middle income set-
tings. These developments could provide a number of cases to explore 
how new arrangements governing evidence use are established and embed-
ded and can provide a number of insights around institutionalisation of 
evidence advisory systems in these settings.
In higher income settings, there is also scope for further comparative 
work to gain insights into how different national political institutions (e.g. 
unitary vs federal systems) may interact with the establishment of evidence 
advisory systems at both national and sub-national levels. Indeed, even 
though two of our country case studies were federal systems (Germany 
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and Ethiopia) the scope of work covered in this volume was unable to 
explore systems of evidence use below national levels to any significant 
degree. There will also be scope to reflect on different types of political 
systems and the degree to which they allow open contestation surround-
ing policy issues and whether or how this affects uses of evidence. Indeed, 
there is a need to go beyond the usual comparisons of countries that are 
seemingly similar in socio-economic terms and to think across low, middle 
and high income settings in a globalised world.
Approaches such as these could add much needed insights into how 
political and institutional factors work to shape the meaning of evidence 
utilisation in different settings, potentially offering lessons for those actors 
interested in improving evidence use according to one or another set of 
normative goals. At present, much public health literature remains focussed 
on the quality of evidence as judged by technical merits of research design, 
with broad calls for uptake of high quality evidence often made without 
consideration of the policy realities involved. As policy actors in the health 
field increasingly recognise that evidence utilisation is governed by systems 
working within political environments, they will need insights from work 
such as this to inform their efforts to improve the governance of evidence 
systems.
RefeRences
Bero, Lisa A. 2005. Tobacco industry manipulation of research. Public Health 
Reports 120 (2): 200–208.
Buchanan, David, Susan Shaw, Amy Ford, and Merrill Singer. 2003. Empirical 
science meets moral panic: An analysis of the politics of needle exchange. 
Journal of Public Health Policy 24 (3/4): 427–444.
Cairney, Paul. 2016. The politics of evidence-based policymaking. London: Palgrave 
Pivot.
Contandriopoulos, Damien, Marc Lemire, Jean-Louis Denis, and ÉMile Tremblay. 
2010. Knowledge exchange processes in organizations and policy arenas: A 
narrative systematic review of the literature. Milbank Quarterly 88 (4): 
444–483. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0009.2010.00608.x.
D’Souza, Bianca, and Justin Parkhurst. 2018. When ‘good evidence’ is not 
enough: A case of global malaria policy development. Global Challenges. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/gch2.201700077
Davies, Huw T.O., Sandra M. Nutley, and Peter C. Smith. 2000. What works? 
Evidence based policy and practice in public service. Bristol: Polity Press.
 CONCLUSION: REFLECTING ON STUDYING EVIDENCE USE… 
236 
Epstein, Steven. 2006. The new attack on sexuality research: Morality and the 
politics of knowledge production. Sexuality Research and Social Policy 3 (1): 
1–12. https://doi.org/10.1525/srsp.2006.3.1.01.
Hammersley, Martyn. 2013. The myth of research-based policy and practice. London: 
Sage.
Hawkins, Benjamin, and Arturo Alvarez Rosete. 2017. Judicialization and health 
policy in Colombia: The implications for evidence-informed policymaking. 
Policy Studies Journal. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.12230
Jasanoff, Sheila, and Dorothy Nelkin. 1981. Science, technology, and the limits of 
judicial competence. Jurimetrics Journal 22: 266.
Keane, Helen. 2003. Critiques of harm reduction, morality and the promise of 
human rights. International Journal of Drug Policy 14 (3): 227–232. https://
doi.org/10.1016/s0955-3959(02)00151-2.
Khan, Mishal S., Ankita Meghani, Marco Liverani, Imara Roychowdhury, and 
Justin Parkhurst. 2017. Influences of external donors on national health policy 
processes: Experiences of local policy actors in Cambodia and Pakistan. Health 
Policy and Planning 33 (2): 215–233.
Lee, Kelley, Anna B. Gilmore, and Jeff Collin. 2004. Looking inside the tobacco 
industry: Revealing insights from the Guildford Depository. Addiction 99 (4): 
394–397. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1360-0443.2004.00718.x.
Lyons, Maryinez. 1999. Medicine and morality: A review of responses to sexually 
transmitted diseases in Uganda in the twentieth century. In Histories of sexually 
transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa, ed. Philip W. Setel, 
Milton Lewis, and Maryinez Lyons. Westport: Greenwood Press.
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 2006. The logic of appropriateness. In The 
Oxford handbook of public policy, ed. Michael Moran, Martin Rein, and Robert 
E. Goodin, 689–708. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marmot, Michael G. 2004. Evidence based policy or policy based evidence? 
Willingness to take action influences the view of the evidence – Look at alcohol. 
British Medical Journal 328 (17 April): 906–907.
McCambridge, Jim, Benjamin Hawkins, and Chris Holden. 2014. The challenge 
corporate lobbying poses to reducing society’s alcohol problems: Insights from 
UK evidence on minimum unit pricing. Addiction (Abingdon, England) 109 
(2): 199–205.
McCormack, Brendan, Joanne Rycroft-Malone, Kara DeCorby, Alison 
Hutchinson, Tracey Bucknall, Bridie Kent, Alyce Schultz, Erna Snelgrove- 
Clarke, Cheyl Stetler, Marita Titler, Lars Wallin, and Valerie Wilson. 2013. A 
realist review of interventions and strategies to promote evidence-informed 
healthcare: A focus on change agency. Implementation Science 8 (1): 107.
McKibben, Heather Elko. 2010. Issue characteristics, issue linkage, and states’ 
choice of bargaining strategies in the European Union. Journal of European 
Public Policy 17 (5): 694–707.
J. PARKHURST ET AL.
 237
Mitton, Craig, Carol E.  Adair, Emily McKenzie, Scott B.  Patten, and Brenda 
W.  Perry. 2007. Knowledge transfer and exchange: Review and synthe-
sis of the literature. The Milbank Quarterly 85. https://doi.org/10.1111/ 
j.1468-0009.2007.00506.x.
Nutley, Sandra M., Isabel Walter, and Huw T.O. Davies. 2007. Using evidence: 
How research can inform public services. Bristol: The Policy Press.
Nutley, Sandra, Alison Powell, and Huw Davies. 2013. What counts as good evi-
dence? London: Alliance for Useful Evidence.
Oliver, Kathryn, Simon Innvaer, Theo Lorenc, Jenny Woodman, and James 
Thomas. 2014. A systematic review of barriers to and facilitators of the use of 
evidence by policymakers. BMC Health Services Research 14 (1): 2.
Oshitani, Shizuka. 2013. Global warming policy in Japan and Britain: Interactions 
between institutions and issue characteristics. Manchester: Manchester University 
Press.
Parkhurst, Justin. 2013. The subtle politics of AIDS: Values, bias, and persistent 
errors in HIV prevention. In Global HIV/AIDS politics, policy, and activism, 
ed. Raymond A. Smith, 113–139. Santa Barbara: Praeger.
Parkhurst, Justin. 2017. The politics of evidence: From evidence based policy to the 
good governance of evidence. Abingdon: Routledge.
Parkhurst, Justin, David Chilongozi, and Eleanor Hutchinson. 2015. Doubt, defi-
ance, and identity: Understanding resistance to male circumcision for HIV pre-
vention in Malawi. Social Science & Medicine 135: 15–22.
Rhodes, Tim, Anya Sarang, Peter Vickerman, and Matthew Hickman. 2010. 
Policy resistance to harm reduction for drug users and potential effect of 
change. BMJ 341. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.c3439.
Russell, Jill, Trisha Greenhalgh, Emma Byrne, and Janet McDonnell. 2008. 
Recognizing rhetoric in health care policy analysis. Journal of Health 
Services Research & Policy 13 (1): 40–46. https://doi.org/10.1258/
jhsrp.2007.006029.
Shiffman, Jeremy. 2007. Generating political priority for maternal mortality reduc-
tion in 5 developing countries. American Journal of Public Health 97 (5): 
796–803.
Shiffman, Jeremy, Kathryn Quissell, Hans Peter Schmitz, David L.  Pelletier, 
Stephanie L.  Smith, David Berlan, Uwe Gneiting, David Van Slyke, Ines 
Mergel, and Mariela Rodriguez. 2015. A framework on the emergence and 
effectiveness of global health networks. Health Policy and Planning 31 
(suppl_1): i3–i16.
Smith, Katherine. 2013a. Beyond evidence based policy in public health: The inter-
play of ideas. Basingstoks: Palgrave Macmillan.
Smith, Katherine. 2013b. Understanding the influence of evidence in public health 
policy: What can we learn from the ‘tobacco wars’? Social Policy & 
Administration 47 (4): 382–398.
 CONCLUSION: REFLECTING ON STUDYING EVIDENCE USE… 
238 
Tong, Elisa K., and Stanton A. Glantz. 2007. Tobacco industry efforts undermin-
ing evidence linking secondhand smoke with cardiovascular disease. Circulation 
116 (16): 1845–1854. https://doi.org/10.1161/circulationaha.107.715888.
Ulucanlar, Selda, Gary J. Fooks, Jenny L. Hatchard, and Anna B. Gilmore. 2014. 
Representation and misrepresentation of scientific evidence in contemporary 
tobacco regulation: A review of tobacco industry submissions to the UK gov-
ernment consultation on standardised packaging. PLoS Medicine 11 (3): 
e1001629. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1001629.
Wald, Kenneth D., James W. Button, and Barbara A. Rienzo. 2001. Morality poli-
tics vs. political economy: The case of school-based health centers. Social Science 
Quarterly 82 (2): 221–234.
Weiss, Carol H. 1979. The many meanings of research utilization. Public 
Administration Review 39 (5): 426–431.
———. 1982. Policy research in the context of diffuse decision making. The 
Journal of Higher Education 53: 619–639.
———. 1991. Policy research: Data, ideas, or arguments. In Social sciences and 
modern states: National experiences and theoretical crossroads, ed. Peter Wagner, 
Carol Hirschon Weiss, Björn Wittrock, and Hellmut Wollmann, 307–332. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the per-
mitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
J. PARKHURST ET AL.
239© The Author(s) 2018
J. Parkhurst et al. (eds.), Evidence Use in Health Policy Making, 
International Series on Public Policy, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93467-9
Index
A
Accountability, 14, 28, 75–88, 92, 
116, 172, 186, 188, 189, 192, 
196, 203, 204, 224
Adjudication, 113, 114, 121, 
125–127, 129, 130
Agenda setting, 129, 140, 210, 228
Agriculture, 13, 41, 52, 55, 59, 61, 
62, 66, 210
Aid agencies, vi, 15, 23, 33, 34, 37, 
39, 41, 42, 52, 57, 81–83, 87, 
88, 163, 166–168, 174, 175, 
177–179, 201–216, 224, 225, 
229, 230, 234
Aid-dependent, 15, 177, 178, 201–216
Alcohol industries, 8, 228
Arm’s length public health bodies, 177
B
Basic Law (Grundgesetz), 171
Bounded rationality, 7
Britain, v
Bundesrat, 114, 115, 121, 190
Bundestag, 114, 115, 120, 121, 190
Bureaucracy, 84, 117, 163, 173
C
Cambodia, viii, 13, 15, 21–44, 
165–167, 174, 175, 177, 179, 
188, 189, 191, 196, 202, 
206–210, 212, 213, 229
Cochrane collaboration, 2, 28
Colombia, viii, 13, 14, 91–106, 
164–165, 169, 174, 175, 178, 
188–191, 193–195, 197, 224, 
225, 231
Commissioning research, 170, 176
Committees, 25, 55, 86, 95, 98, 112, 
113, 115, 117, 120–125, 163, 
170–173, 191–193, 197, 224, 
227, 230
Complaint of unconstitutionality, 194
240 INDEX
Comprehensive rationality, 7
Conditionality, 202–204, 211, 215
Conflict, v, 4, 8, 54, 61, 66, 67, 
91–93, 116, 119, 124, 140, 141, 
146, 163, 186, 194, 204, 225, 
226, 228, 233
Congress, 36, 93, 95–104, 190,  
191, 193
Constitution, 93–97, 99, 167, 193
Constitutional Court, 96, 97, 178, 
193–195
Constitutional law, 186, 188
Contestation, vii, 5, 8–11, 13–15, 23, 
25, 38, 40, 42, 44, 78, 87, 98, 
105, 130, 146, 223–235
Corporatist system, 112, 116, 130, 178
Corruption, 92
Cost-effectiveness studies, 33
Courts, 92, 96, 97, 103, 114, 117, 
121, 123, 125–127, 129, 130, 
175, 178, 180, 187, 190, 
193–197, 231, 232
D
Department of Health, 170, 192
Development partners, 34, 77, 82, 
162, 163, 166–168, 176, 208
Donor, see Aid agencies; Development 
partners
Dual use, 143
E
Electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes), 14, 
137–147, 226, 232, 234
policy, 14
Embeddedness, viii, 10, 15, 53, 92, 
103, 106, 112, 117, 139, 159, 
166, 172, 231, 234
England, viii, 10, 13, 117, 138, 140, 
169–170, 172, 174–177, 179, 
187, 189, 190, 194–196, 224, 
226, 232
Enlightenment, 5, 212, 213
model, 5
Epidemiological modelling,  
33, 40, 209
Epistemic power, 204, 213
Ethiopia, viii, 13, 15, 52–68, 
167–169, 174, 175, 177, 188, 
196, 202, 206, 208, 210, 
212–214, 225, 231, 235
Ethiopian Public Health Institute 
(EPHI), 54, 57, 168
European Union (EU), 57, 59, 66, 
138, 139, 161, 228
Evaluation process, 76, 78
Evidence, vi, 6, 14, 22, 25, 31, 38, 43, 
58, 67, 76, 85, 91, 114, 124, 
141, 160, 165
advisory systems, 13, 15, 156, 159, 
160, 163, 167, 170, 173, 174, 
178–180, 224, 230, 234
synthesis, 87, 221
use of, v, 139
use within the policy process, 
209–211
Evidence-based advocacy, 204
Evidence-based medicine (EBM), 1–4, 
10, 124, 126, 206, 221
Evidence-based policy (EBP), vi, 1–4, 
7–9, 12, 13, 38, 39, 42, 43, 52, 
76, 88, 111, 112, 115, 130, 139, 
142, 146, 187, 204, 222, 
232–234
Evidence-based policymaking, vi, 7, 
12, 76, 222
Evidence-informed policy, v, vi, 43, 
52, 137–147, 169, 176, 222, 
223, 227, 233, 234
Evidence-informed policymaking, v, 
43, 176, 222
Executive, vi, 78, 92, 95–97, 99–101, 
162, 169, 185, 186, 188, 
190–196
Exercise of power, 206, 213
Experimental studies, 124, 127
  241 INDEX
F
Federalist, 187
Federal Joint Committee (GBA), 
113–117, 119–130, 171–173, 
224, 227
Federation, 167, 187
Frame reflection, 141, 147
Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC), 24, 30, 32,  
38, 39
Framing, 8, 9, 13–15, 22, 26, 30, 39, 
42, 43, 51–68, 140–142, 144, 
147, 207, 209, 210, 214, 226, 
227, 230, 231, 233, 234
G
Gaviria, César, 99, 100, 104, 105
Germany, v, viii, 13, 14, 111–130, 
170–174, 176, 178, 179, 
188–190, 194, 195, 197, 224, 
226, 230–234
Ghana, viii, viii, 13, 15, 75–88, 
162–164, 174, 175, 178, 179, 
188–190, 192, 196, 202, 206, 
207, 211, 213, 214, 224, 229, 230
Ghana Health Services (GHS), 77–82, 
84, 85, 162, 163, 213, 214
Governance, 14, 56, 75–88, 92, 130, 
156, 157, 160, 164, 165, 
170–172, 175, 178, 186–189, 
196, 197, 202, 203, 206, 215, 
216, 226, 230, 234, 235
of use of evidence, 11
Governing institutions, 203, 215
Government Midwifery Incentive 
Scheme (GMIS), 23, 35–37, 206
H
Harm reduction, 141–144, 146,  
226, 228
Health Evidence, 34, 155–180
Health policy subsystem,  
93, 98–99, 106
Health sector planning, 14, 156, 161, 
175, 179, 207
Health Summit, 82–85, 87–88, 211
Health system, 4, 10, 14, 23, 28, 40, 
61, 78, 79, 82, 83, 91–107, 
156–158, 161, 162,  
164–166, 168, 170–173,  
176, 185–190, 196–197,  
225, 226, 231
governance, 83, 156, 170–172, 
185–190, 196, 197
Health technology appraisal (HTA), 
117, 128, 161, 163, 169, 174, 
175, 221
Hierarchies of evidence, 2, 22, 38, 231
HIV/AIDS, 2, 13, 23, 24, 27, 32–37, 
39, 41–43, 161, 165, 206, 
208–210, 229
Holistic assessment tool, 81–85, 87
I
Ideas, vii, viii, 3, 7, 11, 12, 15, 22, 23, 
25, 26, 36, 52, 53, 57, 66, 87, 
100, 115, 158, 204, 205, 211, 
213, 230, 2226
Indicators, 58, 62, 66, 81, 82, 84–86, 
88, 92, 119, 124, 168, 204, 207, 
210, 211
Influence, vii, 3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 
17–179, 186, 189, 191, 
201–203, 205–216223
of donors, 202, 208, 209, 212,  
214, 215
Institute for Health Technology 
Assessment (IETS), 103, 165, 
175, 194, 224
Institute for Quality and Efficiency  
in Health Care (IQWiG),  
112, 118, 119, 124, 127,  
128, 172
242 INDEX
Institute for Quality Assurance and 
Transparency in Health Care 
(IQTIG), 172, 176
Institutional analysis, 10, 230–232
Institutional arrangements, 10–13, 15, 
23, 53, 130, 158, 174, 177, 178, 
224, 230–232, 234
Institutionalist, 42, 91
Institutional logics, 26, 38, 40, 42,  
63, 68
Institutional settings, vii, viii, 23
Institutional structures, viii, 11, 12, 24, 
52–68, 176, 179, 215, 223, 224
Institutional systems of evidence 
advise, 158–160
Institutions, 7, 10, 11, 66, 139, 230, 
187207
of the state, 185–199
Instituto de Evaluación de Tecnologíca 
en Salud (IETS, Institute of 
Health Technology Assessment), 
164–165
Instrumental approaches, 6, 11
Instrumental model, 223
Instrumental use, 6, 12, 115, 189, 
224, 226
Instrumental uses of evidence, 223–224
International aid donors, 15
International Development Partners 
(DP), 77, 166, 176
International donor agencies, vi, 57, 81
International donors, vi, 41, 51, 57, 
81–83, 88, 163, 201, 202, 206, 
229, 230
Issue construction, 15, 227, 230, 232
Issue framing, 8, 30, 52–68, 140–142, 
227, 230
J
Judicialisation/judicializiation, 103, 
178, 231
Judiciary, vi, 14, 15, 92, 129, 130, 
156, 164, 185–197, 232
K
Knowledge construction, 212
Knowledge-driven model,  
5, 212, 223
L
Lancet nutrition series, 59
Law, 31, 32, 35, 92–99, 101–106, 
112, 114, 121–127, 130, 171, 
172, 186–188, 191,  
193–195, 227
Law 100, 98–101, 105, 191
Legislative branch, 96, 97, 178
Legislative framework, 114, 119,  
169, 189
Legislature, 12, 14, 15, 86, 91–107, 
156, 160, 186, 189, 191, 193, 
196, 197, 230, 232
Legitimacy, 76, 77, 87, 88, 93,  
96, 111, 114, 117, 129, 130, 
142, 204
Litigation, 194
Local Nongovernment Organizations 
(LNGOs), 77, 86
Logics of appropriateness, 12, 13, 53, 
66, 210, 231
Logics of evidence use, 38–41, 53
Londoño, Juan Luis, 100, 101
M
Malnutrition, 52, 55, 58, 59, 62–65, 
210, 211
Medical devices, 138–140, 144,  
145, 169
Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA), 
139, 169
Minimum service volumes  
in hospitals, 14
Minimum volumes, 111–130, 190, 
194, 227, 231
Ministerial authority, 156, 178
  243 INDEX
Ministries of Health, viii, 14, 15, 83, 
155–180, 185, 187, 196, 204
Multi-sectoral approach, 55, 210
Multi-sectoral planning, 13, 56,  
225, 231
N
Narratives, 7, 11, 12, 40, 41, 67,  
147, 235
National Health Service (NHS), 169, 
170, 175, 176, 187, 192, 193, 
195, 196
National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE), 117, 139, 169, 
170, 172, 174, 179, 194, 195, 224
National Institute of Public Health 
(NIPH), 165–167, 177
National Nutrition Programme 
(NNP), 53–55, 58–60, 62–64, 
66, 67
New institutionalism, 11, 26
NGO, 33–35, 39, 41, 86, 139
Non-communicable diseases (NCDs), 
54, 58, 64, 65, 208
Normative power, 210
Norms, vii, 5, 11, 22, 26, 40, 66, 139, 
186, 204, 205, 207, 211, 213, 
225, 231, 232
Nutrition, 13, 52–68, 168, 207, 208, 
210, 211, 225, 231
Nutrition policy, 13, 52–56, 59, 
63–68, 207
O
Obesity, 54, 58, 59, 63–65, 210
Overweight, 54, 58, 59, 63–65
P
Parliament, 62, 77, 86, 93, 104, 105, 
114, 115, 119, 120, 126, 129, 
163, 169, 170, 173, 185–197, 227
Parliamentary Office of Science and 
Technology, 190
Parliamentary scrutiny, 192
Performance-based financing (PBF), 
13, 24, 28–30, 35–37, 206
Performance monitoring, 76
Policy
communities, 57
evaluation, 76–78, 83, 85–88
problem, 7–9, 25, 53, 62, 68, 105, 
111, 139, 141, 223, 225, 226, 
228, 230, 233
relevant evidence, generation or 
creation of, 207–209
response, 8, 25, 39, 42, 55,  
59, 63, 68, 141, 204, 207, 
223, 229
Policy-based evidence, 6, 115
Policy-based evidence-making, 6
Policy-relevant research, v
Political contestation, vii, 15, 98, 223, 
225–227, 230, 233, 234
Political ideologies, 225
Political institutions, vii, 7, 10, 12, 22, 
96, 186, 203, 230, 234
Political model, 5
Political system, vii, 11, 22, 93, 96, 
106, 130, 185, 186, 188, 223, 
227, 235
Political use, 115
Post-conditionality, 203, 211
Power, vi, vii, 7–10, 25, 26, 31, 40, 
42, 61, 77–79, 81–88, 92, 95, 
96, 99, 112, 157, 171, 187, 188, 
191, 193, 194, 203–206, 210, 
212–216, 231
and influence, 8, 25, 40, 87,  
212, 213
power/knowledge nexus, 205–206
Practices, v–vii, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9–13, 24, 
33, 52, 53, 76, 79, 83, 88, 114, 
117, 118, 124, 125, 127, 172, 
177, 188, 189, 197, 204, 206, 
211, 222, 226, 231, 235
244 INDEX
Priority setting, 33, 161, 168, 174, 
202, 214
Problem solving, 15, 205, 212,  
213, 216
Problem-solving model, 5, 223
of research utilisation, 5
Procedural rules, 120, 124, 125
Public health, 1, 23, 28, 29, 33, 
37–39, 42, 54, 57, 60, 66, 78, 
80, 100, 101, 138–140, 
142–147, 157, 160, 161, 
165–169, 177, 178, 189, 192, 
193, 205, 210, 223–226, 229, 
232, 235
Public Health England, 138, 140, 
169, 177, 224
Q
Quality of care, 113, 114, 176
R
Rational-linear, 223
Resistance to influence, 214, 215
Resource allocation, vii, 104, 113, 
117, 196, 231
Rights, 11, 12, 37, 92, 98, 99, 104, 
140, 157, 164, 171, 188, 189, 
193–195, 197, 230, 231
Routine data, 123, 161, 168,  
169, 175–176, 179, 207,  
208, 211, 216
Routinisation, 211
Rule of Law, 92
S
Santos, Juan Manuel, 99, 103–105
Sector-wide planning, 176
Select Committee on Health,  
86, 163, 192
Self-administration, 114, 115, 120, 
121, 171–173, 178, 188
Smoking, 27, 30, 32, 38, 39, 42, 138, 
142–145, 147, 229
Social courts, 114, 121, 125–128, 195
Sovereignty, 202, 203
State, viii, 1, 4, 26, 32, 36, 55, 64, 65, 
83, 88, 92–94, 99, 100, 103, 
112, 115, 116, 120–123, 125, 
126, 139, 156, 157, 160, 165, 
169, 171, 172, 174, 185–197, 
202, 203, 226
Stewardship of health systems, 83, 
155–180, 187
Stewards of health evidence, 158
Strategic use, 12, 14, 115–117, 128, 
130, 225–228
Systems and Routines of Evidence 
Utilisation, 211–212
T
Tobacco, 7, 8, 13, 22–24, 27, 30, 41, 
138, 142, 226
control, 7, 13, 22–24, 27, 30–32, 
35, 38, 39, 41, 138, 139, 
142–144, 206, 209, 226, 229
industry, 30–32, 38, 42, 43, 142, 
145, 226
products, 27, 31, 32, 43, 137,  
139, 144
Tobacco Products Directive (TPD), 
139, 140
Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs), 
29–30
Transnational tobacco corporations 
(TTCs), 27, 137
Transparency, 76, 116, 125, 172
Tutelas, 102, 103, 194
U
Undernutrition, 54, 56, 58, 59, 61, 
64, 65, 68, 210
United Kingdom (UK), 3, 13, 139, 
186, 187
  245 INDEX
United Nations AIDS  
programme (UNAIDS),  
28, 32, 39
Urgency message, 96, 97
US PEPFAR programme, 39
V
Vaping, 143–145
Volume–outcome relationship, 114, 
123–125
W
Weiss, Carol H., 5, 6, 9, 22, 27, 57, 
76, 115, 205, 212, 213, 223, 
226, 229
World Bank, viii, 59, 92, 165, 166, 
179, 202
World Health Organization (WHO), 
vi, 1, 24, 27, 52, 81, 83, 84, 138,  
156–158, 180, 185, 205
World Health Report  
(WHR), 104, 157, 158
